Despite the observed frequency of firm lobbying, scholars attempting to explain this behavior have had little luck. Pushing away from theories that center on firm characteristics, this paper argues that firm lobbying can be best explained with a sociological model of competitive action. In particular, firms that perceive other firms to have influence on policy are more likely to lobby policy-makers. Since firms are both competitors in a free market and socially embedded actors, their belief in other firms’ influence on policy pushes them to engage in similar behavior in order to increase profit and survive. I test this argument with a combination of quantitative analysis of survey responses from 7247 firms in 40 countries from the World Bank Enterprise Survey and seven qualitative interviews with key firms in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The results provide evidence for the hypothesis. This finding implies that scholars should not only take into account firm characteristics, but also explore the possible effects of how a firm's decision to lobby or not is influenced by its environment.

According to most of the literature available so far, international and European cross-border banks and investments firms are considered the primary beneficiaries of the CMU and related revitalization of securitization. Nevertheless, an in-depth analysis of the transnational financial industry lobbying and influence, in the light of the final agreement on the securitization reform package, is still missing. This paper intends to fill this gap in the story by assessing if, and to what extent, the alleged industry beneficiaries played an active role in shaping the regulatory agenda within the CMU project and its related outcomes. An in-depth analysis of corporate lobbying in the securitization reform is thus provided, by looking at the interactions between structural and political contextual factors in shaping private/public coalitions along the different stages of the EU policy-making process. As it is argued here, the policy entrepreneurship of the European securitization industry has been the key factor to explain the emergence of the EU regulatory approach and its legislative outcomes.

This paper considers the relationship between assessments of institutional quality in developing countries and the innovative activities of multinational corporations. Firm entry mode literature has established links between domestic institutions and ownership equity patterns among multinationals, but institutionalist analyses have not adequately addressed the types of activities pursued by multinational firms. I argue that in addition to various socioeconomic indicators, the quality of domestic political institutions in developing countries is an important determinant of local innovative activity. I argue that institutional quality in host countries reinforces consistent patterns of interaction between states and firms, leading to reduced risk of technological expropriation and other undesirable outcomes for firms. I test this argument by examining the impact of institutional assessments, carried out by firms themselves and by outside observers, on R&D effort among multinationals, using firm-level surveys conducted in developing countries between 2002 and 2005. The multilevel empirical analysis suggests that multinational firms are likely to both locate R&D activities and pursue them intensively in developing countries with well-regarded institutions, and that the impact of institutional variables is more significant than other likely predictors, such as education levels in host countries.

America's securities markets constitute a central distinguishing feature of its brand of capitalism. What are their political origins? In contrast to arguments which point to business owners as determining the institutional foundations of America's political economy, this paper argues that farmers played a leading role. Indeed, the rules and regulations governing U.S. securities markets were created in opposition to the wishes of business owners, and without farmers' political influence, the U.S. may have developed a financial system similar to that found in continental Europe. Moreover, to the extent that U.S. securities regulations serve as a template for international financial standards, the paper shows that the humble American farmer inadvertently contributed to the financialization of the modern global economy.

This essay explores the relationship between commerce and culture in the context of the recent debate over the social effect of Wal-Mart. In spite of much public debate, little is known about how Wal-Mart affects values. Using data collected from multiple sources, we show there is little evidence that Wal-Mart makes communities more conservative or more progressive.

We are currently witnessing the evolution of global accounting standards, as developed by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). This is a remarkable development, not only because accounting standards are relevant for all business operations. Whereas accounting standard-setting has previously been a task of national authorities, the process will now be managed internationally by a London-based organisation whose parent foundation is a private company incorporated in the US state of Delaware and mainly financed by the Big Four accounting firms. Furthermore, the US appear to be willing to accept foreign standards that are quite different from their own Generally Accepted Accounting Standards (GAAP). This does not only contradict a widespread perception that equals globalization with Americanization, but also offers a remarkable contrast to US unilateralism in other policy fields. Finally, we are also amidst a major change in the substance of accounting standards, as indicated by a shift from historic cost to fair value accounting within the work of the IASB. This special issue of Business and Politics is devoted to a systematic explanation of these developments, drawing on concepts from International Relations, International Political Economy and Systems Theory.

The commercial aircraft industry is no stranger to trade friction, which has brought bitter international disputes over industrial policy to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Yet despite the fact that several countries, notably China, Japan and Russia have stated their intentions to develop aircraft that can compete with other countries, these efforts have not led to a trade dispute. What explains this pattern? Drawing on sources such as the Global Trade Alert database, this paper argues that that the complexity of the aircraft industry generates considerable barriers to entry. Moreover, emerging aerospace states have not repeated earlier efforts of direct subsidy, but rather, they have sought to position themselves in the global aerospace value chain, with selective government interventions designed to help national champions accumulate the necessary technical experience though collaboration with incumbent firms. However, the very diversity of government supports may make protectionist measures more difficult to identify.

Over the last 60 years, the multilateral management of trade through the GATT and subsequently through the WTO has been led by the United States and Europe. Since the turn of the new millennium, however, developing countries have increasingly used their leverage to insist that talks on agriculture receive priority attention, deny the inclusion of investment and competition policy on the negotiating agenda, and block agreement on negotiating modalities for agriculture and non-agricultural market access (NAMA). Cooperation between the United States and the European Union is still essential, but no longer sufficient, for successful multilateral negotiations. Specifically, the “BRICKs” (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and Korea) are likely to be pivotal in directing the course and contributing to the success or failure of the WTO.

It has long been overlooked that factions of finance such as banks and insurers can have opposing policy interests. This paper is concerned with the preferences and strategies of private financial actors in the context of private prefunded pensions. To capture the “tug of war” among these actors, this paper identifies their different financial business models (insurance- and investment-orientation), political roles (financial incumbents and challengers), and levels at which infighting may occur (political and product-market level). For the German case, it shows that product-market competition among financial incumbents and challengers over retirement savings products only turned into competition politics during the 1990s, when shifting political winds provided an opening to insert path-shaping instruments in line with the program of finance capitalism. Financial actors’ preferences are not a derivative of economic or functional incentives, but socially embedded in that they are crucially shaped by interactions with their competitors and the political environment. The analysis disentangles the complex web of competition, cooperation, and ownership among factions of finance and discerns their genuine preferences from those strategically adjusted to context. This sheds doubt on functionalist explanations of (pension) financialization and enhances our understanding of how financial actors form and pursue their preferences.

After the subprime financial crisis, the countries who were worst affected set about reforming legacy financial regulations. Given multiple similarities in the way they experienced the crisis and the similar complexions of their post-crisis economies and politics, the contrast between the UK and the Netherlands' approaches to breaking up their largest banks presents a puzzle for prevailing theories in the politics of financial regulation. Both countries explored a range of reform options using similar expert committees, but while UK policymakers determined that commercial and investment operations should be ring-fenced in the largest British banks, the Dutch reform program centered on the banks’ own recommendations to change banking culture from the bottom up by developing a code of conduct and banker's oath. The paper traces this divergence to two related effects produced by the countries’ contrasting majoritarian and consensus party systems: power sharing and coalition formation. Under conditions of high issue salience, both worked to encourage British policymakers to prioritize reform, while in the Netherlands each factor reduced party political responsiveness and de-emphasized alternatives to the banks’ own reform prescriptions. The paper ultimately suggests that institutional democratic variables are worthy of greater recognition among scholars of business power and financial regulation.

The Lobbying and Disclosure Act of 1995 requires lobbyists to disclose information about their lobbying activities. The resulting data is used by the website OpenSecrets.org (run by the Center for Responsive Politics) to give snapshot pictures of the amount of lobbying groups do. The same data has also been used by scholars to measure the impact of lobbying and to evaluate rent-seeking expenditures by firms. Unfortunately, users of the data are unaware of a reporting option for organizations under the LDA that has consequences for the validity of the data. LDA data does not accurately reflect the amount of money that an organization has spent trying to influence federal law because organizations may choose a reporting requirement under which they must also disclose the amount of money they spent to influence state laws. In this article I analyze the implications of this fact. I begin with a discussion of the problem's scope and then show how it misleads scholars.

This paper examines the political economy of the Orange Revolution in an effort to understand routes by which less democratic postcommunist countries might break with an illiberal status quo. The fusion of Ukraine's rent-seeking economic interests and illiberal political regime produced an unstable equilibrium that is poorly explained by two leading theoretical frameworks: ‘market reform’ and ‘political competition’ theory. Only by combining key insights from each do we get a full explanation of the pressures that generated Ukraine's challenge to illiberalism in 2004. We examine this story with a particular focus on the crisis-prone nature of ‘competitive authoritarian regimes’ and the related strategic calculations of business elites.

International environmental cooperation can impose significant costs on private firms. Yet, in recent years some companies have been supportive of international climate agreements. This suggests that under certain conditions environmental accords can be profitable. In this paper, I seek to explain this puzzle by focusing on the interaction between domestic regulation and decisions at international climate negotiations. I argue that global climate cooperation hurts the profits of polluting firms if domestic governments do not shield them from international compliance costs. Vice versa, if firms are subject to protective (i.e., insufficiently severe) policy instruments at home, firms can materially gain from international climate agreements that sustain expectations about their profitability. I test the argument with an event study of the effect of decisions at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) on major European firms that received free carbon permits in the early stages of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The analysis suggests that financial markets carefully follow the international climate negotiations, and reward the regulated firms based on the outcome of UNFCCC decisions. The evidence also indicates the advantageous interplay between certain types of domestic regulations and international regimes for business. More generally, the results show the perils of privately supported policy for the effectiveness of international public good provision.

This article constructs a measure of geopolitical and economic tensions in US–China relations based on the sentiment expressed in major US news media and utilizes it to analyze the impact of bilateral tensions on US imports from China between 2002 and 2019. Our results suggest that bilateral tensions have had a negative effect on US imports. Additional analyses of the impact of bilateral tensions for industries with varying levels of supply chain linkages to China suggest that, contrary to expectations, they have more disproportionately affected industries highly integrated with the Chinese market. This pattern continues to hold during the trade war period. Not only were bilateral tensions associated with higher tariffs for industries with high levels of global value chain linkages to China, but the tariff hikes have also had a more sustained impact on such industries. Overall, our findings indicate that potential “sunk costs” considerations may not have been strong enough to forestall the downward trend in bilateral trade relations under both routine diplomacy and trade war conditions.

The auto industry is usually considered to be a global industry. Yet the majority of passenger cars are still manufactured and sold in industrialised states where its largest firms are headquartered. The central claim made is that despite the auto industry being comprised of multinational corporations, there are clear national differences in the motivations firms cite for environmental initiatives. US firms are more focused on traditional material factors, especially market forces. However, German and Japanese firms are more focused on social concerns and internally-driven strategies. They have more normative, non-market rationales for their environmental initiatives. By analysing what firms themselves say motivates them to improve the environmental performance of their products, via a qualitative analysis of recent environmental reports by German, US and Japanese firms, as well as interviews conducted with key personnel, the conclusion reached is as follows. While the question of ‘greenwashing’ versus real commitment to reduce the environmental impact of the industry's products remains relevant, the institutional basis of capitalist relations in their home state (i.e. their home state's variety of capitalism) suggests different nationally appropriate and conducive paths to environmental commitments.

The primary research question animating this article revolves around understanding how multinational mining corporations (MMCs) are responding to the twin pressures of globalization and localization to develop Corporate Responsibility (CR) approaches that apply at a global level and to their subsidiaries in various different jurisdictions, with particular attention being paid to the role of home, host and international factors in shaping the CR approaches of MMCs. The focus of attention is on the experience of Canadian MMCs in Latin America, using as an illustration the particular CR response of one Canadian MMC at its subsidiary Guatemalan mining operation. Research suggests that home country factors play an important role in shaping corporate CR approaches in a manner which take into account the circumstances extant at subsidiary operations in developing countries, as do transnational advocacy networks and global normative instruments.

The promotion of additive manufacturing (AM) as a set of enabling technologies has been a prominent feature of new policies seeking to revitalize manufacturing in developed economies. Because of its differences from traditional manufacturing technologies, small businesses, in particular, face high costs in adopting AM methods. How can governments assist small firms and their innovation ecosystems to make significant leaps in enabling technologies? This paper conceptualizes the challenges faced by groups of small enterprises adopting new technologies and a decentralized policy effort to systematically increase the use of advanced manufacturing technologies. In Canada, funding used by community colleges to create applied research centers has been intended to establish anchors for local “industrial commons” around advanced manufacturing methods. By providing both information and working capital to private sector partners, these community college programs should ideally mitigate challenges to the adoption of AM technologies—the so-called “valley of death”—in local ecosystems. There are many successful individual cases of partnership (i.e., private goods); however, this bottom-up approach seems to fail both as a means of promoting vibrant industrial commons (i.e., public goods) and as a coherent national strategy. We trace the challenges of this approach to principal-agent problems associated with layering new programs upon existing organizations, the density of program participants, and the presence of appropriate technologies.

This study uses club theory to describe the incentives of extractive industry MNCs to support the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a multi-stakeholder promoted voluntary social program (VSP) aimed at creating national legislation to make the royalty payments received by governments from mining and oil and gas companies more transparent to the public. We characterize the EITI as a VSP that lacks stringent standards and that has a moderate to high level of enforcement through the national governments that have adopted its principles. According to club theory, VSPs with these characteristics produce only a low to medium level of club benefits, in this case “social branding,” for member firms. Noting that over 60 MNCs have signed on to the EITI as of April 2012, we argue that VSPs offering low to medium club benefits should be most attractive to MNCs from countries with long arm disclosure laws, to MNCs lacking relationships with NGOs seeking inexpensive CSR, to MNCs relying upon financing from institutional and social investors, to MNCs attempting to differentiate themselves from competitors on social criteria, and to MNCs with broad stakeholder-focused top managers. We also describe the implications for MNCs if the EITI were to include a more stringent set of social requirements.

Business plays a critical yet poorly understood role in trade policymaking. This paper develops an analytical framework that focuses on the distribution of business trade preferences, the forces that cause those preferences to change, and the ability of different groups to exert political influence over policy. It then applies this framework to Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s. Large, exporting firms increased their weight due to shifts in the international context, the condition of the domestic economy, and previous government policies. Policymakers granted political access to actors whose economic and political leverage had risen, typically those who controlled numerous investment resources and sought out a direct role in policymaking. Many of these actors also favored free trade. Business participation in trade policy reflects these patterns. Large, outward-oriented firms played an increasingly important role in Mexico's adoption of free trade policies over the 1980s and early 1990s.

We examine how economic change influences the supply of organized interests. Indeed, the economies of states have changed markedly since the turn of the century. State economies have grown, and the relative contributions of different economic sectors have changed. We use the Energy-Stability-Area model of interest system density to assess how these changes – along with changes in the productivity of different economic sectors in terms of generating organized interests – have influenced the size and composition of state interest communities from 1997 to 2007. We find that all three sources of economic change have uniquely contributed, and to a significant degree, to demographic change in state communities of organized interests.