Under the present law, policy-based reasoning plays a major role in the judicial determination of private law disputes. The propriety of this type of reasoning, however, has been the subject of much debate. Whilst many argue that there is nothing objectionable about using policy-based reasoning, others, particularly those who believe in a rights and/or corrective justice-based view of private law, argue that policy should play no role in the determination of private law disputes, and that courts should instead rely on what they call “principle”. This article will examine both sides of the debate, initially exploring what is actually meant by “principle” and “policy”, and then providing an overview of the primary arguments relied on in favour of both a policy- and principle-based approach to resolving private law disputes. Finally, a compromise between the two approaches, the so-called “pluralist” approach, will be examined.

The need to redress the inequality of power between the citizen and the State, which lies at the heart of public law, is illustrated nowhere more clearly than in the facts of R. v. North and East Devon Health Authority, ex p. Coughlan [2000] 2 W.L.R. 622. As a result of her severe disability Pamela Coughlan was, for many years, looked after as a hospital in-patient. In 1993, however, she agreed to move to a purpose-built care facility on the strength of the respondent’s promise that it would be her “home for life”; yet, only five years later, the health authority decided to close the new home, citing financial reasons. That the applicant possessed a legitimate expectation which would be breached by closure of the home was not in doubt. The difficult question was how the expectation could be protected. Courts have long been willing to enforce procedural promises and to safeguard expectations of substantive benefits by requiring the adoption of a fair procedure (typically consultation) before the benefit is denied. Coughlan, however, makes it clear that courts may go further than this by substantively protecting substantive expectations.

There can hardly be any aspect of the law of contract which has in recent years exercised the ingenuity of the courts and the academic lawyers more than the effect of fundamental breach on exemption clauses. The doctrine which seemed to be emerging, that no exemption clause could relieve a party who was in fundamental breach, has been discredited by the House of Lords in Suisse Atlantique, but though the speeches in that case have clarified the position, there is still room for a general statement of the law. The present article is concerned with clear presentation of principle rather than exhaustive examination of authority, whether academic or judicial; and though most of the points have been anticipated at some time or another, it has not seemed desirable to clog the argument by discussing these anticipations. There may also be some value in considering, as aspects of a single problem, some features of the law of contract which are usually discussed in the books under different and widely separated heads such as “Conditions and Warranties,” “Exemption Clauses,” “Discharge by Performance,” and “Discharge by Breach.”

This article seeks to demonstrate three things. First, the orthodox conceptualisation of the tort of public nuisance is flawed, since: (1) it is in violation of basic private law principles related to privity and the actionability of crimes and (2) if taken seriously would mandate that the tort be abolished (as torts protect private not public rights). Second, the rights at the heart of the tort are the privately actionable rights to pass and repass on public highways and to fish in public waters, and that it is plausible that a sophisticated legal system would recognise such rights. Third, a tort reconceptualised in this way can make sense of: (1) the special damage rule that is generally thought arbitrary and (2) the general intuition that the recovery of damages for pure personal injuries is best left to other torts.

In disputes over the use and possession of the human body and its parts, there has been a marked reliance on property law concepts. Judges frequently resort to the language of “ownership”, “gifts”, “donations”, “trusts” and so on, in order to resolve disputes over the use of human biomaterials. When this happens, however, we observe certain recurring mistakes. Judges and academics writing in this area have sometimes misunderstood the basic rules governing the creation and operation of property rights. We do not seek to take a stance on the normative matters at stake. Our aim is to provide an accurate account of how property law could operate when applied in the context of human tissue use. We hope to redress some misconceptions, but our bigger goal is to provide a new methodology of how to work through the various questions that must be considered when determining how to regulate human tissue, by explaining how property principles would work at each stage. In this way, we seek to enable those who wish to debate whether property principles should be applied to human tissue the means to have accurate debates.

Mr. Bruton occupied a flat by virtue of a written agreement with the Quadrant Housing Trust. The agreement specifically categorised itself as a “weekly licence” although it did give exclusive possession to Bruton. For its part, the Trust held the flat as licensee from the freehold owner, Lambeth Council, in order to pursue its charitable housing aims of providing temporary and emergency accommodation. By virtue of section 32 of the Housing Act 1985, any grant of a lease by the Council to the Trust would have been ultra vires. Bruton accepted the “licence” from the Trust on this basis, but now alleged that he held the flat on a lease, giving security of tenure and triggering a repairing obligation for the Trust under section 11 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 (implied repairing obligations for short term leases). The High Court had held that the agreement was a licence and this was confirmed by the Court of Appeal, with Millett L.J. noting that it was difficult to see how Bruton could have a lease when the Trust itself held no estate in the land out of which a lease could have been granted: [1998] Q.B. 834, 845. The House of Lords, unanimously, held that Bruton had a lease on a simple application of Street v. Mountford [1985] A.C. 809. The fact that the Trust held no estate in the land was neither here nor there: Bruton v. London & Quadrant Housing Trust [1999] 3 W.L.R. 150.

THE facts of Barclays Bank Ltd. v. Quistclose Investments Ltd. are well-known. In July 1964 Rolls Razor Ltd. declared a dividend payment that they were unable to meet. In order to meet their obligation, the company arranged to borrow the amount of the dividend, £210,000, from Quistclose Investments. The money was duly transferred into a separate account of Rolls Razor, opened specially for the purpose, held at Barclays Bank. The dividend was payable on 24 July but had not been paid when, on 27 August, Rolls Razor entered voluntary liquidation. Barclays and Quistclose both claimed the money. Barclays asserted a right of set-off against the Rolls Razor overdraft, while Quistclose claimed that the money was held in trust for them and, since Barclays were aware of this, the bank were accordingly constructive trustees of the funds.

In Kleinwort Benson v. Lincoln City Council [1998] 3 W.L.R. 1095 the House of Lords heard consolidated appeals arising out of the failure of interest rate swap transactions entered into between various banks and local authorities. Having paid out considerable sums under the swap arrangements, the banks were disconcerted to find them declared ultra vires and void (Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham L.B.C. [1992] 2 A.C. 1). The Lords have now held that sums paid by the banks may be recovered back, by action in restitution for mistake. In so holding, they have abrogated the rule that a mistake of law is not actionable, and denied (at least on these facts) any defence that the parties acted on the basis of “settled law”.