South-East Asian government, politics and policy

Summary

“Democracy means acting in accordance with taya.”

(Ashin Eindaga, public sermon, Yangon, January 31, 2011)

The Burmese word taya has multiple layers of meaning that can refer to justice, law, truth, the Buddha's teachings or a combination thereof. Not only this, there are also multiple conceptions of “truth” that operate within Theravāda doctrine, as well as different levels on which people can grasp the Buddha's teachings, dependent on their moral and spiritual progress. The above quote from a Burmese monk's sermon illustrates the impossibility of parsing Burmese Buddhist views on, for example, democracy, without reference to the Buddhist concepts that they use to describe political beliefs and practices or to the overarching Theravāda moral framework within which those concepts are understood.

This chapter lays out the basic components of the modernist Buddhist worldview which anchors the Burmese political thinking analyzed in this book. I consider this “moral universe” to be a relatively consistent set of beliefs and concepts within which many Buddhists in Myanmar cognitively organize and engage with their social and political worlds. This framework draws from Burmese sources and I occasionally note areas where Burmese interpretations of these basic components may differ from the more general conceptions that scholars designate as “ Theravāda.” I also point toward some of the ways in which Burmese thinkers have understood these principles to be relevant in navigating the social and political spheres, which are developed in later chapters. While Burmese Buddhists usually work with ideas that are part of the common conceptual framework of Theravāda Buddhism, the unique aspects of their perspectives on politics can come from several factors, including a stronger emphasis on a particular concept, a distinct interpretation of a common idea, a discussion or debate specific to Burmese society, or a response to a particular political and economic event or context.

As noted in the Introduction, this particular iteration of a Theravāda moral universe is not itself universal, although I would argue that it has provided the framework for the dominant tradition of Buddhist political thought in Myanmar over the last 150 years and specifically for those writers, thinkers, and preachers whose ideas are examined here.

Summary

In the previous chapter, I argued that the conception of human nature provided by the moral universe contains two distinct perspectives on the conditions of human existence. On the one hand, being pu htu zin (Pāli puthujjana), beings intrinsically driven by desire and craving, humans are destined for lives filled with conflict, harming each other and engendering a perpetual cycle of violence. From another perspective, however, humans are capable of controlling and even overcoming their enslavement to desire, living morally worthy lives and (for a select few) stepping completely out of the cycle of suffering and continued existence (Pāli samsāra, Bur. thanthara). While it is analytically useful to separate these two perspectives, they are not mutually exclusive; in fact, the conception of human nature in the moral universe necessarily encompasses both points of view. However, when looking at Burmese Buddhist arguments regarding the end goals of politics, these twin aspects of human nature inform ideas that fall into two broad categories.

If one takes human beings to be fundamentally fallible and unable to control their desires, the purpose of politics is to create an authority that has power over human actors, managing their conflicts, punishing them when appropriate, and constraining them to act in accordance with both moral and mundane laws. I call this the argument for order, most apparent in the tale of human decline in the Aggañña Sutta. Order not only implies political control over subjects, it also refers to the proper arrangement of society according to the laws of nature, which results in balance and harmony.

The alternative end goal of politics is freedom/liberation. Although it is cumbersome to use this term, the two words have specific connotations in the Buddhist context and it is important to distinguish between them while also understanding how Burmese thinkers have connected mundane understandings of freedom to moral/spiritual freedom and liberation. “Freedom” would include a moral/spiritual understanding based on human potential to realize the overcoming of desire as well as more lawki (mundane or worldly, Pāli lokiya) understandings such as freedom from political and economic oppression or enslavement.

Summary

There is no word or phrase in Burmese that approximates the meanings and implications of the English phrase “political participation.” The English term can include activities such as voting, running for office, contributing time or money to a campaign, organizing or attending a rally, signing a petition, or attending a public forum. It can also refer to actions that make the political aspects of everyday life recognizable as such, including debating a political issue with a neighbor, challenging racially biased hiring practices at a company, or insisting on more gender equity in housework. Chapter 3 included discussion of the multiple interpretations of the Burmese word nain ngan ye, which is almost universally used for “politics.” To most Burmese, the words for “politician” (nain ngan ye thama) and to “do politics” (nain ngan ye louk de) are associated almost completely with electoral or legislative politics and for many they also have strong negative connotations. Chapter 3 also noted the distinction between a more bounded and self-centered “party politics” as opposed to “national politics” (a-myo-tha nain ngan ye), which is what the military claims it engages in.

In the 1940s, political figures such as General Aung San attempted to raise the status of nain ngan ye, to change people's perceptions of the practice, and to expand it to include every aspect of human interaction, yet found mixed success. After independence, political leaders failed to construct a system hospitable to broader citizen participation, an atmosphere that military leaders used to their advantage. The political dysfunction of the parliamentary period in the 1950s paved the way for the military to rule for almost fifty years while paradoxically claiming that it was not “doing politics.” During that period the only opportunities for most citizens to “participate” in “politics” were through government-controlled civic organizations or occasional campaigns to oppose the military government.

Since 2011, Myanmar appears to be entering an era of renewed citizen participation in a system that is at least semidemocratic, decades after the failed 1988 uprising and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's claim that “people's participation in social and political transformation is the central issue of our time” (1994).

Summary

On September 24, 2007, tens of thousands of Buddhist monks marched down the main thoroughfares of Yangon, a sea of dark maroon robes creating the lasting image of what the media would deem the “Saffron Revolution,” after the color commonly associated with monks’ robes in the country. This was the sixth day of monastic demonstrations in downtown Yangon, the culmination of a wave of dissent that had begun with citizen protests against the removal of fuel subsidies the month before and had escalated after reports that the Burmese military had violently subdued monks demonstrating in the northern city of Pakokku earlier in September. Beginning on September 18, the ranks of the monks had swelled each day and similar actions were taking place in urban areas across the country. This day they marched along with tens of thousands of lay people, although the monks had initially asked the laity not to join the demonstrations. Gradually, however, lay people did join, linking hands to create protective barriers around the monks as they marched and raising the banners of opposition groups, including the National League for Democracy (NLD) and even the long-outlawed student union.

While some monks began the march each afternoon at their home monasteries, eventually converging on Sule Pagoda in downtown Yangon, growing numbers gathered at the foot of the iconic golden dome of the Shwedagon Pagoda, a mile or so north of the city center. These monks met to chant protective prayers before marching, but the significance of the location was not lost on any Burmese observers. In addition to being the most revered Buddhist site in the country (strands of the Buddha's hair are allegedly buried beneath it), it has also been a focal point of political activity since the colonial period. The martyred leader of the independence movement, General Aung San, gave speeches in front of the pagoda in the 1940s and over forty years later, his daughter, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, invigorated the democracy movement of 1988 with a speech in the same location. The rhetoric and protest repertoire of the monks in 2007 perfectly mirrored the Shwedagon Pagoda's combination of religious and political symbolism.

Summary

By now it should be clear that Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by 2049 involves an ambitious geopolitical agenda. This discussion begins with a macrohistorical overview of East Asian geopolitics to provide a slightly different perspective on the motivations and constraints that shape China's desire for great power predominance in East Asia today. It then summarizes the main features of current Chinese geostrategy and concludes by noting certain dilemmas and limitations.

Geopolitics refers to the contest among states to control geographic space in order to gain security against potential enemies, increase power and influence over others, and assure access to markets and resources. The geopolitical strategy of a state traditionally relies upon military power and alliance arrangements, making geopolitics an arena traditionally dominated by great powers.

In the study of geopolitics it is axiomatic that major developments in the balance of power cause states to alter their geostrategies and change the geopolitical status quo. There is no greater development in the balance of power than when a state is added or subtracted from the number of great powers, and today we see China asserting a great power identity and challenging the post-cold war unipolar structure of global politics. Offensive realists argue that when a state reaches for great power status, the desire for security from other great powers compels it to seek hegemony in its home region. If successful, security motivations drive it to weaken other great powers in their respective home regions (Mearsheimer 2014). Thus, few realists would be surprised if China's great power aspirations require strategic dominance in East Asia. The question is whether it develops a suitable geostrategy.

THE GEOPOLITICS OF EAST ASIA IN MACROHISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Continental vs. Maritime Spheres

Since the dawn of civilization, the geopolitical heartland or core of East Asia has been the vast fertile region bounded on the north by the Yellow River, the coastal seas to the east, the Pearl River in the south, and the Tibetan plateau and deserts to the west. The rich land and labour resources of the core permitted the rise of East Asian civilization and it became the seat of successive empires.

Summary

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policy makers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

Summary

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Summary

For nearly two decades, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has served as a vehicle for the postsocialist states of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV) to seek diplomatic recognition and enmesh their economies with the dominant discourses, structures, and visions of post-Cold War capitalist modernity. Notwithstanding the ambivalent consequences of CLMV membership for ASEAN, existing studies suggest that the benefits of membership for these newer and poorer states have been starkly apparent: from gaining entry to a panoply of ASEAN driven diplomatic arrangements spanning the Asia-Pacific, and securing leverage in managing their involvements with the Great Powers, to restructuring their regulatory and tariff regimes to accede to the WTO, and, cumulatively, consolidating the bases of regime security. In both scholarly and lay understandings of how CLMV states benefit from ASEAN, then, attention has been firmly on the political, security and economic outcomes of these processes, with diplomacy viewed as a passive instrument to pursue these ends. Such a static view of diplomacy, I argue, obscures a vital mechanism in and through which these broader macro-social changes are being sought and accomplished.

Diplomats and their foreign ministries are not the only actors in the gamut of CLMV-ASEAN involvements and nor are they the final arbiters of foreign policy decision-making. That said, it is instructive to foreground diplomats and diplomacy in the context of ASEAN-CLMV interactions on two counts. First, ASEAN has historically been a prerogative of diplomats and the foreign ministry — from its early beginnings as an exclusively foreign ministry-led process, to contemporary tussles in the age of expansive “community building” where an otherwise weaker foreign ministry wrestles with, if not asserts itself over, other powerful ministries (Defence, Finance) by keeping watch over the procedures and coordination of ASEAN activities.

Second, and more importantly, it is worth emphasizing the irreducibly diplomatic quality of the varied interactions through which official “ASEAN” is produced. Be they diplomats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), trade representatives and officials from various other ministries, or leaders at Summits, individuals performing the state must be sited around a meeting table with table-top flags, room flags, and country place cards; must advance “national positions”; and must learn — if not cope — with a putatively “ASEAN Way” of negotiation and decision making.

Summary

Introduction: credible commitments and formalization

This chapter proposes the following thesis: States entering regional (and other) organizations accept formal commitments to achieve their goals with the expectation that other participant States will reciprocate. The legal and institutional features of the organization create credibility by locking participants into a system which regulates their behavior and restricts their ability to release themselves from the commitments accepted. By locking themselves into specific policy choices, States reduce the margin of action for future governments, and thus the risk that they will change them. My thesis is that the intensity and extent of the formal commitments depend directly on the kind of objectives/regional public goods that the organizations pursue. The larger the number of objectives, and the more ambitious in relation to the current status quo, the more robust the institutional commitments need to be if the organization is to succeed in attaining them. There is a trade-off between yielding sovereignty (that is, accepting credible commitments) and entering into complex integration schemes. Less ambitious objectives may be attained with a lower level of institutional commitment.

This study will focus on the formal mechanisms that secure “credible commitments.” Credible commitments result from institutional design which comprises a number of instruments: the regulation of membership; the institutional structure of integration organizations; the decision-making procedure; the nature of derived norms and the mechanisms for their incorporation into national orders; and the mechanisms of jurisdictional control, supervision and scrutiny. Each of these serves to “lock” participants into integration schemes, and restricts their freedom to withdraw from accepted commitments.

By focusing on institutional design, this study adopts a clear position on regional integration: it considers that integration is a formal process. Current scholarship has consolidated a conceptual difference between “regionalization” and “regionalism.” These two concepts correspond to what in the 1990s W. Wallace insightfully named “informal” and “formal” integration respectively. Regionalization, or informal integration, refers to a spontaneous process of interaction between public or private actors, creating networks and directing flows towards each other in economic, security and cultural domains, among others.

Summary

States formalize their cooperative relations with the aim of providing, together, certain public goods that they cannot provide in isolation. The range of these goods is greatly varied, encompassing security, identity and religion; and development, infrastructure and regulatory frameworks for trade, labor or air transport, for instance. To this end, States accept to be bound by formal arrangements whereby they commit to deliver these goods, but also to respect the agreements concluded. Formal institutions respond precisely to these needs for provision and commitment.

Globalization has underlined the inability of States to provide goods in isolation and has hence accelerated legal integration at international and supranational levels: the number of international institutions – now over 60,000 – began growing after the Second World War and is still rising; the relations between State administrations and international institutions are becoming ever more numerous; forms of regional organization have been spreading; new forms of global networks and global “administrations” have been developing.

As a consequence, scholars worldwide have devoted themselves to studying global governance, international organizations (IOs) and regionalism. From these various perspectives, what has emerged clearly is that a mono-disciplinary approach is not capable of capturing all the implications related to these issues, which means that it becomes crucial to combine different fields of research. In this context, the use of concepts derived from both political science and law has turned out to be extremely effective, such as in the case of regime theory being used to explain the formation of global regulatory systems. This is why this book presents these two perspectives jointly, in its endeavor to define models of international and supranational legal integration.

Our aim, therefore, is threefold. First, we map and outline models of regional integration by studying their institutional design and processes of governance. Second, we extend our analysis to IOs and other international regimes, to identify which techniques are capable of governing complex global legal systems. Third, we offer a toolbox of institutional processes and legal mechanisms, which may be adopted by current or new projects of international and supranational integration, such as ASEAN. We address these aims in two chapters, both based on the idea that integration is a formal process.

Summary

This monograph is published within the context of a wide-ranging research project entitled, Integration Through Law: The Role of Law and the Rule of Law in ASEAN Integration (ITL), undertaken by the Centre for International Law at the National University of Singapore and directed by J. H. H. Weiler and Tan Hsien-Li.

The Preamble to the ASEAN Charter concludes with a single decision: “We, the Peoples of the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. [h]ereby decide to establish, through this Charter, the legal and institutional framework for ASEAN.” For the first time in its history of over four decades, the Legal and the Institutional were brought to the forefront of ASEAN discourse.

The gravitas of the medium, a Charter: the substantive ambition of its content, the creation of three interlocking Communities, and the turn to law and institutions as instruments for realization provide ample justification for this wide-ranging project, to which this monograph is one contribution, examining ASEAN in a comparative context.

That same substantive and, indeed, political ambition means that any single study, illuminating as it may be, will cover but a fraction of the phenomena. Our modus operandi in this project was to create teams of researchers from Asia and elsewhere who would contribute individual monographs within an overall framework which we had designed. The project framework, involving several thematic clusters within each monograph, is thus determined by the framework and the place of each monograph within it.

As regards the specific content, however, the authors were free, indeed encouraged, to define their own understanding of the problem and their own methodology and reach their own conclusions. The thematic structure of the entire project may be found at the end of this Preface.

The project as a whole, and each monograph within it, display several methodological sensibilities.

First, law, in our view, can only be understood and evaluated when situated in its political and economic context. Thus, the first studies in the overall project design are intended to provide the political, economic, cultural and historical context against which one must understand ASEAN and are written by specialists in these respective disciplines.

Summary

Introduction

Having analyzed governance structure and processes in integration organizations, this chapter focuses on the legal mechanisms and instruments that drive the development of international regimes, their institutional features and their functioning.

Therefore, the aim of this chapter is twofold. First, it purports to outline and critically describe the typology of international organizations and their regimes, to identify common themes and illustrate the main legal techniques of governance. To this end, the analysis will cover not only regional organizations, but other international institutions too, of both an intergovernmental (such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Health Organization (WHO) or the International Labour Organization (ILO)) and a hybrid public–private nature (such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)). Second, this chapter aims to provide a comparative toolbox of legal instruments that can assist determining which solutions may be more or less effective in processes of regional integration; this will also enable verifying which legal technique is adopted more often, and why, in a given model of integration, amongst those outlined in Chapter 1.

Sharing the assumption that integration is a “formal process,” the perspective adopted here is essentially a “managerial” one, which seeks to avoid bias connected to any given political objective. The latter may of course significantly influence the preference for one solution or another (for example, the establishment of an international parliament or court within a given regime, or of a requirement that each Member State within the entity create a domestic terminal entrusted with ensuring the implementation of the policies set by the international organization).

However, this chapter seeks to adopt a neutral approach, investigating the common threads in the development of international regimes by examining mainly how they work towards their objectives. International regimes have increasingly been using accountability mechanisms, but principally to ensure their own efficiency and effectiveness rather than to address any democratic gaps. In other words, the need to enhance the legitimacy and accountability of IOs has a functional reason; this is confirmed by the fact that all regimes tend to adopt similar mechanisms, regardless of the degree of “democracy” they may present.

South-East Asian government, politics and policy

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2 - Building Blocks of a Moral Universe

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Contents

4 - Order and Freedom/Liberation: Purposes of Politics

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5 - What is “Politics” and What Constitutes “Participation”?

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Frontmatter

Introduction

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The Geopolitics of Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream: Problems and Prospects

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Frontmatter

Foreword

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The Geopolitics of Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream: Problems and Prospects

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Foreword

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Learning Diplomacy: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam Diplomats in Asean

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Frontmatter

Learning Diplomacy: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam Diplomats in ASEAN

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List of tables

Contents

Chapter 1 - Governance structures and processes in integration organizations

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Preface

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General editors’ preface

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Chapter 2 - The development of international legal regimes

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South-East Asian government, politics and policy

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