The decision in American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. was hailed. rather unenthusiastically, as a revolutionary development in the law governing interlocutory injunctions; it was seen as an abandonment of the earlier approach exemplified by, although not discussed in, Stratford and Sons Ltd. v. Lindley. There was some indignation at the apparent loss of a quick, relatively cheap means of settling cases by decision on an application for an interlocutory injunction, and considerable doubt as to the suitability of the principles set out by Lord Diplock in Cyanamid for use in all types of interlocutory action.

Avoidance of emergency legislation

“The people had a right to free discussion. It was free discussion which elicited truth. They had a right to meet.” In these words at a civic reception in Liverpool on October 3, 1838, Lord John Russell proclaimed his belief in one of the basic freedoms of democracy, at the very time that Chartists were mobilising their forces and spreading their doctrine at meetings held throughout the country. This was an untimely declaration which drew upon him the deserved reproof of Sir Robert Peel; it unfortunately seems to have been put later to some rather unscrupulous use by the Chartists, an example of which went to furnish Sir James Graham with offensive material for his attack on the Government during the debate of January 29, 1840, on a motion of no confidence. None the less, even when the Chartist gatherings had attained an advanced stage of organisation, Russell with undaunted singleness of purpose affirmed the Government's resolve not to ask Parliament for additional powers or extraordinary measures, but to rely on the existing laws: “It would be very inadvisable to make any sudden change in the laws of the country and to introduce laws, the same as in some foreign countries, of exception for certain parties; because those laws have two bad effects—the one is that they excite the sympathy of a number of persons who otherwise would have no feeling in common with ill disposed and designing persons; and in the next place, because the people of the country in general, and even those who appear to be the worst disposed, do feel that there is a power and supremacy in the law, to which they are ready to yield obedience; and if a new law were introduced merely for the suppression of those societies, they would not feel that they were treated with the same justice with which they would have been treated if the ordinary laws of the country had been resorted to for their suppression and punishment.”

The charge of conspiring to defraud is the most important and frequently employed branch of the law of criminal conspiracy. Yet it has been largely ignored in most general discussions of the law of conspiracy, or at best treated as a special case to be exempted from the general attack on a crime which can only be described as an agreement to act illegally. The reasons for this tacit acceptance are largely pragmatic: the charge is clearly useful in bringing to justice a significant number of persons involved in large-scale frauds who might otherwise escape prosecution. A thorough-going assessment of its place in the criminal law is nonetheless long overdue.

One of the most useful and most-used powers that criminal courts1 have is the power to bind people over to be of good behaviour or to keep the peace. Magistrates form the view that a person (“the principal”), who might be a person of previously unblemished reputation, is likely to breach the peace or commit criminal offences. They require him to enter into a recognisance, in form a voluntary covenant or agreement, to keep the peace, or to be of good behaviour, sometimes in a set sum (say £100) for a set period. If he refuses, he can be imprisoned, regardless of the seriousness or triviality, lawfulness or unlawfulness, of the behaviour that originally brought him to court, perhaps as a witness. He may also be required to find sureties, other people who are prepared to promise that they will forfeit a sum of money (say £50 each) if their principal fails to behave. If the principal misbehaves, debts to the Crown arise of £100 from the principal and £50 from each surety. The mechanics are therefore rather similar to bail. Binding over operates today in two ways. First, it can be used after conviction for an offence as an alternative to sentence. The accused enters into a recognisance to keep the peace or be of good behaviour. If he breaches his undertaking, he can be summoned back to court to be sentenced for the original offence. Secondly, it can be used after conviction for an offence as an alternative to sentence. The accused enters into a recognisance to keep the peace or be of good behaviour. If he breaches his undertaking, he can be summoned back to court to be sentenced for the original offence. Secondly, it can be used as a preventive measure to deal with people who are before the court but have not been convicted. This latter use provides a flexible way to deal with cases arising out of disputes between neighbours and minor public order problems without the need for a full hearing. It saves time and money.

A Purchaser of land who fails to complete his contract for some reason stands to lose his equitable estate in the land and may also forfeit any deposit or other prepayments that have been made. The purpose of this article is to investigate the circumstances in which such a purchaser may obtain equitable relief against forfeiture, and to argue that the jurisdiction to give relief is broader than has been thought in recent years. The matter has been the subject of two recent decisions of such importance that an appraisal of the law seems apposite. To define the field of inquiry, it is helpful to consider two preliminary matters

InRedland Bricks Ltd. v. Morris Lord Upjohn, in a speech with which all the other Law Lords agreed, asserted that the Court of Appeal had been wrong to consider the applicability of Lord Cairns' Act. Much of the judgments, he observed, had been taken up with a consideration of the principles laid down in Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting Co., a case concerned exclusively with the proper principles upon which in practice Lord Cairns' Act should be applied. Neither Lord Cairns' Act nor Shelfer's case, he said in terms, had anything whatever to do with the principles of law appli-cable to the case then before the court. It is accordingly crystal clear that Lord Upjohn regarded Lord Cairns' Act as totally irrelevant: what is less clear is the reason for his opinion.

The common law doctrines relating to mixtures and improvements of personal chattels give the impression, to most English lawyers, of being somewhat mysterious. Proprietary interests come and go like ships in the night, now mingled with rights to possession, now quite separate. But although cases involving proprietary claims are not common, the issue often arises as to A's personal rights against B, where B has without A's consent expended effort on A's property, and B's personal rights against A (if any) in respect of the improvement.