This chapter analyses how the state, under the rule of Erdoğanists, has been treating undesired citizen identity groups. In post-coup-attempt Turkey, the AKP has developed a staunchly populist narrative to divide the citizens of Turkey as factions of 'the people’ (or ‘the nation’) versus its out-groups: Kemalists, White Turks, Kurds, Alevis, Gülenists, leftists, liberals, etc. who are framed as citizen-enemies. All of these groups have been constructed as terrorists – internal enemies of the nation and pawns of Western powers that do not want Turkey to lead the Muslim world. The chapter starts with the most significant and oldest antagonists of Islamists – Erdoğanists – who arethe Kemalists and their desired citizens –the Homo LASTus – and also the non-Kemalist White Turks and secular elites who allegedly victimised Islamists in the past and who are allegedly stillplotting against them. Then, following the same order of the chapter on Kemalism’s undesired citizens, this chapter will discuss other undesired citizens of Erdoğanism: disloyal practising Muslims and Islamists; leftists, liberals, socialists; non-Muslims; Alevis; and disloyal Kurds.

This chapter investigates how the AKP has been very gradually de-Kemalising education and Islamising it at the same time. It explores how the AKP has been instrumentalising the national curriculum and compulsory and optional religious lessons at schools, Erdoğanism’s most-favoured schools, Imam Hatip Schools and Islamist educational foundations to create the Homo Erdoğanistus. The chapter starts with an analysis of the continuities and changes between the Kemalist and Erdoğanist national curriculums, showing how these to overlap to a great extent when it comes to the nation’s insecurities. The AKP has been using these insecurities for its desired citizen project too, and the education system has been undergoing profound changes that are intended to enable Erdoğanists to shape the worldview and national identity of the citizens.

This chapter elaborates on the definition of Erdoğanism from the perspective of this book. To define Erdoğanism for the purposes of this book, the chapter first discusses the insecurities, anxieties, and fears of Erdoğanism. After this it analyses the Islamist populism dimension of Erdoğanism and how its narrative divides the nation into real citizens and their enemy the 'evil' Kemalist elite and the Homo LASTus grassroots and also all secular Turks who are dubbed as the 'White Turks'. In this imagination, the out-group is not only comprised of the citizen-enemies, there are also international groups, entities, institutions, lobbying groups and states that collaborate with both the evil White Turk elite. The chapter calls this populism ‘Islamist Civilizationism’. This discussion is followed by an analysis of Erdoğanist victimhood and resentment vis-à-vis the secular sections of society as well as the West. Finally, the chapter attempts to define Erdoğanism.

Chapter 5 examines the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections, which brought moderate candidate Hassan Rouhani to power. Rouhani entered the 2013 election on an electoral platform that aimed to bring Iran out of international isolation as a means to improve the country’s dire economic crisis. With the exception of conservative hardliner Saeed Jalili, who campaigned on a religious, ideological platform, none of the candidates campaigned on the values and ideals of the revolution. The electoral fault-lines were predominately shaped around the economy, effective nuclear diplomacy and the establishment of détente foreign policies. This chapter will then explore the 2017 election, which was perhaps the most secular election in the Islamic Republic’s forty-year history. What was astonishing in this election was not what was said, but what was not said. None of the candidates dared to employ early revolutionary slogans. Certain phrases and concepts were missing from candidate campaigns, such as the dispossessed and disenfranchised, martyrdom, claims of being a true follower of the Supreme Leader, anti-Americanism and anti-capitalism. Through an exploration of these campaign discourses, this chapter will demonstrate that since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, electoral politics have tremendously evolved from Khomeini’s revolutionary religiosity to encompass liberal, secular values and ideals.

Since the mid-1990s, the Islamic Republic’s political landscape has been dominated by reformist/moderate and conservative/hardliner factions. The dominant narrative of Iranian electoral politics portrays reformists as the embodiment of Iran’s transition to secularity in their pursuit of liberal reform. On the other hand, conservatives are traditionally defined by their dedication to the Supreme Leader and commitment to maintaining the country’s socio-political status quo. The conservatives’ seemingly closer ties to revolutionary institutions, such as the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guards, has led many observers to assume that they seek to maintain the values and ideals of the Khomeini era and are opposed to secularity. This polarised image of Iranian electoral politics, prevalent in the media and scholarly accounts, masks a very significant transformation. As we have documented, since the first decade of the revolution, political forces across the entire spectrum have become secularised, evident in their departure from the ethos of Khomeini’s revolutionary religiosity.

Chapter 2 examines the Islamic Republic’s first five presidential elections, which were held in the revolution’s first decade. These elections brought to power Abolhassan Banisadr (1980), Mohammad-Ali Rajai (1981), Ali Khamenei (1981 and 1985) and Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989). This chapter highlights how presidential elections in this milieu were highly influenced by Khomeini’s religious revolutionary ethos, as reflected in the chapter’s title: ‘The Age of the Imam’. This ethos was pervasive and far from a distinguishing feature of the triumphant Islamic Republican Party (IRP). It was a characteristic of the age and its zeitgeist. Undoubtedly, there were disagreements, but these were framed and expressed in the context of revolutionary religiosity. Although the fifth election was held after the death of Khomeini in July 1989, it is included in this chapter as it was also guided by Khomeini's revolutionary principles. This chapter, and its focus on Khomeini’s religious revolutionary ethos, frames the ensuing transformation of electoral discourses and imaginaries in the post-Khomeini era.