It is of course by no means certain that the Treaty of Nice will be ratified and that we will face the most radical revision to the EC Treaty provisions on the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) since its inception in 1957. Unlike most other proposed changes, however, this revision was foreshadowed in substance if not in detail by the Treaty of Amsterdam, which by adding a new paragraph 5 to the existing Article 133, allowed for the possibility of the extension of the CCP by Council decision. This aspect of the Treaty of Nice is particularly worth discussing, even in the absence of certainty as to its coming into force, both because some alterations to the CCP would be possible even under the existing regime, and because the issues raised by the Nice amendment are extremely pertinent to any such development. Discussion of the implications of the choices made at Nice are instructive when considering not only the post-Nice CCP but alternative options in the event of other Treaty amendments. The complexity of the Nice amendment is a reminder of just how difficult it is to achieve consensus in this area, and also of how important in practice that consensus is.

This chapter examines the influence of the Advocates General in promoting trust in the work of the Court of Justice of the European Union. While it accepts that it may be difficult to quantify this influence—given the non-binding nature of the Opinions—it argues that the work of the Advocates General has an impact in securing confidence in the Court. This conclusion is supported by an examination of three possible levels of the influence exerted by the Advocates General, which are considered in the chapter in descending order of abstraction. The first and most abstract dimension of this influence is that provided by the institutional characteristics of the office of Advocate General and the role associated to it. The second dimension is the general contribution of the Opinions to the development of the case law. Finally, the chapter looks at the contribution of the Advocates General in the specific context of cases involving conflicting rights and interests and particularly in cases where fundamental human rights collide with essential Treaty objectives and freedoms—like the free movement of goods or persons—an area where trust in the work of the Court is crucial to ensure the legitimacy of the Union.

A debate is under way about the future of the European Union. It was started by the Declaration adopted by the European Council of Nice in December 2000, was given more substance by the Declaration of Laeken in December 2001, and received a formal focus in the Convention which has been brought together in Brussels under the chairmanship of former President Giscard d’Estaing. The Nice Declaration referred to, among other things, ‘the simplification of the Treaties with a view to making them clearer and better understood without changing their meaning’, but the Laeken Declaration goes considerably further. There is a section in the Declaration entitled, ‘Towards a constitution for European citizens’, which contemplates possible changes to the structure not only of the Treaties but of the Union itself, including perhaps the abolition of the division into three so-called ‘pillars’, and the distinction between the European Union and the European Communities. The Declaration also raises the matter of the legal status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights which was proclaimed in Nice, and speculates as to the possible adoption ‘in the long run’ of what it calls a ‘constitutional text’. A reordering of the primary instruments of the Union is, therefore, very much on the agenda of the Convention, and the idea has heavyweight political supporters.

European law manifests powerful perfection-seeking internal dynamics, nudging—even compelling—legal actors to strive to make the European legal order ‘the best it can be’. This chapter uses a comparative approach to show that this perfectionism is contingent (that is, not necessarily shared by all legal orders), and that it is a highly distinctive characteristic of European legalism specifically. Uncovering the hidden dynamics of this juridical perfectionism is an important step towards rethinking European law’s agency and its correlate: our own ability to shape European integration through law.

Since the precarious state of Greece’s public finances was revealed last October, efforts to save the ‘cradle of Europe’ are in full swing. Hence a huge rescue package for Greece was agreed on in April 2010. This was followed by an even larger EU Stabilisation Fund worth €750 billion for States encountering financial problems. While the economic aspects of these rescue mechanisms have been debated intensively, their legality has escaped closer examination. Rushed through parliaments as an ‘economic emergency’, the peoples of Europe were more or less presented with a ‘fait accompli’. But are these measures really legal under EU law? What about the notorious ‘no bailout’ clause? And what about the alternatives to the rescue packages: Would it have been legal to withdraw from EMU? Or to expel a State from EMU? This chapter will shed some light on these important aspects of EU law.

This chapter considers the ECJ procedure and, in particular, the length of time required for cases to be heard, especially in proceedings pertaining to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, an area in which the saying ‘justice delayed, justice denied’ has particular force. It examines in particular the new urgent procedure, conceived in order to enable the Court to decide a case falling under the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice within an expedited time-frame. It concludes that, while undue haste should be avoided, lengthy time-frames for court proceedings are more often than not a sign of poor case management. The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice provides a special incentive for the ECJ to be vigilant as regards the length of court proceedings.

This chapter makes no attempt to present a definitive exposé of the relationship between Schengen free movement rights and the principle of ne bis in idem. Although elements of the basic structure of that relationship are relatively fixed, the questions that it raises are complex and sensitive. In the absence, thus far, of legislative action by the Council, it has fallen to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to define a number of core concepts in the contexts of references for preliminary rulings that have been made to it by national courts. In so doing, it has necessarily found itself choosing between two desirable goals that are partially irreconcilable with each other: liberalised free movement of persons within the ‘Schengen Area’, on the one hand, and the Union’s objective of ‘provid[ing] citizens a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice’, on the other hand.

The Court of Justice of the European Union has on numerous occasions employed the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to the extent that they represent principles of customary international law, in its judicial reasoning. At first glance, the Court’s use of the Vienna rules demonstrate fidelity towards international law; it can be seen as contributing to the ‘strict observance and the development of international law’. Upon closer examination, however, one finds that the Court applies these rules in a fashion that often deviates from the way in which other courts and bodies have applied the same principles. This article examines how the Court has used international treaty law, arguing that the Court often employs a novel, ‘European’ approach to certain principles. While the Court is free to apply treaty law in a manner it believes to be appropriate, the extent of this divergence risks undermining the integrity and uniform application of the Vienna rules.

The judgment by the German Constitutional Court (‘BVerfG’) of 5 May 2020 has caused a stir all over Europe. The relationship between the BVerfG and the European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) has never been an easy one, especially after the Solange judgment of 1974. The Solange jurisprudence has, however, not only been synonymous with conflict and rivalry but also for dialogue and, eventually, mutual respect. With the PSPP judgment, this dialogue seemed to have found an end, while by the order of 29 April 2021 the BVerfG appears to have returned to a more conciliatory tone. Nonetheless, the disruption between Karlsruhe and Luxembourg persists.

In this article, the PSPP judgment will be examined in detail, presenting it as the last step of long, contorted jurisprudence. It will be shown that the rupture that occurred in May 2020 was technically unnecessary and rather the result of deep-rooted cultural conflict with a clear economic background. The legal reasoning on both sides—that of the BVerfG and that of the PSPP judgment's most outspoken critics—is problematic at best. While for the time being the BVerfG seems to have learnt the lesson from the conflict provoked by its own judgment, the underlying, substantive conflict is still unresolved.

It will be shown that this conflict can only be solved on a political level. Thereby, cultural pre-concepts will have to be overcome. Uncompromising reliance on a national ‘popular spirit’ (Volksgeist) will not offer a way out but neither will, for the time being, exclusive reference to a European Volksgeist ignoring Member State realities. The ‘weighing and balancing’ the BVerfG has missed in the previous Weiss ECJ preliminary ruling (again on the PSPP programme) will have to take place on a far broader scale.

In response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the EU adopted a series of unprecedented ‘massive and targeted sanctions’ against the Russian economy. Whereas the EU has clarified that its restrictive measures are not directed against Russian society, it is has stated that it seeks to ‘diminish’ the Russia economy and ‘cripple’ its ability to finance the war. Such measures recall economic warfare, where the adversary's economy is targeted in order to weaken it and, if successful, would undoubtedly have an impact on Russian people. Moreover, the sanctions have had repercussions on third states and economic operators. Applying the proportionality principle, the article finds that the restrictive measures the EU has imposed on Russia in response to its aggressive war in Ukraine are disproportionate due to their impact on third parties.

States regulate products. They may make access to their market, or favourable rates of taxation, conditional on compliance by products with rules that aim to protect safety, health, morality, the environment and so on. When these rules concern the physical composition of the product, regulating, for example, the ingredients in foodstuffs or the chemicals used in toys, or the recyclability of batteries, Cassis de Dijon, and its legislative and jurisprudential spawn, tell the European lawyer how to approach the resulting barriers to trade.

The principle of mutual recognition tests a potential breach of internal market treaty provisions and restricts the scope for a Member State to justify a breach by reference to what happens, or has happened, in a different Member State. The principle of mutual recognition is a distinct principle to that of non-discrimination and does not apply by reference to the functional equivalence of Member States’ regulatory regimes. Mutual recognition has been developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) as a distinct principle (perhaps a general principle) of EU Law, quite separate to the settled principles of non-discrimination and prohibition of obstacles to market access. The principle of mutual recognition entrenches a neo-functionalist model of the Union project and acts as an accelerant to the harmonisation of the domestic regimes of Member States which are subject to its application, in areas where harmonisation is realistically possible. In areas where harmonisation is not realistically possible, the application of the internal market by reference to the principle of mutual recognition sets aside non-internal-market-compliant Member States’ regulatory provisions, leaving an unsatisfactory space in these regulatory regimes. However, the principle of mutual recognition is, in the light of the application of the principles of non-discrimination and the prohibition of obstacles to market access, quite unnecessary and operates to frustrate legal certainty and the legitimate expectations of the Member States.

This article will place the 2020 amendments to the Russian Constitution in comparative perspective. Although these amendments were officially justified as strengthening the Russian state in order to tackle emerging new problems, they constitutionalise already-existing legislative trends from the last twenty years. They therefore do little to overcome existing problems of Russian state building. What was the reform process about then? It was intended to project the image of reform by involving the people in a staged process of constitutional change while further entrenching the power of the current political elite. The constitutional reforms therefore demonstrate the symbolic role that constitutional law can play in seeking to ensure the survival of mature or later-stage forms of authoritarian populism. This kind of ‘theatrical constitution-making’ is a broader reminder of how the expressive aspects of constitutional change can be (ab)used by established authoritarian regimes.

In 1997 the idea of a European Public Prosecutor was floated in the Corpus Juris Project as one of a series of measures designed to ensure that fraud on the Community budget would be detected and punished. This chapter describes how in the UK the proposal was misrepresented by the eurosceptic press, and how Parliament reacted to the distorted version by changing the law to render any future participation by the UK in a project to create a European Public Prosecutor practically impossible.

It is always an honour to be invited to give a named lecture and especially to be invited to do so in this University. But it is an added privilege and also a pleasure to be invited to do so when one has known the person in whose honour the lecture has been named. It is particularly delightful to be able to do so with Lady Mackenzie-Stuart among us.

This article examines the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, in order to assess the effectiveness of the remedies provided and procedures followed by the Immovable Property Commission (IPC), a mechanism that was established by Turkey in order to remedy displaced Greek Cypriots. It recommends changes for the improvement of the IPC and argues that with their adoption, the Commission could act as a blueprint for the establishment of similar remedying bodies in other frozen conflicts as well. Such institutions are not only important in terms of states’ compliance with their human rights obligations, but can also contribute to the resolution of the underlying conflict itself.

This chapter considers the evolving institutional responses to the challenge of regulating telecoms in the EU, taking in the Commission’s push for creating an EU agency versus the resilience of the transnationally networked model, which is usually attributed to the Member States’ sovereignty reflex. Were recent negotiations over the reform of the Regulatory Framework for telecoms, concluded in 2009, simply a turf-war in which the Commission sought to extend the EU’s role against resistance from the Member States, or did the national telecoms regulators and their existing transnational network influence the eventual compromise to retain the soft law, networked model, albeit with some hardening? Characterised as a classic integration struggle, the Member States’ intergovernmental instincts were pitched against the Commission’s supranational instincts and its preference for instruments of control premised on the centralised exercise of hierarchical power. But this chapter paints a more fine-grained picture of the negotiation’s dynamics and especially the influence of the national regulatory authorities (NRAs) and their existing transnational network; a community of expertise that stood to have its role either strengthened or diminished in the revised institutional architecture. In doing so, the chapter moves beyond orthodox (intergovernmental and neofunctionalist) accounts of these dynamics to take an institutionalist approach that is better suited to analysing the EU as a mature system of governance.

One of the principal achievements of the 1994 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization was the new mechanism for dispute settlement, embodied in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. While its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947 (and the 1979 Agreements resulting from the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations) had already evolved, to a considerable degree, from a negotiating forum for the conduct of world trade diplomacy to a “judicial” system properly so called, the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding nevertheless marked a decisive step forward.

All member states must, as a matter of Community law, provide for a qualified right to go to another Member State to receive treatment at the expense of the competent social security system. According to Article 22 of Regulation 1408/71 such a right is conditional upon prior authorisation by the competent institution. Authorisation cannot be refused when the treatment is amongst the benefits provided for by the State where the individual resides and the treatment cannot be provided within the time ‘normally necessary’ for obtaining the treatment in the State of residence. The Court however has found that Article 49 EC imposes upon Member States obligations that go beyond those contained in the Regulation: thus a prior authorisation requirement constitutes a justified barrier (subject to important qualifications) in the case of hospital treatment and a non-justified barrier in the case of nonhospital treatment. The effects of this interpretation are far-reaching: not only do Member States see their obligations under Community law redefined in a way which might have a significant financial impact on their social security systems; but also the reasoning of the Court could be applied to other branches of the public sector, such as education.

The impact of the increasing liberalisation of the energy sector in general and electricity supply in particular is hard to deny. Yet just a few short years ago, such developments were almost unthinkable. A complex combination of factors has led to an increasingly favourable political and economic climate for market opening and competition. However, the benefits of these developments remain distinctly unevenly spread throughout Europe, while the potential difficulties that an unchecked liberalisation process can cause are slowly coming to the fore. The challenge faced by the European Union in this sector is to promote these developments while remaining alive to their potential social and environmental consequences.