The new UK internal market, as embodied in the UK Internal Market Act 2020 and the common frameworks, is the latest example of market integration, but it is far from being the only one. A myriad of composite market structures exists across the world, including in Australia, Canada, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, the US and the EU. This article investigates how the UK internal market compares to other internal markets: to what extent does it follow pre-existing paths, to what extent does it depart from them? It is argued that the UK has diverged from international blueprints in several important aspects. Despite drawing on methods that are frequently employed for achieving economic integration, it reinterprets and combines these in a unique way. The result is an internal market which is defined by an unusual degree of centralisation, strong trade rights and a high potential for deregulation.

“There is no such thing known to our procedure as putting half a prisoner's character in issue and leaving out the other half.” This observation fell from Humphreys J. in delivering the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in R. v. Winfield (1939). The purpose of this article is to suggest that at common law this statement is not borne out by principle or by authority. The effect on the common law where the prisoner elects to go into the witness-box in exercise of the statutory opportunity created by the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, will also be considered. The type of situation that arises is illustrated by Winfield's Case, where the facts, in brief, were that on a charge of indecent assault, W. put in issue his good character for sexual morality, and the prosecution in cross-examination proved his previous convictions for offences involving dishonesty. The court held that such cross-examination was proper. The question is whether the evidence of the good or bad character of the prisoner must be confined to the trait or traits relevant to the type of crime charged. It will be submitted that the evidence must be so confined. On an indictment for murder, evidence of the good or bad character of the prisoner for honesty will be inadmissible. Not only the crime charged but also the circumstances in which it is alleged to have been committed must be considered. If the murder is committed with a hammer, character for peace and quiet on the one hand and for violence on the other will be admissible, but not if it is a case of slow poisoning.

Care and concern for the elderly have long been regarded by social anthropologists as hallmarks of a civilised community. Unfortunately the care of the elderly frequently presents problems of both a social and legal nature. Some of the difficulties which confront legal practitioners arise from factual situations similar to the following: an aged, widowed father, whose health is deteriorating, asks his adult child to move into his house and look after him for the rest of his days. In return, the father promises orally to leave the house by will to the child or to the child and his or her spouse. The type of problem which can then occur is seen when it is found on the father's death either that he has died intestate, and the estate of which the house forms part has to be divided equally between the child and his or her brothers and sisters, or that he has forgotten to alter his last will. Consequently a will executed perhaps many years earlier provides that the house should be left to some other relative—or even to the legendary cats' home. The child, having assiduously cared for the elderly father, may wish to claim the house and may seek the practitioner's advice.

In Kleinwort Benson v. Lincoln City Council [1998] 3 W.L.R. 1095 the House of Lords heard consolidated appeals arising out of the failure of interest rate swap transactions entered into between various banks and local authorities. Having paid out considerable sums under the swap arrangements, the banks were disconcerted to find them declared ultra vires and void (Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham L.B.C. [1992] 2 A.C. 1). The Lords have now held that sums paid by the banks may be recovered back, by action in restitution for mistake. In so holding, they have abrogated the rule that a mistake of law is not actionable, and denied (at least on these facts) any defence that the parties acted on the basis of “settled law”.

Recent decisions relating to commercial transactions have raised issues about the limits of the courts’ jurisdiction to interfere with contractual terms, even where the terms seem to yield unjust results on breach. The author argues for a reconceptualisation of the ancient equitable doctrine of relief against forfeiture, as one which ensures that rights taken by way of security should never allow a secured creditor to recover more than his secured debt. Building on roots in the law of mortgages, this requires the court to characterise the substance of the parties’ bargain. It can, in common with the law of penalties, be understood as implementing a mandatory policy which allows the parties full freedom in crafting their primary obligations, but denies them full freedom in deciding what shall be the consequences of a breach of a primary obligation. The author argues that the restatement fits the contours of the existing law, and the requirements of corrective justice.

One can conceive of more exciting presents than a part of a debt; but a creditor is sometimes moved to make such an assignment. Suppose, for example, that he is owed £100 by X and desires to transfer the right to half of it to a friend. How can he do this?

This article discusses the case of Brock and Wyner (2001) (the “Wintercomfort Case”) and considers its implications for private citizens who traditionally have not incurred criminal liability merely for failing to prevent a third party from committing an offence unless they have some specific legal responsibility for the victim or for the business or motor-vehicle in connection with which it is committed. The wide and vague interpretation placed on section 8 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, which applies to everyone who occupies or manages premises, is contrasted sharply with the House of Lords’ views of its predecessor (section 8 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1965) in Sweet v. Parsley. The author draws attention to the clearer and more circumscribed section 19 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and argues for an equally specific provision to be substituted for a Section 8 of the 1971 Act.

Where two parties are liable in respect of the same obligation and one party discharges the obligation, he may be able to recover some or all of his outlay from the other. This article addresses the rationale underlying the relief granted in such circumstances. While restitution theorists tend to emphasise the claimant’s lack of choice, it is argued that this focus is misleading. Moreover, using unjust enrichment to explain relief is unnecessary and inaccurate. An alternative explanation is put forward, which derives support from the case law on contribution—that relief aims to ensure equitable distribution of the burden of liability.