Since its first codification in the early twentieth century, Iranian family law has followed the Shiʿi (Jaʿfarī) school of jurisprudence. In other parts of the Shiʿi world, the question of codifying Shiʿi family law has emerged more recently. This chapter argues that codification enhances the formal rule of law. In the past, family law codification was considered to conflict with a fundamental element of Shiʿi legal thought and religious practice, namely ijtihād, independent legal reasoning by qualified scholars, which makes for a living law. Based on a comparative analysis of Iranian family law and recent Shiʿi (draft) laws put forward in Afghanistan, Bahrain, and Iraq, this chapter discusses where modern Shiʿi family law is located between the “opposite” poles of the formal rule of law (where law is general, prospective, clear, and certain) and ijtihād. The findings indicate that, today, the two are not viewed as contradicting each other. Yet, while Iranian family law only serves as a limited model for other parts of the Shiʿi world, the comparison shows that Iran subjects Shiʿi family law to the formal rule of law more comprehensively than is the case in the other three analyzed countries.

This chapter examines both the regulatory and judicial aspects of artistic expression in the Islamic Republic of Iran, in an attempt to illustrate the fragility of the rule of law pertaining to art and culture in theory and practice. The chapter provides a brief historic overview of censorship since the 1979 Revolution, capturing the relative fluctuations in the application of the law over time, depending on the approach of the individuals in charge. In order to demonstrate the nature of the judiciary’s verdicts in light of the defendants’ artistic expression, the chapter also introduces examples of the cases of artists and writers prosecuted for their work both offline and online. Overall, the chapter highlights the multifaceted nature of the regulatory limitations on cultural and artistic expression and creativity.

The chapter discusses regulations and legal reform in medical law, in particular assisted reproductive technology (ART). A combination of Iranian state law, Shiʿi rulings, and national, medical, and clinical guidelines govern access to ART. In 2003, parliament enacted a law allowing the use of embryo donation for treating infertility in married couples. The law also implicitly recognized the permissibility of embryo-carrying and surrogacy arrangements. In comparative terms, this made Iran the most progressive country in the Muslim world regarding ART regulations and has resulted in the phenomenon of medical tourism. The chapter discusses the many ways in which Shiʿi Islamic legal rulings are mobilized to respond to medical and ethical concerns of different constituencies, illustrating the dynamism and adaptability of Shiʿi fiqh. Taking family as a legal concept, the chapter argues that Iranian family beliefs and values play a crucial role in shaping Iran’s permissive reproductive policy. Genealogical continuity and legal parenthood are central to these beliefs and values.

In summer 2013, a new Penal Code came into force in Iran, the first permanent one of its kind, as all previous reforms had been temporary measures. This chapter analyzes some characteristic features of the new 2013 code, particularly with regard to their sources and their effects. While rules in the areas of hadd, qesās, and diyeh are regarded as divine law that cannot be altered or abolished, they have been subject to interpretation, and Iranian Islamic legal scholars often restrict the applicability of hadd, partly by relying on minority opinions in legal justification. Furthermore, the 2013 Penal Code embeds hadd, qesās, and diyeh in other rules of substantive or procedural law in such a way that punishments can be diminished while formally remaining true to Islamic legal traditions. This is done, for example, concerning criminal responsibility of juveniles, and in the law of evidence. The chapter reviews the many adjustments and reforms undertaken in the Islamic Republic’s history to thoroughly Islamize its criminal law.

This chapter highlights the centrality of the rule of law to Khatami’s presidential campaign. It then reviews the policies of the heads of the judiciary in the post-Khomeini era, with the most far-reaching reform initiatives occurring during the tenure of Shahroudi (1999–2009). These included trying to phase out special courts, prohibiting the security services from running their own detention and prison systems, ending the death penalty for minors, ending execution by stoning, strengthening the rights of political prisoners, and reforming the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure. Many of these were reversed or watered down by Sadegh Larijani, head of the judiciary 2009–2019. Ebrahim Raisi (2019-2021) revived some of Shahroudi’s reforms in sentencing and also inaugurated a concerted effort to fight corruption in the judiciary. The chapter illustrates that the judiciary is not a monolith, and much of the quality of the rule of law stands and falls with its leading administrators and professionals.

The quality of rule of law has been anything but static in the Islamic Republic: It has varied from area to area of law and across time, with improvements in some years and regressions in others. Established accounts tend to either discount the dramatic erosion of the rule of law in light of the revolution’s other perceived or real achievements (e.g., in terms of education or the Human Development Index [HDI], for example), or paint an entirely bleak picture with gross human rights violations. Discussions seldom differentiate between different areas of law, or acknowledge fluctuations of the rule of law across time. This chapter reviews some of the key areas covered in the volume such as criminal justice, minority rights, property rights, family law, labor rights, freedom of artistic expression and others, mapping progressions and regressions of the rule of law in these spheres and concludes with reflections on prospects for rule-of-law reform.

The chapter analyzes the nature and evolution of the administration of criminal justice in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Although current Iranian law incorporates a range of provisions intended to protect the rights of the accused in criminal prosecutions, in practice these provisions are routinely violated. It is argued that the violations of due process in the Islamic Republic of Iran are the result of several factors. First, the criminal justice system has been configured to deal with political opposition as an existential threat to the state, resulting in frequent executive interference in the judicial process and arbitrary trials in revolutionary courts. Second, the structural subordination of the judiciary to the effective power of the Supreme Leader and specific executive agencies has eroded the rule of law. Third, the ideological imperative to Islamize the judicial system after the 1979 Revolution has led to the adoption of judicial procedures that have given judges very wide discretion in the conduct and outcome of cases, notably in criminal law.

The 1979 Revolution led to the construction of a penal system ostensibly based on Islamic principles of restitutive and restorative justice rather than incarceration. This was tied to an Islamic vision of justice as swift and efficient, with emphasis on corporal punishment as opposed to socially detrimental imprisonment. Despite this, custodial sentences have been used extensively since 1979 and imprisonment rates have often been above the median in global terms, even though the level of violent crime has been relatively low. Furthermore, Iran has been unable (or unwilling) to generate the prison capacity needed, leading to severe problems with overcrowding and attendant health problems, such as the spread of HIV/AIDS and COVID-19. Concentrating mainly on “ordinary” rather than “political” prisoners, this chapter discusses the reasons behind the overcrowding in prisons since the revolution and the government’s attempts to alleviate the situation.

Workers’ rights and conditions have not been at the core of the Islamic Republic’s main policies, especially from the 1990s onward. The existent labor law offers far-reaching exemptions and loopholes that make it possible to circumvent workers’ rights, while prohibitions on independent unions deprive workers of the legal tools to claim their rights. This chapter gives a detailed analysis of the evolution of labor regulation and reform in postrevolutionary Iran, building on primary research and interviews with industrial workers, scholars, and legal experts, conducted in Iran. In particular, the chapter demonstrates how, from Rafsanjani’s neoliberal turn to Rouhani’s presidency, labor casualization and job insecurity have gradually – and systematically – undermined working conditions, exposing workers to severe exploitation and limiting their legal protection. The presidents’ policies have not been equally detrimental, as the values behind every administration, as well as the general economic contexts, influenced their choices: from Rafsanjani’s market-oriented rhetoric to Khatami’s participatory narrative of civil society, Ahmadinejad’s conservative populism to Rouhani’s business-friendly pragmatism.