eBay provides an online auction venue for remote and anonymous members of its online community to realize gains from trade. As a venue it never sees the items sold, verifies the item listings, handles settlements, or represents the buyer or seller. Despite the associated market imperfections and incentive problems, over five million auctions are active on an average day. Trading is based on trust among members of the eBay community, and trust is supported by a multilateral reputation mechanism based on member feedback. eBay supplements the reputation mechanism with rules and policies that mitigate incentive problems, reduce transactions costs, and support trust among members and between members and the company. Reputations and the rules and policies provide a private ordering of eBay's community. This paper examines this private ordering in the context of the company's strategy and in the shadow of the public order.

What is the relationship between globalization and the political power of business? Much of the existing literature focuses on the ability of mobile capital to threaten exit in order to press for more business friendly rules. In this article, we refine arguments about exit options in global markets by arguing that the relative exit options available to business and other actors are neither fixed, nor exogenous consequences of some generically conceived process of globalization. Instead, they themselves are the result of struggles between actors with different interests and political opportunities. Since exit options play a crucial role in determining the relative structural power of business vis-à-vis other actors, we dub the power to shape exit options structuring power, distinguishing it from structural power, and argue that it is crucial to explaining it. We identify two channels through which actors can shape exit options – extending jurisdictional reach and reshaping the rules of other jurisdictions – and the factors that will make regulators and business more or less capable of exercising structuring power. We then use two exploratory case studies – one involving privacy regulation, the other accountancy standards – to illustrate how structuring power can work to shape exit options, and thus structural power. We conclude by considering the relationship between structuring power, structural power, and the existing literature in comparative and international political economy.

With increasing regularity managers must address nonmarket as well as market problems. A common U.S. manifestation of this often-unwelcome reality is the abrupt emergence of a “Washington problem,” such as a piece of hostile legislation gathering momentum in the Congress. Although most business leaders today realize that doing nothing is rarely a viable response many activist nonmarket strategies are likewise problematic. For example even in the rare instances in which companies have the resources to devote to last-minute cover-the-Capitol blitzes such strategies are rarely effective and invariably wasteful. On any given issue a significant minority of legislators will oppose the lobbying manager's recommendations no matter what and a sizeable minority will favor them no matter what. Effective nonmarket strategies in contrast consist of knowing enough about governmental processes to ascertain who are the likely pivotal voters. This article presents a theory that provides a parsimonious way to think about pivotal voters in separation-of-power situations. Ultimately the theory provides guidance for the formation of more efficient and effective nonmarket strategies.

How and to what effect do firms coordinate their actions to deal with the negative external effects of productive activity? Under which conditions do associations engage in self-regulation and how do they tackle the specific regulatory challenges at stake? When developing hypotheses, we first vary attributes of the information environment in which private actors interact; and, secondly, actors' preferences as a function of the problem type at hand. With respect to the environmental conditions, our findings show that a regulatory threat matters when developing associative action, whilst the evidence is less clear as regards NGO campaigns. In terms of the problem type, we find that redistributive issues and prisoner's dilemma situations are much more conflict prone than coordination/win-win type of problems. Industry actors recur to various governance devices such as flexible contract design and compensation mechanisms to solve redistributive problems. Prisoner's dilemma (PD) problems may only partially be addressed by governance devices to the extent that free-riding is controlled and sanctioned within an association. We conclude that private actors engaging in self-regulation will not successfully manage all types of conflicts. They lack powerful sanctioning tools to deal with PD situations, but prove to be able to flexibly handle redistributive problems.

I conduct an event study of an exogenous pollution shock-smog in the winter of 2013 to examine how the market values of firms in polluting industries and environmental protecting industries, respectively, responded in “the world's worst polluter”: China. I first show that politically connected polluters, defined by having at least one board member who was a former local bureaucrat, are more likely to be state owned and in debt. During the 21 days of the smog, polluters experienced a cumulative abnormal return of −5.38%, while protectors had a cumulative abnormal return of 3.50%. However, politically connected polluters were less susceptible to the shock: they experienced a 1% greater positive abnormal return than unconnected polluters. Connected protectors also benefited from a greater 1% abnormal return than unconnected protectors. The findings imply that environmental disasters have distributional effects, and support a theory that links rent-seeking behavior to pollution.

This article examines bank lobbying in the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). While excessive bank lobbying is routinely linked to weakened banking regulations, we still know little about bank mobilization patterns. In particular, when and why do some banks lobby the BCBS while others do not? I argue that the decision to lobby is a function of two factors: banks’ organizational characteristics and domestic banking regulations. I test my argument using a unique dataset of over 33,000 banks worldwide during the period in which Basel III was negotiated. My findings confirm a pronounced bias in bank mobilization patterns toward wealthy, internationally active banks. I also find that banks facing more stringent banking regulations at home tend to lobby the BCBS in an effort to level the playing field with international competitors. This effect is particularly salient for stringent regulations on banking activities as well as higher capital adequacy requirements.1

This paper examines the political activity of US defense contractors over the years 1980–1994. Using econometric techniques to account for both fixed-effects and selection, I examine the industry determinants and distribution patterns of political action committee (PAC) contributions to the US House of Representatives. The analysis finds that the size of the defense budget is a primary factor explaining political activity across the industry as well as within individual firms; firm size, dependency on defense, and defense contract awards explain much less. I also find that firms appeared to change their political strategies in the face of large exogenous shifts in the US defense budget. While defense expenditures were on the rise, defense firms spread their contributions relatively broadly over the defense committee system; when the budget fell, however, the firms switched strategies and targeted committee leaders. An incidental contribution of the paper is an empirical application of the trimmed least absolute deviations estimator for fixed-effects models with selection.

Wind power remains one of the fastest growing energy sources in the world, even as countries have struggled to come back from the global economic crisis of 2008. Yet the sector's rise has been the product of a crucial shift in how governments approach renewable energy. To build political support for wind power, governments have added industrial policy instruments to traditional renewable energy deployment mechanisms. This paper argues that we are witnessing a rise in protectionism in the wind power sector growing out of specific political and economic challenges at the national level that have arisen in the period following the 2008 crisis. In addition, this paper demonstrates that protectionism, justified by a rationale of promoting local economic development, takes many forms, and countries have come up with ever more varied and sophisticated methods of using industrial policy to establish and protect nascent, strategic industries. Finally, it challenges conventional wisdom that protectionism is reserved for the emerging economies as either a strategy to improve economic competitiveness or as a short cut to technological innovation. It demonstrates that while these strategies do indeed persist in emerging economies, North America and Western Europe continue to protect their own wind industries, even as they initiate disputes with countries for implementing similar measures.

In recent years, Saudi Arabia has strengthened its regulatory and financial institutions and adopted many reforms concerning its business environment. Yet, Saudi Arabia seems an unlikely country to succeed at implementing business environment reforms given the presence of an authoritarian state and rent-seeking behavior from elites that is the outcome of oil wealth. What explains the ability of Saudi Arabia to initiate reforms that many states have struggled to implement or uniformly reject? This paper argues that the country's monarchical system helps the government solve the credible commitment problem with private sector elites, thereby facilitating business environment reforms. The monarchical system does this by legitimizing and reinforcing the institution of economic familism. The salience of this institution provides a reliable guarantee to private sector elites that their rents and business interests will be protected during the reform process. The case of Saudi Arabia stands as an important example of how absolute monarchies can pursue certain economic reforms, and also how an informal institution can solve the credible commitment problem in an authoritarian context where formal institutions are either absent or weak.

Real exchange rate movements are robustly related to the rise and fall of trade protectionism. I demonstrate this by presenting a theoretical model that incorporates the real exchange rate into a standard factor proportions model of trade policy preferences. The model demonstrates why some firms' trade policy preferences, and thus total demands for protectionism, change in response to real exchange rate movements. I evaluate the model with data on antidumping investigations in six industrialized countries between the late 1970s and 2004. The exercise suggests that the real exchange rate hypothesis offers a more compelling explanation for protectionist waves than the business cycle hypothesis.

Corporate Responsibility (CR) is today an essential component of corporate global strategy. CR can bolster the institutional context for market expansion fill institutional voids or facilitate market entry as a component of non-market strategy. Yet, in fulfilling these functions, CR may need to be highly sensitive to local contexts. How can transnational firms organize CR so as to maximize efficiencies from globalization and to minimize the fragmentation of corporate organizational cultures? provide a framework for analyzing the way that corporations coordinate global and local functions. We build on this framework in a case study of Novo Nordisk and its approach to determining global and local CR policies and procedures with regard to its China and US subsidiaries. Our findings suggest that it is important for companies to define a common set of organizational norms. In addition, CR need to be sensitive to local institutional contexts, but learning from subsidiary experience is important and lends itself to standardization and replication of initiatives across market contexts.

This paper examines several hypotheses that have been proposed to explain the existence and growth of legislators' campaign “warchests”. We examine the sources and political consequences of warchests in US House elections over the period of 1978–1998. Briefly, our findings are as follows. First, we find little evidence in support of the deterrence hypotheses. Second, short-term electoral forces-scandals, partisan tides, challenger quality-accounts for a large fraction of the explained variation in savings. Third, incumbents act as if they have finite, “target” levels of total savings. Fourth, some of the accumulated savings before 1992 appear to be for retirement. Finally, we find considerable evidence that many of the largest warchests are accumulated to help members run for higher office.

By analyzing the interaction between a business firm and multiple government institutions (including a regulatory agency, an executive and a bicameral legislature), we develop predictions about how firms target their political strategies at different branches of government when seeking more favorable public policies. The core of our argument is that firms will target their resources at the institution that is ‘pivotal’ in the policy-making process. We develop a simple framework, drawing on the political science literature, which identifies pivotal institutions in different types of political environments. We find empirical support for our thesis in an analysis of how U.S. accounting firms shifted their political campaign contributions between the House and Senate in response to the threat of new regulations governing auditor independence during the 1990s.

The creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 was a landmark in the development of the liberal international economic order. Yet the global economic crisis of 2008 put the spotlight on the longstanding question whether WTO membership limited the policy choices of governments coping with distress. This Special Issue of Business and Politics uses the crisis as a “stress test” for evaluating the prominent thesis that multilateral trade rules presently impose sharp limits on national industrial policies. The evidence from a wide range of sectoral and national contexts suggests that the WTO's ability to constrain member governments’ use of industrial policy is highly exaggerated. As we argue in this introductory essay, and as the studies in this Issue show, assertions of the WTO's strength do not reflect the incomplete and contested nature of its accords and the imperatives of policymaking in an era when many governments simultaneously intervene in national economies.

After the global financial crisis of 2007–9, policymakers hailed macroprudential policy as the solution to financial markets’ boom-bust patterns. Financial regulations would have to operate countercyclically, increasing in stringency during a boom while becoming lenient in a bust. Simultaneously, the procyclical effects of pre-crisis rules would have to be eliminated. Actual reforms, however, do not live up to these high hopes. In addition to the countercyclical policy framework's limited scope and ambition, its open-endedness is particularly striking. As policymakers have not specified when supervisors should (de)activate what instruments and how firms should measure risk, there is an inbuilt indeterminacy at macroprudential policy's core. I argue that obstacles inherent to the nature of systemic risk are key to understanding this policy outcome. As the financial system is reflexive, adaptive, and complex, there are hard limits to supervisors’ ability to “read” the financial cycle. Furthermore, as macroprudential policy itself becomes “part of financial markets,” countercyclical interventions may have systemically significant unintended consequences. This article empirically shows how policymakers at the global and EU level, confronted with these measurement and mitigation problems, ultimately opted for a limited and open-ended policy framework.

We discuss the political and legal environment surrounding Internet wine sales, and consider the arguments in the debate over direct shipment bans on wine by investigating the wine market in the Northern Virginia suburbs of Washington, DC. Using a sample of wines identified by Wine and Spirits magazine's annual restaurant poll, we find that 15 percent of wines available online were not available from retail wine stores within 10 miles of McLean, Virginia during the month the data were collected. Our results also indicate that Virginia's direct shipment ban, which was in place until 2003, prevented consumers from purchasing some premium wines at lower prices online. Aggregate cost savings depends on the consumer's shopping strategy, the price per bottle, the quantity of wine ordered, and the shipping method chosen. For the entire sample, online purchase could result in an average savings of as much as 3.6 percent or an average premium of as much as 48 percent. A comparison shopper who considers both online and offline retailers could save an average of 1.6-9.7 percent. These results help explain why consumers and producers have found it worthwhile to challenge interstate direct shipment bans, which tend to benefit wine wholesalers.

Despite a considerable push by policy-makers to incentivize green business practices, take-up of environmental initiatives amongst North American retailers has been highly uneven. While some “big-box” retailers have launched ambitious environmental initiatives, others continue to conduct business as usual. This paper asks: why do some mega-retailers commit to ambitious environmental agendas while others in the same sector do not? And how can the answer to this question improve public policy? I investigate these questions using comparative case studies of four North American big-box retailers: Wal-Mart, Target, Costco and Kroger. My findings suggest that the socialization of senior executives through multi-stakeholder sustainability networks is the critical variable accounting for progressive environmental practices in some corporations and not others. This finding suggests that existing public policies that focus on making the business case for sustainability are based on incomplete assumptions about why companies “go green.” It further suggests that socialization theory can help explain broader instances of corporate social responsibility and proposes that scholars in this field should devote more attention to the composition of socializing groups.

Analyses of corporate governance problems in China's state sector have mainly focused on administrative interference from state agencies. So far the influence of Communist party institutions has received little attention. Although the influence of ideology has diminished greatly, the Chinese Communist party continues to monitor and control economic actors at every level of the state sector. This article shows that the institutional structure through which the party executes its monitoring and control functions has a corrosive effect on the day-to-day governance of the vast majority of state enterprises. The party's management structure aggravates the inadequate monitoring of managerial performance, weakens managerial incentives, and amplifies insufficient corporate transparency, thereby allowing state asset managers to carve out informal spheres of autonomy. These spheres of autonomy create opportunities for insider control, economic corruption, and the illicit privatization of state assets. Effective and sustainable privatization and corporate governance reforms in China's state sector will thus require the party to substantially diminish its authority over state sector executives.

This study investigates stakeholder pressures on corporate climate change-related accountability and disclosure practices in Australia. While existing scholarship investigates stakeholder pressures on companies to discharge their broader accountability through general social and environmental disclosures, there is a lack of research investigating whether and how stakeholder pressures emerge to influence accountability and disclosure practices related to climate change. We surveyed various stakeholder groups to understand their concerns about climate change-related corporate accountability and disclosure practices. We present three primary findings: first, while NGOs and the media have some influence, institutional investors and government bodies (regulators) are perceived to be the most powerful stakeholders in generating climate change-related concern and coercive pressure on corporations to be accountable. Second, corporate climate change-related disclosures, as documented through the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), are positively associated with such perceived coercive pressures. Lastly, we find a positive correlation between the level of media attention to climate change and Australian corporate responses to the CDP. Our results indicate that corporations will not disclose climate change information until pressured by non-financial stakeholders. This suggests a larger role for non-financial actors than previously theorized, with several policy implications.

Germany is pivotal to the success of any trade agreement between the European Union and the United States. As the third largest exporter in the world, Germany is dependent on open markets; throughout the post-war period, government support for free trade has been unequivocal. Despite these positive incentives for expanding free trade, both German business and the wider public voiced fierce opposition to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). TTIP became a flash point for the German public to overcome collective action problems and create a broad protest movement against a free trade agreement for the first time in German history. This movement enabled the public to successfully exercise influence on German foreign economic policy-making, which had long been protected from public pressure. By 2015, the success of that pressure in penetrating the policy-making apparatus combined with growing government concern about the potential of international firms to undermine national policy. As a result of the confluence of these two forces, German leaders changed their position in TTIP negotiations.