Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-7cvxr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-22T16:04:49.381Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Who Supports Compensation? Individual Preferences for Trade-Related Unemployment Insurance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Sean D. Ehrlich
Sean D. Ehrlich*
Affiliation:
Florida State University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The political economy of trade literature argues that the policy of compensating those who lose from trade is an important component of maintaining public support for free-trade, a linkage known as the compensation hypothesis or embedded liberalism thesis. This article tests the causal mechanisms underlying the compensation hypothesis by examining support for trade-related compensation using survey data from the United States. Expectations about the effects of trade strongly predict support for trade-related unemployment insurance, with those who expect to lose more likely to support and those who expect to gain more like to oppose, but has no influence on support for general unemployment insurance despite previous research suggesting it should.

Keywords

trade policyunemployment insurancecompensation hypothesisembedded liberalism
Type
Research Article
Information
Business and Politics , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , April 2010 , pp. 1 - 22
Copyright
Copyright © V.K. Aggarwal 2010 and published under exclusive license to Cambridge University Press 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Adsera, Alicia and Boix, Carles. 2002. Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness. International Organization 56 (2): 229–262.Google Scholar
Baker, Andy. 2005. Who Wants to Globalize? Consumer Tastes and Labor Markets in a Theory of Trade Policy Beliefs. American Journal of Political Science 49 (4): 924–938.Google Scholar
Balcells Ventura, Laia. 2006. Trade Openness and Preferences for Redistribution: A Cross-National Assessment of the Compensation Hypothesis. Business and Politics 8 (2).Google Scholar
Cameron, David. 1978. The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis. American Political Science Review 72 (4): 1243–1261.Google Scholar
DeMeritt, Jacqueline H.R. 2008. Military Intervention and Government Killing. Unpublished manuscript.Google Scholar
Destler, I.M. 2005. American Trade Politics. 4th Edition. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.Google Scholar
Down, Ian. 2007. Trade Openness, Country Size and Economic Volatility: The Compensation Hypothesis Revisited. Business and Politics. 9 (2).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ehrlich, Sean D. and Maestas, Cherie. Forthcoming. Risk Exposure, Risk Orientation, and Policy Opinions: The Case of Free Trade. Political Psychology.Google Scholar
Esping-Anderson, Gosta. 1990. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Garrett, Geoffrey and Mitchell, Deborah. 2001. Globalization, Government Spending and Taxation in the OECD. European Journal of Political Research 39 (2): 145–178.Google Scholar
Hainmueller, Jens and Hiscox, Michael. 2006. Learning to Love Globalization: The Effects of Education Individual Attitudes towards International Trade. International Organization 60 (2): 469–498.Google Scholar
Hanmer, Michael J. and Kalkan, Kerem Ozan. 2008. Behind the Curve: Calculating Predicted Probabilities and Marginal Effects from Limited Dependent Variable Models. Unpublished manuscript.Google Scholar
Hays, Jude C., Ehrlich, Sean D., and Peinhardt, Clint. 2005. Government Spending and Public Support for Trade in the OECD. International Organization 59 (2): 473–494.Google Scholar
Hiscox, Michael. 2002. International Trade and Political Conflict: Commerce, Coalitions, and Mobility. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Iversen, Torben and Cusack, Thomas R. 2000. The Causes of Welfare State Expansion: Deindustrialization or Globalization? World Politics 52 (3): 313–349.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Iversen, Torben and Soskice, David. 2001. An Asset Theory of Social Policy Preferences. American Political Science Review 95: 875–893.Google Scholar
King, Gary, Tomz, Michael, and Wittenberg, Jason. 2001. Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation. American Journal of Political Science 44 (2): 347–361.Google Scholar
Kono, Daniel Y. 2008. Does Public Opinion Affect Trade Policy? Business and Politics 10 (2).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mansfield, Edward D. and Mutz, Diana C. 2009. Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety. International Organization 63 (3): 425–457.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mayda, Anna M., O'Rourke, Kevin H., and Sinnott, Richard. 2007. Risk, Government and Globalization: International Survey Evidence. IIIS Discussion Paper No. 218. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=980939 Google Scholar
Mayda, Anna M. and Rodrik, Dani. 2005. “Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist than Others?” European Economic Review 49 (6): 1393–1430.Google Scholar
Meltzer, Allen and Richard, Scott. 1981. A Rational Theory of the Size of Government. Journal of Political Economy 89: 914–927.Google Scholar
Moene, Karl and Wallerstein, Michael. 2001. Inequality, Social Insurance, and Redistribution. American Political Science Review 95: 859–873.Google Scholar
Orloff, Ann Shola. 1993. The Politics of Pensions: A Comparative Analysis of Britain, Canada, and the United States, 1880s-1940. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.Google Scholar
Rehm, Philipp. 2009. Risk and Redistribution: An Individual-Level Analysis. Comparative Political Studies. 42 (7): 855–881.Google Scholar
Rickard, Stephanie. 2008. Compensating the Losers: Evidence of Policy Responses to Globalization from Congressional Votes. Paper Presented at 2008 Midwest Political Science Association Conference.Google Scholar
Rodrik, Dani. 1997. Has Globalization Gone Too Far? Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rodrik, Dani. 1998. Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments? Journal of Political Economy 106 (5): 997–1032.Google Scholar
Rudra, Nita. 2002. Globalization and the Decline of the Welfare State in Less-Developed Countries. International Organization 56 (2): 411–445.Google Scholar
Ruggie, John G. 1982. “International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order.” International Organization 36 (2): 195–231.Google Scholar
Ruggie, John G. ed. 2008. Embedding Global Markets: An Enduring Challenge. New York: Ashgate Publishing.Google Scholar
Scheve, Kenneth and Slaughter, Matthew. 2001. Globalization and the Perceptions of American Workers. Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics.Google Scholar
Scheve, Kenneth and Stasavage, David. 2006. Religion and Preferences for Social Insurance. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 1 (3): 255–286.Google Scholar
Swank, Duane. 2002. Global Capital, Political Institutions, and Policy Change in Developed Welfare States. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Walter, Stefanie. 2008. Globalization and Compensation Revisited: Testing the Causal Chain on the Individual Level. Paper Presented at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.Google Scholar