Scholars have recommended taking a closer look at firms that raise funds from the financial system as a way of understanding the relation between finance and growth. This article explores the role of the U.S. financial system in providing funds to two prominent American firms, General Electric and Westinghouse Electric, over the course of the last century. The financial system's support was important for both companies, but there were important differences, as well as changes over time, in their patterns of financial dependence and autonomy. Two factors—investments in working capital and dividend policies-are important for explaining the financing patterns of both firms, suggesting clear hypotheses about the determinants of demand for corporate finance that can be tested in further financial histories. The findings also highlight the importance of looking at working, as well as fixed, capital in studies of enterprises' relations with the financial system, and of examining the money that flows out of companies as well as the funds that flow into them.

American and German accountancy took different paths in the early part of the twentieth century. In Germany, a persistent disconnect arose between relatively sophisticated managerial accounting practices for insiders and the methods used in public financial accounting. The “equity revolution” America experienced—an enormous shift in the number and expectations of shareholders—prompted new demands for financial statements designed to help evaluate the future earning power of companies. In contrast, the effects of World War I retarded equity–market development in Germany. Political frictions reinforced the Germans's; discomfort with equity markets and increased their resistance to revising accounting principles. Banks, tax law, courts, and lawyers, instead of professional accountants, became the primary source of accounting principles. Only in past decades, under pressure from the European Union and global capital markets, have the accounting systems begun to reconverge.

Business Cycles was Joseph Schumpeter's least successful book, measured by its professed aims and several other yardsticks. Yet the book has two vital aspects that have largely been overlooked. First, the prodigious research that went into its writing caused a significant change in Schumpeter's thinking about capitalism. It moved him to a more historical and empirical approach that shaped nearly all his subsequent work. And second, much of the book constitutes a preview of modern, rigorous business history. This article explores both of these elements—not in the spirit of rescuing a neglected classic, because the book is not a classic. Instead, Business Cycles is a noble failure that paid unexpected dividends both to the author and to scholarship.

The Italian fashion industry rose to a position of international prominence in the second half of the twentieth century. An important factor in the sector's global success was the opening up of the international, particularly the American, markets. The changes that occurred within the fashion industry after World War II, most critically the end of the Parisian monopoly, offered opportunities that were exploited differently by the various competitors. While cities like London and New York managed to promote themselves as alternatives to Paris, Italy was initially unable to create a single fashion capital. Florence, Rome, and Milan felt themselves equally entitled to become the staging ground for Italian fashion production, but Milan, benefiting from certain features of its productive structure, eventually emerged as the winner. The city's success was based on a long, steady accumulation of resources and the ability to harness its creative and managerial capabilities. The result was Milan's emergence as a fashion “superstar” in the 1970s.

Histories of the rising popularity of Danish modern furniture in both Denmark and the United States have traditionally ascribed its success to the inherent beauty of Danish design. This article argues that Danish modern furniture succeeded for two other reasons. First, through the creation of powerful narratives, or stories, that framed the way consumers made sense of this furniture; and, second, through the calculated development of a network of individuals and organizations whose goal was to promote and legitimize these narratives.

Scholars have recommended taking a closer look at firms that raise funds from the financial system as a way of understanding the relation between finance and growth. This article explores the role of the U.S. financial system in providing funds to two prominent American firms, General Electric and Westinghouse Electric, over the course of the last century. The financial system's support was important for both companies, but there were important differences, as well as changes over time, in their patterns of financial dependence and autonomy. Two factors—investments in working capital and dividend policies—are important for explaining the financing patterns of both firms, suggesting clear hypotheses about the determinants of demand for corporate finance that can be tested in further financial histories. The findings also highlight the importance of looking at working, as well as fixed, capital in studies of enterprises' relations with the financial system, and of examining the money that flows out of companies as well as the funds that flow into them.

The introduction of container shipping in the late 1950s and early 1960s has received little attention from historians, but it represents a major technological advance with significant economic consequences. By dramatically lowering the cost of freight handling, the container reduced the need for factories to be near suppliers and markets and opened the way for manufacturing to move out of urban centers, first domestically and then abroad. This impact was particularly intense in New York City, where the container revolution began. Containerization had a devastating impact on New York City's economy, and was a major contributor to the collapse of its industrial base between 1967 and 1975.

The Mittelstand sector of the German economy, which is made up of small and medium-sized family firms, is generally not mentioned in debates about German capitalism. This article makes the case that the focus of research on the German economy should shift from large corporate structures to these smaller firms. The classic Mittelstand model, which dominated the economy until about 1970, was characterized by identity of ownership and management, strong emotional investment by owners and staff, and an emphasis on continuity, paternalism, and independence. Beginning in the 1960s, this model was undermined by fundamental changes in the country's economic and sociocultural environment. In response, the firms abandoned a number of their traditional attributes, a process that led to the demise of some businesses and the regeneration of others. Although the modern form adopted by the surviving Mittelstand firms allows them to be less dependent on individual families, to enjoy more access to external capital, and to display more openness and international orientation, they can no longer rely on the prospect of long-term stability, as they did in the past.

Scholars have studied innovation from various perspectives, but few have considered the interaction between big business and the fashion marketplace. This study examines the efforts of E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Company to create and expand the American synthetic-fibers market after World War II. DuPont described this work as transforming the “relatively simple ‘art’ of selling fabric” into the “complicated ‘science’ of marketing.” This process involved developing in-house marketing expertise and reaching out to sources as disparate as American fabric designers, Parisian couturiers, Seventh Avenue manufacturers, southern textile giants, and mass-market retailers. To promote the “wonders” of synthetic fibers, DuPont relied on “fashion intermediaries” to determine what customers wanted and how its fibers could meet those needs. This study suggests that the mass-market success of DuPont's synthetic fibers owed as much to creative marketing, styling, and performance as it did to industrial research and organizational innovation.

In half a century PolyGram expanded from two small Dutch and German companies to become the world's largest music multinational. It did so in the midst of a fast-changing business environment, in which relatively homogenous products and tastes gave way to differentiated outputs for segmented markets. Making use of strengths inherited from its owners Philips and Siemens, PolyGram integrated a continuous series of foreign acquisitions into one international organization while maintaining the creative identities and independence of the firms it acquired. To control and manage the resulting idiosyncratic configuration, it developed the federated form, a decentralized organizational structure that fit the shifting environment. PolyGram became what can be defined as a rightsbased multinational, and its structure showed similarities to multinationals in other rights-based industries.

The primary importance of long-distance telephone service to the American Telephone and Telegraph Company in the first two decades of the twentieth century was not commercial but organizational and political. The so-called Bell System was not a single firm before 1910 but was, rather, an association of regional companies with considerable autonomy. As AT&T's leaders worked both to overcome independent competitors and to curtail the autonomy of their own local affiliates, long-distance service offered them a powerful technological justification for the consolidation of control. Outside the Bell System, long distance also served as a vivid symbol of interconnection and integration. Long distance proved central to AT&T's campaign to convince Americans of its own legitimacy and that of nation-spanning corporations in general.

The Dutch company Philips succeeded in producing transistors early on. By the early 1950s, it had acquired a strong position in the European semiconductor market. However, by the end of the 1950s, it was being surpassed by competitors. In response to the developments in solid state electronics, Philips' management adjusted the company's research, development, and production capabilities, enabling the firm to bring point-contact and layer transistors onto the market and to develop its own high-frequency transistor. When demand for industrial transistors increased, Philips was unprepared, leaving it without an entrée to this new market. The company's exclusive contracts with IBM not only failed to produce the expected results; they also limited its ability to establish ties with other computer companies and most important it illustrated Philips' choice not to produce computers. Therefore, Philips did not build knowledge and expertise in the computer field. Philips' organizational structure hampered both its innovative capacity in the field of applications and its ability to adjust transistor requirements to suit customer needs. Thus, by the early 1960s, Philips found itself in a weakened position in the increasingly competitive transistor market.

The Kirin Brewery Company is a large, long-established, and successful firm in a traditional, “old economy” sector in Japan. Nevertheless, in the early 1980s it entered the “new economy” business of biopharmaceuticals, based on advances in scientific techniques at the time and prospects for the bio-technology industry in the future. This essay explains why Kirin entered this field and how it developed the necessary competences. The development of these new competences was in no small part owing to entrepreneurial alertness and opportunity recognition by individuals in various functions of the firm. As such, the case illustrates the presence in the large modern corporation of the individual entrepreneur, a figure whose existence and role is often downplayed or simply omitted in nominalist treatments of entrepreneurship, which depict innovation as a somewhat mechanistic endeavor, absent any element of entrepreneurial behavior.

In the early 1970s, a few computer companies began to form partnerships with other firms in the international computer industry for the purpose of sharing research and development (R&D) resources. This trend did not take hold in a meaningful way until the beginning of the 1980s. Our study focuses on this particular sector because it represents a major industry in which interfirm R&D partnering occurs.