This chapter elaborates on the definition of Erdoğanism from the perspective of this book. To define Erdoğanism for the purposes of this book, the chapter first discusses the insecurities, anxieties, and fears of Erdoğanism. After this it analyses the Islamist populism dimension of Erdoğanism and how its narrative divides the nation into real citizens and their enemy the 'evil' Kemalist elite and the Homo LASTus grassroots and also all secular Turks who are dubbed as the 'White Turks'. In this imagination, the out-group is not only comprised of the citizen-enemies, there are also international groups, entities, institutions, lobbying groups and states that collaborate with both the evil White Turk elite. The chapter calls this populism ‘Islamist Civilizationism’. This discussion is followed by an analysis of Erdoğanist victimhood and resentment vis-à-vis the secular sections of society as well as the West. Finally, the chapter attempts to define Erdoğanism.

Chapter 5 examines the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections, which brought moderate candidate Hassan Rouhani to power. Rouhani entered the 2013 election on an electoral platform that aimed to bring Iran out of international isolation as a means to improve the country’s dire economic crisis. With the exception of conservative hardliner Saeed Jalili, who campaigned on a religious, ideological platform, none of the candidates campaigned on the values and ideals of the revolution. The electoral fault-lines were predominately shaped around the economy, effective nuclear diplomacy and the establishment of détente foreign policies. This chapter will then explore the 2017 election, which was perhaps the most secular election in the Islamic Republic’s forty-year history. What was astonishing in this election was not what was said, but what was not said. None of the candidates dared to employ early revolutionary slogans. Certain phrases and concepts were missing from candidate campaigns, such as the dispossessed and disenfranchised, martyrdom, claims of being a true follower of the Supreme Leader, anti-Americanism and anti-capitalism. Through an exploration of these campaign discourses, this chapter will demonstrate that since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, electoral politics have tremendously evolved from Khomeini’s revolutionary religiosity to encompass liberal, secular values and ideals.

Since the mid-1990s, the Islamic Republic’s political landscape has been dominated by reformist/moderate and conservative/hardliner factions. The dominant narrative of Iranian electoral politics portrays reformists as the embodiment of Iran’s transition to secularity in their pursuit of liberal reform. On the other hand, conservatives are traditionally defined by their dedication to the Supreme Leader and commitment to maintaining the country’s socio-political status quo. The conservatives’ seemingly closer ties to revolutionary institutions, such as the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guards, has led many observers to assume that they seek to maintain the values and ideals of the Khomeini era and are opposed to secularity. This polarised image of Iranian electoral politics, prevalent in the media and scholarly accounts, masks a very significant transformation. As we have documented, since the first decade of the revolution, political forces across the entire spectrum have become secularised, evident in their departure from the ethos of Khomeini’s revolutionary religiosity.

Chapter 2 examines the Islamic Republic’s first five presidential elections, which were held in the revolution’s first decade. These elections brought to power Abolhassan Banisadr (1980), Mohammad-Ali Rajai (1981), Ali Khamenei (1981 and 1985) and Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989). This chapter highlights how presidential elections in this milieu were highly influenced by Khomeini’s religious revolutionary ethos, as reflected in the chapter’s title: ‘The Age of the Imam’. This ethos was pervasive and far from a distinguishing feature of the triumphant Islamic Republican Party (IRP). It was a characteristic of the age and its zeitgeist. Undoubtedly, there were disagreements, but these were framed and expressed in the context of revolutionary religiosity. Although the fifth election was held after the death of Khomeini in July 1989, it is included in this chapter as it was also guided by Khomeini's revolutionary principles. This chapter, and its focus on Khomeini’s religious revolutionary ethos, frames the ensuing transformation of electoral discourses and imaginaries in the post-Khomeini era.

Chapter 3 examines the 1993 (Rafsanjani), 1997 and 2001 (Khatami) elections, with a view to highlighting the departure from the three elements of Khomeini’s revolutionary religiosity. This shift was evidently influenced by major events of the time: the end of Iran’s eight-year war with Iraq, the death of Khomeini in 1989 and the rise of his successor, Ali Khamenei. These major events opened up Iran’s socio-political environment beyond the contours Khomeini’s revolutionary discourses of jihad, martyrdom, the afterlife and ascetic equality. During this period, and in line with the processes of secularization, the meaning of Islam was reappropriated and infused with new meaning. It was conveyed as a religion of free-thinking, welfare, prosperity, peace and life, as opposed to jihad, martyrdom and poverty as expressed in the revolution’s first decade.

Chapter 4 examines the 2005 and 2009 elections, which brought conservative hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to power. In a similar vein to the previous chapter, it is argued here that, although conservatives stand in opposition to reformists, they are no less secularized than the latter. Surprisingly, and in contrast to the dominant narrative, Ahmadinejad’s 2005 election campaign was not centered on revolutionary values, such as obedience to the Leader, jihad and an ascetic Marxism. While the election was a victory for the conservatives, it did not usher in a return to early revolutionary values. As this chapter will demonstrate, during this period the social and political mindset of Iranians and their values changed tremendously, and domestic politics gradually become indifferent to religion. Significantly, the introduction of televised presidential election debates saw candidates cross many redlines and break many political and religious taboos.