This paper identifies recurrent patterns in the political activity of American corporations that support trade. These firms have made public coalitions a central element of their pro-trade activities, and their collective efforts vastly outstrip those of trade's corporate opponents. This superiority in organization is paired with dramatically greater volumes of lobbying and campaign contributions. I explain these striking divergences by integrating collective action theory into a firm-centred model of trade politics: the heavy concentration of gains from trade among a small number of firms makes both individual and collective political action easier for pro-trade firms than for producers opposed to trade. This explanation is supported in panel analysis of firms’ participation in pro-trade coalitions, which shows that size, multinationality, and heterogeneity in global networks of production and sales drive participation in pro-trade groups. Globally engaged firms have supported trade by matching pro-trade preferences with highly organized political action.

Close ties between government authorities and private firms are often the object of suspicion, but a systematic understanding of when they arise is still missing. This article uses machine learning tools to analyze a large dataset of public contracts from across Europe, in order to identify the conditions under which close connections, defined both in terms of repeated interaction, as well as geographical dispersion, appear. Previous theoretical results suggest that close ties should emerge as an enforcement mechanism in settings characterized by weak outside enforcement, such as those involving corruption. Results from random forest models show support for this hypothesis, along with identifying other structural determinants of the outcome. The most striking finding is that even after accounting for numerous potential confounders, major differences in terms of average diversity levels between countries persist, and these differences map onto an indicator of governance quality and corruption, but not at all on income per capita. These findings point to the centrality of the structure of interactions between private and public actors for understanding governance outcomes.

An extensive game lodge industry operates across Southern Africa. Many of these lodges market themselves as ‘eco-tourism destinations’ where wildlife protection, community development and the maintenance of bio-diversity are supposed to be central values of the business model. This article deals with the tensions that arise for the management of such enterprises between a multiplicity of local and global interests around land use pertaining to conflicting motivations of profitability and capital-intensive development, protection of bio-diversity and enabling community empowerment. The article illustrates the interplay between these competing interests, preferences and claims surrounding the use to which the land these lodges occupy is used. It examines a set of cases in South Africa with special reference to the Sabi Sand Private Game Reserve.

When I was a boy, my family would occasionally receive tall baskets filled with fruits, nuts and jams, most often around the holidays. These gifts from business acquaintances of my father were not meant to be inducements for him to break the law; rather, they were little niceties intended to maintain ongoing relationships. Today, when my wife and I are invited to dinner, we usually bring flowers or a bottle of wine as a gift. This is not some crass attempt on our part to ensure that sanitary conditions are maintained during meal preparation; it is only a symbol of our appreciation for the kindness of our hosts. Not for a moment do I believe that we would be ostracized should we go to dinner engagements empty-handed, nor would my father have punished nongivers. As such, these gift exchanges can be seen as epiphenomena: they symbolize underlying relationships, but they do not constitute relationships.

Compensation hypothesis, which has established a link between trade openness of countries and levels of government spending, has been widely accepted in the literature on trade policy and international globalization. However, the nature of the distribution effects produced by trade is likely to determine the existence of more or less redistribution demands from the median voter, and therefore government growth. In this paper I hypothesize that the effects of trade openness on redistribution demands are not homogeneous between countries, and I argue that they depend both on the type-of-factor endowment of the economy and the size of the sectors more likely to be affected by trade. I test this hypothesis with ISSP data for 23 countries, both with a country level and an individual level analysis. The results show that redistribution demands issued from trade openness of the median voter of a country are largely conditional on GDP per capita and size of potential loser sectors such as manufacturing: while trade has a negative effect on pro-redistribution preferences in “poor” and/or in “low manufacturing” countries; it positively affects pro-redistribution preferences in “rich” and/or in “high manufacturing” countries. Additionally, I empirically observe that the size of the loser sector plays a more important mediating role than the type-of-factor endowment of the economy.

This paper analyzes congressional voting on tobacco issues over two decades. Contrary to existing claims, the analysis shows that the tobacco industry's legislative success is more a function of representatives' regulatory and pro-business ideologies than of tobacco PAC money or a geographically-based tobacco voting bloc. In most cases, the tobacco voting bloc—representatives and senators from major tobacco producing districts and states—is not strong enough to protect and sustain the tobacco price support system, let alone affect the outcome of commercial issues such as cigarette taxes and regulation. The industry's campaign contributions also have sporadic and limited impact on commercial issues affecting tobacco. Only on agricultural issues do tobacco PAC contributions exhibit any influence.

Corporate political strategies have been used extensively by firms attempting to shape their political environments. In this context, access to targeted policymakers is essential to allow their deployment. Thus, we propose to study the determinants of access to the European Commission representatives. This research builds on the resource-based view (RBV) of firms to argue that political knowledge is a valuable resource to increase firms' degree of access to the European Commission. To test our hypotheses, we built a novel dataset merging firms characteristics with lobbying meetings information, and analyze it through negative binomial regression. The results suggest the importance of political knowledge, emphasizing that it may represent a source of sustainable competitive advantage. This study highlights interesting information that broadens the understanding of corporate political strategies in the European Union.

Following the financial crisis, the United Kingdom introduced major structural reforms to address concern about Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) banks, while France and Germany adopted much weaker reforms. This is puzzling given the presence of large universal banks engaged in market making activities in all three countries, which suffered significant losses during the international financial crisis, and given the commitments to reform made by political leaders in all three countries. The paper explains this policy divergence by analysing how dynamics of agenda setting contributed to the emergence of policy windows on structural reform. We explain the United Kingdom's decision to delegate the process to an independent commission as an example of venue shifting which helped to insulate the process from industry framing, and resulted in “conflict expansion” by mobilizing a wider coalition of actors in support of bank ringfencing. By contrast, in France and Germany the agenda was tightly managed through existing institutional venues, enabling industry to resist the framing of the issue around TBTF and limiting the role of non-business groups—a process we label as “conflict contraction.” We argue that analysis of agenda setting dynamics provides new insights into the cross-national variability of business power.

The political economy of trade literature argues that the policy of compensating those who lose from trade is an important component of maintaining public support for free-trade, a linkage known as the compensation hypothesis or embedded liberalism thesis. This article tests the causal mechanisms underlying the compensation hypothesis by examining support for trade-related compensation using survey data from the United States. Expectations about the effects of trade strongly predict support for trade-related unemployment insurance, with those who expect to lose more likely to support and those who expect to gain more like to oppose, but has no influence on support for general unemployment insurance despite previous research suggesting it should.

In this article we examine how Chinese local officials impact rural business environment and market development since the late 1990s. If their power is not effectively checked by village elections, local political elite are able to manipulate reform policies in a way to serve their economic and political interests at the cost of villagers' interests. In other words, local officials selectively implement reform policies not only to maximize economic rents available for extraction but also to minimize the risk that may challenge their rent-seeking capacity in the countryside. We draw on a survey data collected by the authors from rural China in 2003 and 2004 to test our hypothesis on the relationship between political control exercised by local officials over village elections and rural business environment & market development. Our analysis shows that if a local government can keep a village elections under its control, then local officials would charge more license application fees from self-employment business owners, put village land re-allocation process under government administrative control, restrict peasants from founding their own professional associations. Local officials' self-serving strategy inevitably deteriorates rural business & market environment and bodes an incomplete market-oriented reform for reformists in the central government.

Jiangsu and Zhejiang are of two of China's most prosperous and dynamic provinces. This paper first presents a factual account of two empirical phenomena: 1) FDI has played a more substantial role in the economic development of Jiangsu than in Zhejiang, and 2) ownership biases against domestic private firms in Jiangsu were more substantial than in Zhejiang. The paper hypothesizes that there is a connection between these two empirical phenomena. Specifically, ownership biases against domestic private firms increase preferences for FDI because FDI provides a measure of relative property rights security. Thus a biased domestic private firm has an incentive to move its assets and/or future growth opportunities to the foreign sector. The paper uses two private-sector surveys—one conducted in 1993 and the other in 2002—to provide an empirical test of this hypothesis. Our analysis shows, controlling for a variety of firm-level attributes and industry and regional characteristics, those private firms which perceive ownership biases to be more severe are more likely to form joint ventures with foreign firms.

In 1967, Gordon Tullock asked why firms do not spend more on campaign contributions, despite the large rents that could be generated from political activities. We suggest in this paper that part of the puzzle could come from the fact that one important type of political activity has been neglected by the literature which focuses on campaign contributions or political connections. We call this neglected activity “asset freezing”: situations in which firms delay lay-offs or invest in specific technologies to support local politicians’ re-election objectives. In doing so, firms bear a potentially significant cost as they do not use a portion of their economic assets in the most efficient or productive way. The purpose of this paper is to provide a first theoretical exploration of this phenomenon. Building on the literature on corporate political resources, we argue that a firm's economic assets can be evaluated based on their degree of “political freezability,” which depends on the flexibility of their use and on their value for policy-makers. We then develop a simple model in which financial contributions and freezing assets are alternative options for a firm willing to lawfully influence public policy-making, and derive some of our initial hypotheses more formally.

This paper examines the determinants of financial industry actors’ regulatory preferences—examining why some financial industry actors prefer less stringent financial regulations while others prefer more stringent regulations. The determination of preferences, we argue, can be understood as mutually dependent. How an organization is connected to other organisations through network ties may help to explain its regulatory preferences. Our empirical point of focus is financial industry lobbying in the context of the European Union (EU). Using data from nearly nine hundred lobbying letters related to legislation on banking, insurance, and securities regulation, we map out a “socialization network” that models connections between financial industry firms, their associations, as well as a broad range of other organisations and actors that are auxiliary to this community of organizations. Using these data we find evidence that organizations’ preferences are informed by their location within this socialization network. Controlling for a range of other plausible factors, we find that 1) those connected via common associational ties, 2) those closer to one another in the network and 3) those more “embedded” in this network are all less likely to diverge in terms of their preferences from one another.

A business enterprise interested in influencing the design, adoption or enforcement of a particular law, rule or regulation often confronts a choice. Does it lobby officials directly? Or does it do so indirectly, using a collective action group as an intermediary? We draw on data from a large, 2010 survey of enterprises across the Russian Federation to demonstrate that the propensity to engage in intermediated lobbying increases with region-level political competition. Our explanation builds on recent evidence confirming Mancur Olson's claim (1982) that less encompassing actors tend to lobby for more distortionary policies. We hypothesize that with greater political competition government officials become more responsive to encompassing voices (i.e. associations of businesses as opposed to single firms), since the electoral costs of being captured by narrower interests becomes greater. Evidence from a complementary survey of regional business association managers points in the same direction; the relative attention paid by officials to lobbying efforts by encompassing associations increases with political competition.

Scholarship in international political economy (IPE) has noted the rise of resource nationalism in since the early 2000s. Despite the increased presence of state regulation in the resource sector, resource nationalism has not been incompatible with foreign investment. This article contributes to better understand resource nationalist policies that emerged in recent years and offers new theoretical insights to explain state-IOC relations by integrating obsolescing bargaining theories and constructivist approaches. Drawing on the case of Venezuela, this article explains how the Chávez regime pursued a hybrid model of control and welcoming of investments in the oil sector. The article argues that both bargaining insights and ideational considerations are important in explaining this model. In the context of high oil prices and sunk investments, it is unsurprising that a leftist government would seek to renegotiate contracts to seek better deals from extractive companies. Yet, focusing exclusively on those incentives misses important ideational drivers for the government to keep investors in the country. For Chávez's government, effecting changes in the oil policy was possible after waging an intense battle with its NOC, PDVSA, over control. Association with foreign investment became crucial to build its socialist model and to control its own company.

In 1996, the Finnish government initiated an Action Plan aimed at the more effective control of economic crime and the grey economy, involving wide-scale reform in legislation, regulatory agencies, enforcement practice, and research activities. The emergence of this Action Plan forms the empirical focus of this article, which addresses two specific research questions. First, what were the economic, social and political factors that produced this Action Plan? Second, how can this initiative contribute to a critical assessment of the claims of “globalization discourses,” which seem to render such an idiosyncratic nation-state development as unlikely? The article critically examines some of the elements of globalization discourses with particular respect to the implications for the nature of contemporary states and the possibilities for the more effective regulation of corporate activity. It then outlines the processes and events that allowed the Finnish Action Plan to emerge. Finally, it asks what lessons are to be learnt from the Finnish case, before identifying some further lines of enquiry to be pursued. This Finnish initiative seems to represent one important instance of the extent to which states can develop relatively autonomous economic and social policy, even where this appears to be detrimental to the interests of “capital.”

Governments support clean technologies to advance both environmental goals and national competitiveness. By adopting environmental policies early on, governments are argued to create durable competitive advantages for domestic companies that develop clean technologies for export to late adopters. This paper argues that policy competition between lead and follower markets conditions the ability of governments to create durable competitive advantages in low-carbon technologies. Depending on the complexity of the technology, we observe two patterns of green industrial policy competition. In low-complexity technologies, such as solar photovoltaics, follower markets are likely to adopt policies that support manufacturing capacity to rapidly achieve price advantages from economies of scale, with global supply chains intensifying this competition (“scaling up”). In high-complexity technologies, such as electric vehicles, follower markets are likely to adopt policies that support research and development to develop differentiated high-tech products for export (“innovating up”). We also suggest that new forms of interdependence in policy competition can affect the political sustainability of lead market policies. Competition in scaling-up is more likely to undermine political coalitions in favor of government support for low-carbon technologies, while innovating-up dynamics embed political coalitions that support lead market policies for low-carbon technologies.

We examine the characteristics of business firms that gain access to legislative and executive branch officials in the trade policymaking area. Our empirical analysis of over 1200 manufacturers reveals that legislators were most attracted to firms with foreign market expertise, firms which actively participated in politics with outside lobbyists and campaign contributions, and firms with significant employment in the state and/or district. Executive branch officials were responsive to firms with foreign market expertise, firms from industries that had previously received tariff protection, firms using in-house government affairs specialists and outside lobbyists to convey information, and firms making campaign contributions to members of the trade oversight legislative committees. Our results largely support the political market framework and provide insights about the attractiveness of certain demanders to suppliers of trade policies from the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. federal government.

Negotiations for China's accession to the WTO provoked a debate between pessimists who believed that opening the economy would lead to a flood of imports and a de-nationalization of manufacturing industry, and those who believed that it would spur rationalization of state-owned enterprises, lock in domestic reforms, attract foreign investment, and open the way for trade expansion. The industry most frequently mentioned as endangered was motor vehicles, where an awkward combination of Stalinist central planning with localized autarky had resulted in a proliferation of inefficient producers. With the partial exception of two investments by Volkswagen, initial joint ventures in assembly operations failed miserably. China's commitments on joining the WTO banned (or at least complicated) many of the most important industrial policy tools it had used to promote the auto industry since the opening to joint ventures in the early 1980s'including performance requirements, high tariffs, and numerical quotas. After accession in 2001, tariffs fell steadily while output and foreign investment soared. The Chinese government moved towards a lighter-handed but more effective form of industrial policy that reduced top-down planning while expanding market incentives and scope for managerial freedom. Rather than destroying industrial policy for the auto industry, WTO accession constrained and disciplined it. When foreign auto firms and their governments pushed for more aggressive protection of trademarks and other intellectual property rights under the WTO, the Chinese government initially stalled. Continuing pressure then tilted the balance of state policy toward promotion of independent design, whether by state-owned enterprises testing the boundaries of their joint ventures with foreign multinationals, or by audacious smaller firms purchasing foreign designs and technology to complement inexpensive local parts and assembly, thereby creating the conditions for the emergence of a more competitive industry.

This article tests two hypotheses about post-communist business associations. The first predicts weak business associations which are presented with insurmountable collective action problems by the flattened civil society inherited from totalitarianism. According to this hypothesis, no business associations are inherited from the previous regime, and associations are confronted with difficult-to-organize latent groups of large numbers of new small enterprises. The second hypothesis, as proposed by Mancur Olson, predicts strong business associations benefiting from the collective action advantages of the communist economic structure which was composed of small numbers of large enterprises. The hypotheses are tested with case studies of Poland's five most influential business associations. The conclusion is that the flattened civil society hypothesis is best borne out by the evidence. This suggests that, in other countries, political factors, rather than the standard communist economic structure, are more likely to explain the persistence of industrial super lobbies.