The impact of the increasing liberalisation of the energy sector in general and electricity supply in particular is hard to deny. Yet just a few short years ago, such developments were almost unthinkable. A complex combination of factors has led to an increasingly favourable political and economic climate for market opening and competition. However, the benefits of these developments remain distinctly unevenly spread throughout Europe, while the potential difficulties that an unchecked liberalisation process can cause are slowly coming to the fore. The challenge faced by the European Union in this sector is to promote these developments while remaining alive to their potential social and environmental consequences.

This paper offers up a map of self-authored post-legislative guidance practice among the EU’s decentralised agencies. It shows that the use of guidance by EU agencies is widespread and significant, but not pervasive in that 14 of the EU’s 33 agencies currently engage in guidance-making. Where guidance is produced, it varies significantly between and within agencies as regards volume and length. These documents are hard to find, they are called a miscellany of different things, and there seems to have sprung up, ad hoc, a hierarchy of guidance that is both interesting and lacking in clarity. The question as to whether such guidance binds those to whom it has been addressed has been fudged, with agencies and courts engaging in exercises of tautology and misdirection to avoid the appearance of anything that looks like binding norm-making by the EU’s agencies. Consultation and participation in the making of guidance seems lackadaisical. This map suggests a level of differentiation that is so ill-thought out, and so ad hoc, so lacking in foresight and oversight, as to be dysfunctional. At the same time, the lack of engagement by the EU courts with these norms suggests that the site of opportunity for a way forward in this area lies other than with the judiciary.

Security is the meta-constitutional rationale of the European liberal project and is expressed by two tendentially self-justificatory discourses of power, which are two sides of the same coin: security and rights. The political, inherently conflictual nature of EU constitutional claims has been variously disguised through such discourses. Yet, as the process of constitutionalisation reaches a more advanced stage, in which the probability of high-intensity legal-political conflict as regards key issues of EU integration is growing, the moment has come to address conflict directly, rather than conceal it behind a veil of neutrality. Being ready for actual confrontation means dismissing the straitjacket imposed by the European liberal project. A move from self-referential to heterarchical security is thus advocated. As a result, the constellation of nation states should not be sidelined too easily and the needs and claims of the local level should be considered more carefully. In other words, the principles of primacy, autonomy, uniformity, and effectiveness of EU law ought to be conceived in relative, rather than in absolute terms. One possible way of addressing conflict is to simultaneously permit the CJEU (as well as other EU institutions) to engage more proactively with national courts and identify a common epistemic core, which ought to be upheld whenever the liberal-democratic premises of the European project are threatened.

EU sports law has conventionally been understood to involve the assembly of the several decisions of the Court of Justice and the Commission that apply free movement and competition law to the practices of governing bodies. The influence of these decisions has generated change in some aspects of sporting governance, in the EU, and beyond. But the EU does not set the terms according to which sport shall be organised. This article makes the case for the EU moving beyond its orthodox approach to sports law, which is rooted in the accidents of litigation, and also choosing to embrace a role as a regulator. This will diminish the autonomy that governing bodies in sport have long prized, but the article asserts the need for this in order to address the conflict of interest to which governing bodies fall prey when they perform regulatory functions while also making commercially significant choices. It is, however, unclear whether the political will needed to propel EU sports law beyond the application of internal market law to embrace also the establishment of mandatory ex ante standards can be assembled.

Over the course of 2013–15, there have been significant developments in the reform of class actions in Europe. The European Commission published its Recommendation of common principles concerning collective redress in June 2013, whilst the Consumer Rights Act 2015 – which was introduced into the United Kingdom Parliament in January 2014 and obtained Royal Assent on 26 March 2015 – contains a class action for competition law infringements. Although there is some ‘common ground’ between these legislative instruments, their divergences are far more legally significant, and comprise the focus of analysis in this article. Regarding the two topics of standing to sue, and the opt-in versus opt-out approach to forming the class, the approaches of the European Commission and the UK Parliament differ markedly, reflecting the deep policy, political and judicial divisions which have manifested in this area of reform for over a decade. The legislators have also ultimately chosen different scopes of application, with the European Commission preferring a ‘horizontal’ approach to reform, whilst the UK Parliament has pursued a sector-specific reform agenda. In respect of standing to sue and the opt-in versus opt-out debate, there are numerous sound legal and political reasons that manifestly support the UK law-makers’ decision to depart from the 2013 Recommendation. However, in respect of the horizontal-versus-sectoral debate, the topsy-turvy history of reform at both European and domestic levels has resulted, ironically, in both the Commission and UK policy-makers reversing the views which each had initially adopted within the past decade. Undoubtedly, as these reform measures demonstrate, the collective redress landscape is both evolving and controversial.

This article explores the justifications for, and objections to, the proposed European Union ‘women on company boards’ Directive. It notes that Member State opposition to the measure had different emphases. The new, post-socialist Member States that intervened prominently questioned the Commission's understanding of the underlying social reality of gender inequality and the measure's focus on results, while the old Member States that intervened raised mainly the issue of subsidiarity and challenged the need for legislative action, and/or particularly the need for legislative action at EU level. The article further argues that the Commission weakened its case by emphasising economic rationales for the measure, and submits that a principled justification fits the proposal better. Finally, the article argues that subsidiarity-related arguments are available also to justify non-cross-border, non-economic projects, such as that of gender equality.

There is a generalised perception that the European Court of Justice has adopted different approaches to the different free movement rules included in the Treaties. In particular, the free movement of goods has ‘benefited’, until 1993, from a wider scope of application. Contrary to what has for long constituted the standard approach to the free movement of persons, the free movement of goods was constructed as requiring more than national treatment and non-discrimination in regard to goods from other Member States. Even non-discriminatory restrictions on trade in goods could constitute a violation of Community rules if not justified as necessary and proportional to the pursuit of a legitimate public interest. The freedom to provide services has somewhat occupied a middle ground between the interpretation given to the goods and persons provisions. Following the Court’s decision in Keck & Mithouard in 1993, a reversal of fortune appears to have taken place regarding the Court’s approach to the different free movement provisions, with the free movement of persons and the freedom to provide services now benefiting from a more ‘aggressive’ interpretation in comparison with the free movement of goods.

The above quotation from the Confederation of British Industry’s (CBI) response to the European Commission’s (hereinafter, ‘the Commission’) Green Paper on the reform of the EC Merger Regulation in 2002 still summarises quite aptly the criticism expressed in recent years by members of the business and legal community about what the critics perceive as a serious shortcoming in the current system of EC merger control: the lack of effective, meaningful in practical terms, judicial control over the administration’s decisions in this area.

The contribution explores the implications of disagreements about rights in the ‘multi-layered’ European polity for the autonomy of EU fundamental rights law. It argues that insomuch as the EU’s weak claim to supra-national political authority is corroborated by a strong case for economic integration, the internal market operates not simply as a constraining factor in the effective realisation of fundamental rights, but provides the very foundation of their autonomous interpretation in the EU legal order. Sections II and III elaborate upon the relationship between conflicts of authority in the European legal space and the autonomous interpretation of EU fundamental rights law under conditions of political disagreement. Section IV links the argument to the often-alleged instrumentalisation of EU fundamental rights in the service of the market. Sections V and VI substantiate the guiding contention of the contribution—that the autonomy of EU fundamental rights law is rooted in the unity of the market—with an analysis of pertinent case law. The concluding section suggests that the transformation of the EU into a ‘genuine’ human rights polity must proceed through a politicisation of the market by virtue of fundamental rights law.

The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Kadi is of defining constitutional importance. The Court understood the EU Treaties (at the time, the EC Treaty) as establishing their own constitutional space, asserted the autonomy of EU law vis-à-vis international law and held that responses to emergencies should be handled through, rather than outside, the bounds of the EU Treaties. The judgment is predicated on liberal democratic ideals and views respect for legality as a sine qua non in times of emergency. This chapter seeks to discuss selected case law developments after Kadi. It focuses on the effect of invalidity of sanctions on third parties, issues pertaining to the validity and interpretation of Council Regulation 881/2002/EC, economic sanctions against nuclear proliferation and corresponding developments in the case law of the UK Supreme Court. It does not deal exhaustively with post-Kadi case law. Section I provides a brief introduction to the judgment in Kadi. Section II explores the effect of the ruling on third parties. Section III discusses a selection of recent case law of the Court of Justice and the General Court, and section IV explores in some detail the judgment of the UK Supreme Court in Jabar Ahmed.

In recent years, the question of whether, and to what extent, measures implementing United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolutions can be subject to judicial review has stirred heated debates. This contribution takes a fresh look at the question in the context of the EU’s implementation of a series of Security Council Resolutions relating to the fight against terrorism using the well-established EU principle of loyal cooperation. It suggests that the principle could play a role in determining the appropriate standard and intensity of judicial review, and considers the value of approaching the question in that way.

“The European Union continues to be strongly committed to the stabilisation and development of South-Eastern Europe. The Union’s strategy is to draw the countries of the region closer to the prospect of European integration.” This confident statement opens the joint Report on EU action in support of the Stability Pact and South-Eastern Europe (SEE) presented by the Finnish Presidency and the European Commission to the European Council at Helsinki in December 1999. It contains three ideas which are key to the EU’s policy towards the region: stabilisation, development and integration. The Stability Pact seeks to provide a framework for the coordination of effort towards these objectives: greater political stability, security and democratisation; economic reconstruction and development; political, economic and legal integration both within the region and between the countries of SEE and the EU.

This chapter aims to explore some challenges that are likely to arise in the context of the UK’s present and future relationships with the EU. Three aspects come under scrutiny, namely the global opt-out available for the UK in the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (Protocol 36 to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)), the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence and the contemplated 2017 referendum on whether the UK should remain an EU Member State. The chapter stresses not only the importance of restoring objectivity in the debates surrounding these issues, but also the necessity of taking due account of the uncertainties that these processes unavoidably entail as to their end results for both the UK and Scotland.

This article examines counter-terrorism efforts in the EU as it matures as a field of law. It sets out three critiques of EU counter-terrorism law: that of ineffectiveness, of anti-constitutionalism, and of contrariness to human rights and the rule of law. It considers these critiques in light of the development of policies and legal initiatives—against foreign terrorist fighters and against radicalisation. It concludes that there are both persistent problems, and some improvements, in the law. The EU's capacity to meet the challenges posed by terrorism and the counter-terrorism imperative, and how it does so, has global impact. The article concludes with an argument for better law-making in the EU to ensure it serves as a better exemplar of transnational law.

Governments are increasingly turning to the market to provide public goods, works and (perhaps most controversially) services. Markets, and market values, have come to govern our lives as never before and the financial crisis appears to have done little to dampen governments’ faiths in markets. The public procurement rules define some of the parameters within which governments must engage with the market but the ideology of these rules, particularly how much ‘space’ they afford Member States to pursue non-commercial policies in their procurement decision-making, is deeply contested. This chapter argues that there is a missing empirical dimension to these ideological discussions. It seeks to partially redress this by presenting findings from an ethnographic study of a competitive tendering exercise at a British prison, from which it is argued that a more complex ideological picture emerges than appears from doctrinal analyses of the rules.

This contribution will tackle a central question for the architecture of fundamental rights protection in the EU: can we envision a Charter that fully applies to the Member States, even beyond the limits of its scope of application? To improve our understanding of the boundaries of the Charter and the potential for further expansion, I will examine the legal avenues through which the CJEU has extended the scope of application of EU fundamental rights in fields of state powers. While the latent pull of citizenship towards a more expansive application of the Charter has not been fully realized, the principle of effective judicial protection (Article 19(1) TEU) has recently shown potential for protection under EU law beyond the boundaries of the Charter. As will be argued, effective judicial protection may well become a doorway for full application of the Charter to the Member States. While such an outcome might currently seem politically unsound, I contend that a progressive case-by-case expansion of the applicability of the Charter to the Member States would be welcome from the standpoint of a robust notion of the rule of law in the EU.

The binding legal force that the Charter acquired with the Treaty of Lisbon has led some national constitutional courts to adopt an entirely new approach to EU fundamental rights. Most notably, the Austrian Constitutional Court, the Italian Constitutional Court, and the German Federal Constitutional Court have explicitly made the Charter a yardstick of constitutional review. This article compares and contrasts the approaches of these three courts to the Charter. It shows that the strategies of the Austrian and German Constitutional Courts have many characteristics in common, including that national constitutional rights are treated as a primary source and the Charter as a mere secondary benchmark in the majority of cases. The most distinctive feature of the Italian Constitutional Court's strategy is that it mainly aims to prevent ordinary courts from circumventing constitutionality refences by directly applying the Charter. The article concludes by arguing that it has many advantages when national constitutional courts adopt the Charter as a yardstick of constitutional review. It is for the constitutional courts and the CJEU to ensure that these benefits are not outweighed by some serious drawbacks of constitutional review in light of the Charter.

This article maps out the channels at the disposal of private parties for challenging the legality of EC measures, and attempts some predictions of the future shape and content of this plank of the EU’s judicial architecture. This area of the law is in a state of flux, particularly in the light of rulings such as UEAPME v. Council, Masterfoods Limited v. HB Ice Cream, Fresh Marine Company AS v. Commission, Laboratoires Pharmaceutiques Bergaderm SA, in liquidation, and Jean-Jacques Goupil v. Commission, Bocchi Food Trade International GmbH v. Commission, and most recently, and significantly, Jégo Quéré and Cie SA v. Commission. In this latter ruling the Court of First Instance prescribed a major change to the rules on locus standi under Article 230(4) of the EC Treaty, a hitherto much maligned aspect of the case law, by relaxing the requirement of ‘individual concern’ laid down in that article.

This chapter examines the recent decision by the European Court of Justice in Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation. It is a response to criticism that the ECJ’s judgment, in providing for the review of EC measures implementing UN Security Council resolutions, undermines the authority of public international law. Instead of committing itself to international law and institutions at all cost, the ECJ concerns itself with the constitutional repercussions from national constitutional courts (in the case of failure to protect fundamental rights). Important as the relationship between EC law and international law is, there is a clear sense that the ECJ is responsible to, and will ultimately be held to account by, the courts and constitutions of the Member States of the European Union.