In his recent article, “Rousseau on Agenda-Setting and Majority Rule” (2003), Ethan Putterman examines how the democratic principle of popular majority rule might be reconciled with agenda-setting by legislative experts through an analysis of Rousseau's political theory. He argues that Rousseau accomplishes this reconciliation through a novel separation of powers between the legislative and the executive powers where the sovereign people delegates the exclusive power to initiate laws to the executive. Putterman thereby identifies as a solution to the problem of democratic self-legislation what Rousseau sees as the most important danger to it. At issue is not merely the correct interpretation of Rousseau's theory, for Putterman's argument raises far-reaching questions concerning the compatibility of democratic principles and institutions. After demonstrating that Putterman is incorrect that the sovereign people in Rousseau's state delegate the power of legislative initiative, I examine how Rousseau anticipates and addresses a related question central to contemporary democratic and social choice theory: the problem of preference aggregation through voting in the absence of agenda-setting institutions.

This essay corrects the results reported in Gerber and Green 2000 and replies to Imai (2005). When data-processing errors are repaired, the original substantive findings from the New Haven experiment remain unchanged. As previously reported, brief phone calls do not increase voter turnout. The “correction” that Imai (2005) offers, which purports to show that these phone calls produce large, significant, and robust increases in voter turnout, is shown to contain statistical, computational, and reporting errors that invalidate its conclusions about the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of phone calls and mail. A replication of the New Haven experiment reproduces both the findings reported in Gerber and Green 2000 and the biases of Imai's statistical analysis.

Proponents of the democratic peace are accustomed to criticism. Early refutations of the research program's findings focused on questions of measurement and statistical inference. Skepticism about such matters has not fully subsided, but many more now accept the democratic peace as an empirical regularity. The aim of recent complaints has shifted to democratic peace theory. The typical approach has been to highlight select historical events that appear anomalous in light of the theory and the causal mechanisms it identifies. Sebastian Rosato's (2003) is one such critique, noteworthy for the range of causal propositions held up for scrutiny and the unequivocal rejection of them all. But Rosato fails to appreciate the dyadic logic central to democratic peace theory, and much of his criticism is therefore misdirected. Those cases that remain unexplained by the theory are not especially problematic for this progressively evolving research program.

Much recent research has found that states generally comply with the treaties they sign. The implications of this finding, however, are unclear: do states comply because the legal commitment compels them to do so, or because of the conditions that led them to sign? Drawing from previous research in this Review on Article VIII of the IMF Treaty (Simmons 2000a), I examine the problem of selection bias in the study of treaty compliance. To understand how and whether international legal commitments affect state behavior, one must control for all sources of selection into the treaty—including those that are not directly observable. I develop a statistical method that controls for such sources of selection and find considerable evidence that the unobservable conditions that lead states to make the legal commitment to Article VIII have a notable impact on their propensity to engage in compliant behavior. The results suggest that the international legal commitment has little constraining power independent of the factors that lead states to sign.

Rosato (2003) claims to have discredited democratic peace theories. However, the methodological approach adopted by the study cannot reliably generate the conclusions espoused by the author. Rosato seems to misunderstand the probabilistic nature of most arguments about democratic peace and ignores issues that an appropriate research design should account for. Further, the study's use of case studies and data sets without attention to selection-bias produces examples that actually support theories it seeks to undermine. These problems place in doubt the article's findings.

Who drafts the laws in Rousseau's ideal state? According to John T. Scott it is the people alone who execute this function and Rousseau “does not positively argue that commissaires, magistrates, or anyone else has the power to propose laws.” Challenging this view, I argue that the philosopher's varied statements on the subject of lawgiving can be shown to establish merely a right by the people to participate in agenda-setting by others. Rousseau believes that the laws must reflect the will of the people but not necessarily through their physical writing, drafting, or framing of constitutional legislation. More important than popular agenda-setting is the majority's freedom to check those who do draft the laws. Amending my earlier argument that the sovereign is barred from legislating, I reveal how Rousseau's notion of self-legislation as “gatekeeping,” rather than agenda-setting, is central to the political theory and institutions of Du contrat social.

We acknowledge the contribution of von Stein (2005) in calling attention to the very real problem of selection bias in estimating treaty effects. Nonetheless, we dispute both von Stein's theoretical and empirical conclusions. Theoretically, we contend that treaties can both screen and constrain simultaneously, meaning that findings of screening do nothing to undermine the claim that treaties constrain state behavior as well. Empirically, we question von Stein's estimator on several grounds, including its strong distributional assumptions and its statistical inconsistency. We then illustrate that selection bias does not account for much of the difference between Simmons's (2000) and von Stein's (2005) estimated treaty effects, and instead reframe the problem as one of model dependency. Using a preprocessing matching step to reduce that dependency, we then illustrate treaty effects that are both substantively and statistically significant—and that are quite close in magnitude to those reported by Simmons.

The peer review process relies on the professionalism and generosity of those who contribute their time to read and evaluate the work of others. The Editor thanks the following scholars, who served as manuscript reviewers between August 15, 2004 and August 14, 2005.

Sebastian Rosato (2003) finds the logic of the “democratic peace” flawed in his “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,” and he cites my work and other studies as examples of the flawed logic. Some of the logic he describes is flawed, and it may characterize some of the literature in the wide field of “democratic peace,” but it is not the logic underlying the core of liberal peace theory. Indeed, the persuasive core of the logic underlying the theory of liberal democratic peace is missing from Rosato's account. Republican representation, an ideological commitment to fundamental human rights, and transnational interdependence are the three pillars of the explanation. The logic underlying the peace among liberal states rests on a simple and straightforward proposition that connects those three causal mechanisms as they operate together and only together, and not separately as Sebastian Rosato claims.

I am grateful for the opportunity to respond to the rejoinders to my article, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory” (Rosato 2003). In each case, I summarize the core issues at stake and explain why I do not believe that my critics have succeeded in casting serious doubt on my original argument.

Abizadeh, Arash. Does Collective Identity Presuppose an Other? On the Alleged Incoherence of Global Solidarity 45