ACCESSION to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) has long been on the EU's political agenda. The EU's membership of the ECHR is not only seen as symbolically significant, but is also aimed at filling an important gap in the enforceability of human rights across Europe. At present, the EU cannot be brought before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and, while all EU Member States are parties to the ECHR, as long as the EU protects fundamental rights to a standard equivalent to that required under the ECHR, Member States cannot be held responsible for alleged violations of the Convention resulting from EU law either (Bosphorus v Ireland (2006) 42 E.H.R.R. 1).

It is axiomatic that divorcing spouses cannot by agreement oust the jurisdiction of the court to award ancillary relief: Hyman v. Hyman [1929] A.C. 601. Finality can only be achieved by obtaining the sanction of the court in the form of a consent order, invoking a procedure which requires full disclosure of all material factors so that the court can exercise its own discretion on the basis of the information put before it: Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s.33A; Livesey v. Jenkins [1985] A.C. 424. But out-of-court agreements made by the parties are not without significance. Far from it, they will be treated as a very important consideration should the court subsequently be asked by one of the parties to make an award of ancillary relief, and will not usually be departed from unless there are good and substantial grounds for concluding that injustice will be done by holding the parties to their terms: Edgar v. Edgar [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1410. Presumptive enforceability has been criticised as “the worst of both worlds”, as the parties must go to court to determine whether the agreement they have reached is legally binding: Pounds v. Pounds [1994] 1 F.L.R. 775, 791, per Hoffmann L.J. Either the agreement should bind, or it should be wholly disregarded.

I want first to explore what is happening to crime in an international context. If we look only at our own country the perspective is too narrow, the explanations and remedies too parochial. We cannot hope to comprehend ourselves without taking account of others.

FOLLOWING a referendum on 23 June 2016 in which 52% of voters (38% of the total electorate) had expressed a preference for the UK to leave the EU, the Government announced that it would start the process of withdrawal, in accordance with Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”), by notifying the European Council of the UK's decision, exercising the Government's prerogative power to conduct foreign relations. A number of legal challenges were fast-tracked to the Supreme Court. In R. (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Birnie and others intervening) [2017] UKSC 5; [2017] 2 W.L.R. 583 after an expedited hearing, the Court decided two issues: (1) whether the Government could exercise its power under the royal prerogative to give notice, or needed an Act of Parliament to authorise the giving of notice; and (2) whether the Government required the consent of devolved legislatures in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales before giving notice or introducing to Parliament a Bill authorising the giving of notice. The Court sat unprecedentedly with all 11 serving members. On issue (1), the Court, by an 8–3 majority, held that an Act of Parliament would be required in order to authorise the giving of notice. On issue (2), the Court unanimously held that there was no legal requirement for consent by the devolved institutions.

A recent decision of the French Cour de cassation (Cass. Civ. 1re, 19 nov 2002, Banque Worms c. Epoux Brachot, J.C.P. 2002.II,10 201, concl. Sainte-Rose, note Chaillé de Néré, D.2003.797, note Khairallah) provides an interesting contribution to the recurrent debate, fuelled by the House of Lords request for a preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice in Turner v. Grovit [2001] UKHL 65, [2002] 1 W.L.R. 107, over the availability of extraterritorial injunctive relief within the scope of the Brussels I Regulationwhether in the form of anti-suit injunctions in cases of parallel proceedings, or indeed of freezing orders under Article 31 in relation to assets situated in another Member State.