With increasing fragmentation of worldwide production chains and the corresponding contracting relations between companies, the “firm as an inspector” has become a frequent phenomenon. Buyer firms deploy supervising activities over their suppliers' products and production processes in order to ensure their compliance with regulatory standards, thereby taking on tasks commonly performed by public authorities. Why would a firm engage in such activities? In this article we will analyze the conditions under which firms play the role of an inspector vis-à-vis their sub-contractor firms to guarantee compliance with quality and environmental regulations. We develop a theoretical argument based on transaction cost economics and institutionalism to offer hypothetical answers to this question and provide an empirical assessment of our hypotheses.

Multinational firms unavoidably exert influence over politics through power that is generated by both structure and process. While both political economy and management scholars address international firms, neither field has an adequate understanding of the reciprocal relationship between multinational firms and geopolitical systems. The links between multinational firms form a distinct type of international system for the private sector – one that is simultaneously enmeshed in geopolitics and international markets even as it is also autonomous from them. The scholarly literature on the power of business in politics has demonstrated how influence derives from instrumental agency as well as structural influence, but it has taken an unnecessarily restrictive view of politics and an overly materialist theory of power. Politics are about much more than government policies. In this paper I propose an analytical framework for understanding the multinational firm as a set of relationships. I then apply one key element of that approach – the relationships among firms as a direct source of geopolitical outcomes – to the natural gas trade of Eurasia in three eras that span nearly 40 years. I conclude that the influence of business on a broader understanding of politics – and not just policies – should be central to the study of international and comparative political economy.

Management consultants provide strategic advice to public sector agencies and departments throughout the US, contributing to what some scholars call the “hollowing out of the state.” What ideational frameworks underlie these public -private relationships? Findings from a survey of management consultant show that they believe that they are contracted because they provide knowledge that is unavailable inside the public sector and that their ideas are more innovative. This study helps to explain management consultants’ perceptions of their services contracted by US public sector. By gauging the perspectives of management consultants, this research will potentially help academics and practitioners to better understand public agencies’ contracting of management consultants. This article provides preliminary steps towards better understanding and analyzing the use of management consultants by different levels of the US public sector.

This article examines how two dynamics, one global and one domestic, have interacted to shape the politics of banking in Europe. In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, European governments were subject to renewed structural incentive to promote TBTF banks: in financialized economies, the growth of these banks is perceived as an essential element of a national economy's global competitiveness. Yet, this incentive was subject to enhanced political contention at home. Factions—often led by actors from within the state itself—have opposed governments’ impetus to promote TBTF banks. The specific identity, preferences and resources of these factions are determined by distinctive political institutions and vary across countries. Through the comparative analysis of banking structural reform and banking competition policies in the UK, France and Germany, I argue that varieties of regulatory outcomes are explained by the differentiated institutional capacity of “anti-TBTF” factions to carry weight in policymaking processes across jurisdictions.

This introduction to the special issue combines a review of the existing literature about the causes and consequences of private regulation in the global economy with a preview of the articles in this issue. To organize this (p)review, I introduce a conceptual model “beyond supply and demand,” which distinguishes three major subsets of stakeholders of global private regulation, which may (but need not) overlap: the political actors who call for private regulation, the rule-makers who provide such governance for the global economy, and what I call the “targets” of the private regulations, who are supposed to behave according to these private rules. I then highlight the three core questions addressed by the contributions to the special issue: (1) How do private bodies attain regulatory authority; why do private regulators provide governance; and why do the targets of the rules comply? (2) Who governs the global economy through private regulations? And (3) what are the effects of private regulation, and how does the rise of private regulation affect public regulatory authority and capacity?

Recent research in international political economy has begun to explore the implications of producer heterogeneity for trade politics. Variations in productivity and size lead to systematic variations in market behaviors, especially with respect to firms’ abilities to engage foreign markets. This heterogeneity similarly leads to systematic variations in policy stances: Highly productive firms are more likely to favor trade liberalization than their less productive counterparts. I test the role of firm heterogeneity on trade-policy stances using original and representative survey data of Japanese manufacturers. I find that highly productive firms are more likely to favor liberalization than others, while a large portion of producers is indifferent to trade-policy reform. Other producers do not know how they would be impacted by liberalization; these tend to be smaller than their counterparts. The relationship between productivity and pro-trade attitudes is robust, even when controlling for a wide range of internationalization modes.

In the US, the failure of climate legislation and the implementation of EPA rules are the subject of intense scholarly and public debate. However, the debate has not investigated – and at times has further obfuscated – the preferences and expected tactics of industry stakeholders. Scholars of management and regulation argue that firms’ profit motives can be aligned with socially beneficial outcomes, but they assume that firms prefer market-based regulation over the status quo. Correspondingly, corporate stakeholders have been portrayed as protagonists in campaigns for climate legislation. In a case study of the cap and trade fight during 2009 and 2010, I find that industry stakeholders primarily mobilized to maintain the status quo, but simultaneously joined the cap and trade coalition in order to favorably shape potentially inevitable climate legislation. The case underlines the importance of deeper investigation of business preferences and provides evidence for theories that prioritize power resources and the structural power of business.

Economic development and growth theory have long grappled with the consequences of cross-border flows of goods, services, ideas, and people. But the most significant growth in cross-border flows now comes in the form of data. Like other flows, data flows can demonstrate imbalances among exports and imports. Some of these flows represent ‘raw’ data while others represent high-value-added data products. Does any of this make a difference in national economic development trajectories? This paper argues that the answer is yes. After reviewing the core logic of ‘high development theories’ from the twentieth century, I analyze the sometimes implicit applications of these arguments to data as they are evolving in the existing literature. I then put forward a different argument which takes better account of unique characteristics of the political economy that emerges at the intersection of data, machine learning, and the platform firms that use them. I explore the implications of this new argument for some policy choices that governments face with regard to data localization, import substitution, and other decisions relevant to growth in both advanced and emerging economies.

Amid concerns for a regulatory void in transnational fields, the principle of private regulation has become institutionalized. Many sectors have seen the emergence of multiple and overlapping standards. When comparing the sectors, there is considerable variation in standard multiplicity. We build on three institutional perspectives that have been put forward to explain the emergence of sustainability standards – the economic, idealist and political-institutional perspectives – to analyze the phenomenon of standard multiplicity. Each perspective reflects a different kind of action logic and is simultaneously present and accessible to various parties involved. Based on a cross-sector analysis of standards multiplicity in the forestry, coffee and textile sectors, this article seeks to make two contributions. First, whereas these three perspectives have been presented as competing, we propose that they are complementary in offering partial explanations for different episodes in the dynamics underlying standards multiplicity in different sectors. Second, whereas most studies have analyzed standard setting in single sectors and thus have understood it as being an intra-sector phenomenon, our cross-sector analysis of the dynamics of standard setting suggests that it is propelled by both sector-specific contingencies and experiences as well as by the experiences from other sectors.

The United States and the European Union include several environmental clauses in their respective preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Building on an exhaustive and fine-grained dataset of PTAs’ environmental clauses, this article makes two contributions. First, it shows that the United States and the European Union have initially favored different approaches to environmental protection in their PTAs. The United States’ concerns over regulatory sovereignty and level playing field have led to a legalistic and adversarial approach, while the European Union's concerns for policy coherence have led to a more procedural and cooperative approach. Second, this article provides evidence that European and American trade negotiators have gradually converged on a shared set of environmental norms. Although the United States and the European Union initially pursued different objectives, they learned from each other and drew similar lessons. As a result, recent American agreements have become more European-like, and European agreements have become more Americanized. This article concludes that U.S. and E.U. approaches, far from being incompatible, can usefully be combined and reinforce each other.

Scholars of business associations have recently learned a great deal about how associations contribute to development, but much less about the origins of such developmental associations. This essay introduces and assesses a new political explanation for the origins of ‘developmental associations.’ Conventional wisdom holds that developmental associations must be able to rise above political and collusive pressures and establish autonomy from states. Yet, I argue that these associations' developmental capacities emerge as a result of active state support by key actors, and in response to challenges and threats posed by competitive business organizations. Developmental associations emerge and acquire their capacities as they confront internal threats from other associations, as well as utilize the opportunities presented by the national state and international channels. In this view, functional or organizational capacity is not enough, rather, developmental business associations, must exhibit political capacity'that is the ability to manage the political environment, and respond to the structure of opportunities and threats. This explanation views developmental business associations as political organizations seeking power as well as offers a historically sensitive analysis of transformation of business politics in reforming India.

While there is a strong theoretical foundation for the relationship between business sectors' political spending and the policy benefits that they receive, the empirical support for it is mixed. We use the logic of this exchange to examine a policy area that directly and significantly affects all businesses, and is thus a most likely case, taxation. Using principally firm-level tax rates of a large random sample of U.S. corporations for the 1998–2005 time period, we determine whether lobbying has measurable effects on firm-level tax rates. Contrary perhaps to popular belief, or at least anecdotal illustration, we find after controlling for firm size and industry-level tax rates, among other controls, that there is no discernible effect of political spending on firm-level taxation: firms that spend more in an effort to affect policy generally or tax policy specifically are no more likely to benefit from lower tax rates. We also examine the possibility that firms in the same industry coordinate efforts to affect tax rates. While we find limited evidence that firms occasionally coordinate within industries – or at least lobby simultaneously – to affect tax rates, perhaps more importantly, we determine that free-riding by smaller firms at the expense of the largest firms is rampant.

Over the last decades, encouragement of business engagement with environmental and socio-economic development has gained prominence due to the perceived weakening of states and multilateral institutions against the forces of global capitalism. Different ways of encouraging changes in business behavior have been promoted, such as the formation of public/private partnerships, corporate social responsibility initiatives, and other forms of non-binding organizational arrangements. However, there is no real consensus on the desired role of business in development, what the best policies for global development are, or what “development” itself is and should be defined as. Indeed, precisely as a formal consensus has been reached on the broad agenda of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, a narrower agenda focusing on industrialization, modernization, and economic growth is promoted by new actors, many originating in the Global South. This special issue asks how the emergence of new actors and the adaptation by global institutions affect the ways in which business engages with development. This introductory article positions the issue's contributions into three discussions: exploring issues of global coherence and division on key debates; understanding how new actors are reshaping the public-private divide; and assessing how disconnects within discourse on business and development can amplify negative societal consequences in fragile settings of weak governance.

China's industrial policy for high-technology industries combines key features of the policies pursued elsewhere in East Asia such as opening to foreign investors and supporting domestic firms. Leveraging its large market size, China has gone further than other developing countries by promoting standards for products that compete in China with products controlled by major electronics companies. This paper analyzes the experience to date of this Chinese policy in the consumer optical storage industry in the context of China's evolving national innovation system. China's standard-setting policy is politicized but ultimately pragmatic, which avoids imposing excessive costs on the economy. It may also have dynamic learning benefits for Chinese firms who are starting to compete in global markets.

The globalization of production is changing the political economy of trade policymaking: Traditional supporters of free trade (exporters seeking market access in foreign countries) are joined by new actors (companies needing intermediates from abroad for their production processes) in their lobbying efforts for trade liberalization. Multinational corporations (MNCs) play a crucial role in this new alliance due to their strong involvement in international trade and endowment with resources that can be used to lobby policymakers. We derive an argument from these premises that leads to the expectation of variation in trade policy outcomes across industries depending on their degree of integration in a global network of multinational corporations. Disaggregated data on the level of tariffs and speed of tariff cuts in preferential trade agreements, international mergers and acquisitions at the firm level, and MNC imports of intermediates by sector allow us to test the argument. The findings support our theoretical expectations. The paper sheds light on the processes and outcomes of trade policymaking in a globalized economy by further developing an existing argument about GVCs and trade policy outcomes as well as expanding on it by adding data on international corporate connections.

The economic success of state-led forms of capitalism in Russia, China and some other autocracies is one of the most challenging developments for existing typologies of comparative political economy research. For the OECD-World complex theories and models assess the interrelation of polity and economy (e.g., Hall/Soskice), while well defined and systematic approaches for autocracies are seldomly found. Most of the existing work are rather idiosyncratic case studies. We argue that by climbing up the ladder of abstraction (Sartori), we gain analytical leverage and comparability between cases and regions. That's why we've developped an idealtype called “incorporated capitalism.” By looking at state-capitalist developments in China, Singapore, Saudi-Arabia or Russia, there is strong empirical evidence for a variety of “incorporated capitalism”: bureaucratic market economies and patrimonial market economies. Why are those types of capitalism so successful? In order to answer this question correctly, we have to consider other questions first: 1) Which are the specific patterns of interaction between polity and economy? 2) What are the unique governance mechanisms in those incorporated capitalisms? Using mainly qualitative methods we will empirically proof our theoretical findings in order to decode the special complementarities of the bureaucratic and patrimonial market economy in those four real types mentioned above.

This contribution is a reaction to the striking fact that the political aspect of CSR has remained largely hidden in most of the scientific and practice-oriented management literature. This work intends to illuminate the political dimension of CSR in that the changing stance of the European Commission toward CSR between 2001 and 2006 is analyzed and interpreted as a result of political processes within an “issue arena”. For this case study written documents from the most important actors are used (EU Commission, EU Parliament, the Council, advocacy groups and lobbies for industry and civil society CSR platforms) as well as interviews with high ranking representatives of these institutions (conducted in the spring of 2008).

The role of corporations in the U.S. political process has received increased scrutiny in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's Citizens United decision, leading to calls for greater regulation. In this paper, we analyze whether policies mandating greater disclosure and shareholder approval of political contributions reduce risk and increase firm value, as proponents of such rules claim. Specifically, we examine the Neill Committee Report (NCR), which led to the passage of the United Kingdom's Political Parties, Elections, and Referendums Act 2000 mandating new disclosure and shareholder approval rules. We find that politically active firms did not benefit from the NCR in the days after its release and suffered a decline in value in the months and years that followed. Politically active firms also suffered an increase in risk, as proxied by stock return volatility, following the release of the NCR. We theorize that these findings are due to the reduced flexibility these rules impose on corporate strategy as well as the potential for these rules to facilitate political activism against corporations.

What is the relationship between globalization and the political power of business? Much of the existing literature focuses on the ability of mobile capital to threaten exit in order to press for more business friendly rules. In this article, we refine arguments about exit options in global markets by arguing that the relative exit options available to business and other actors are neither fixed, nor exogenous consequences of some generically conceived process of globalization. Instead, they themselves are the result of struggles between actors with different interests and political opportunities. Since exit options play a crucial role in determining the relative structural power of business vis-à-vis other actors, we dub the power to shape exit options structuring power, distinguishing it from structural power, and argue that it is crucial to explaining it. We identify two channels through which actors can shape exit options – extending jurisdictional reach and reshaping the rules of other jurisdictions – and the factors that will make regulators and business more or less capable of exercising structuring power. We then use two exploratory case studies – one involving privacy regulation, the other accountancy standards – to illustrate how structuring power can work to shape exit options, and thus structural power. We conclude by considering the relationship between structuring power, structural power, and the existing literature in comparative and international political economy.

The Defense Department's Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) has aggressively and persistently supported technologies key to the personal computer (PC) revolution. Uncovering this political-economic link provides an important corrective to the popular lore surrounding the origins of the PC. In their emphases on private sector initiative and entrepreneurial risk-taking, conventional PC histories conform to orthodox market-based explanations of technological and economic progress. In contradistinction, this article “brings the state back in” to the PC realm of apparent market purity.