‘I have been asked to write a book on Arab women’: this answer to polite enquiries on what I was doing with myself these days usually resulted in interesting (and sometimes interested) reactions. Arab women were on the whole pleased and helpful, as were many Arab men. The latter often, only half-jokingly, asked, ‘Why not a book on Arab men?’, and added worriedly, ‘You will write, won't you, that Arab women enjoy their full rights?’ As for sociologists of all nations, their reaction was somewhat disparaging: they thought the subject too general. Anthropologists tended to lose interest when it became clear I was not planning to spend several years in one village on, say, the Nile Delta.

The most frequent reaction to my statement, which showed how marginal this subject is still considered to be, was: ‘Shouldn't someone in your position (I was then editor of a monthly political and socioeconomic magazine), shouldn't someone in your position be writing about something much more important?’ If my interlocutor were Arab, this remark would usually be followed by a list of the problems plaguing the Arab world, from the Israeli occupation of Palestine, to the failures of economic development, to the lack of political freedom. If my interlocutor were Western, the remark might be followed by a pitying look, presumably for having fallen into some feminist trap.

The Arab debate on women has focussed on the same issues for nearly a century. This is partly because of the complex nature of the issues at hand, as has been shown earlier, but also because there has not been a strong enough need for change to force the pace. Western nations might still be arguing about equal rights had the integration of women in the modern work sector not been speeded up by industrialisation and two world wars.

The Arab world has not been through a similar process, although it is, in theory, seeking to industrialise in order to modernise, and although there are plans to integrate women in development. Had the need for women in the modern sector been overwhelming, then much of the Arab discussion about roles and identity would have been shelved. In actual fact, the modern Arab sector can hardly provide enough opportunities for men, let alone for women. What are the dilemmas of development in the Arab world? And what are the prospects of overcoming the obstacles that exist?

The public debate on women's roles began in the nineteenth century, alongside the slow spread of formal schooling for boys and girls. It was conducted within the larger debate on reforming society as a whole in order to lift the Islamic world out of the centuries of stagnation that had afflicted it under Ottoman rule. With the growth of Turkish and Arab nationalism, the reformist debate gradually became more boundary-conscious.

The major issue for the reformists was how to reconcile the precepts of religion to the needs of the modern age. The great liberal Islamic reformists of the nineteenth century, such as Rifaa al-Tahtawi, Jamaleddin al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, believed that Islamic traditions had been corrupted over the centuries. A proper understanding of Islam's message would reconcile the demands of the modern age with the principles of faith. (For the best account of Arab thought in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries see Hourani, 1983.) The need to resolve this question and to set about strengthening Arab society became more pressing as the nineteenth century wore on and the Arab world found itself an easy prey for Europe's growing appetite for new colonies.

In Jordan, the conditions for full integration of women in the modern sector – need, opportunity and ability – were met at the state and popular levels, albeit briefly. In theory, the same should have happened in the Arab Gulf states, where the need for manpower was even more pressing than in Jordan. In practice, it did not. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, Gulf women's integration into the modern sector was a gradual process. It is tempting to turn to tradition and to conservative social attitudes to explain why women held back, particularly as the veil continued to be conspicuous in the Gulf, especially in Saudi Arabia. This does not, however, tell the whole story. As will be shown below, the conditions of need, opportunity and ability were not met at the state and popular levels.

A flood of foreign manpower

The impact of oil wealth on the Gulf makes for one of the most dramatic stories in recent Arab history. Oil was discovered during the early part of this century, although production and export operations only reached appreciable levels in the '40s and '50s. In the early days, the revenues were largely pocketed by foreign oil companies, so the change in the people's way of life was fairly slow at first.

In the 1970s, Arab governments began to talk more frequently and more eloquently about the ‘need to integrate women in development’. Specialised departments were created, plans debated and women recruited. That was followed, in the 1980s, by a veritable eruption of interest at the popular level, reflected in the dozens of conferences and seminars held in the region and abroad on Arab women and their role in society.

This Arab awakening was part of a worldwide process that gained momentum when the United Nations declared 1975 International Women's Year. Indeed, two Arab countries, Egypt and Tunisia, were among the seven countries that introduced the resolution at the UN for a year to highlight women's issues. The Year became a Decade, its aim to achieve equality for women, and development and peace for the world by 1985.

The UN Decade for Women

It could not be said, by 1985, that the aims of the Decade had been achieved, in the Arab world or anywhere else. This was admitted in the documents presented during the End-of-Decade conference in Nairobi in 1985. In spite of some progress, the UN described the overall achievement as ‘modest’ (UN, 1985d, p.22). It identified the obstacles that continued to block the advancement of women around the world as: deeply rooted traditions; poor understanding of the significance of women's issues; and lack of financial resources to reform the position of women (UN, 1984b, pp.21–2).

The Arab debate on the roles of women is part of the effort to define the role of religion in society and what constitutes a ‘modern’ Arab identity. It is also part of the quest for economic development and national independence. I have argued that all the soul searching might have been cut short if there had been an urgent need for women's participation in the modern workforce. This has not happened, in my view, because the mode of development in the Arab world has not resulted in real economic opportunities for men or women. So the vicious circle continues: Arab women can only be truly liberated when Arab society is liberated politically and economically; and Arab society can only be truly liberated politically and economically, when it is liberated socially, which involves equal rights for women.

How much of a part can Arab women play in the process of reshaping the Arab world and in improving their own conditions? How do the existing women's groups function, and what are the alternatives? Radical change in any sphere is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve without the power to impose it. What power do Arab women have? What power are they likely to get?

In the previous discussion, the point was made that cultural tradition is not the main constraint on women's work for wages outside the home, and that attitudes change quite rapidly if the need and opportunity arise. Indeed, three conditions – need, opportunity and ability – must be met at the state and popular levels before women can be fully integrated into the workforce. Jordan makes an ideal case study to illustrate this argument further. It is a labour exporter, and the country's development process has suffered because of the loss of skilled manpower. It is also a labour importer that faces some of the same problems as the oil-rich, labour-importing Arab Gulf countries. Moreover, the Government has pursued policies favourable to women, particularly after the establishment of a woman-headed Ministry of Social Development in 1979. Finally, the country has been better able to provide social services than some other Arab states, and the people are quite highly skilled.

Need at the state level: from unemployment to labour shortage

Jordan's population was estimated at three million by the mid-1980s. Nearly two-thirds are Palestinians, whose forced dispersal from their homeland swelled Jordan's population in 1948 and again in 1967. In the mid-1980s, the main demographic problems were the high birth rate and the youth of the population – about 53 per cent were estimated to be below the age of 15.

Rarely a day went by, in the 1970s and 1980s, when an Arab newspaper or magazine appeared without an article on a ‘first Arab woman’ who had successfully entered a new field. Sample headlines ran like this: ‘The first woman broadcaster in Qatar’ (who joined the staff in the early days of Qatar radio in 1970, and who soon became head of section); ‘The youngest deputy in the Tunisian parliament’ (who was elected in the early 1980s); ‘The first Kuwaiti woman publisher’ (who began publishing political, general interest and sports magazines in 1970); ‘The first Jordanian woman pilot’ (who was reportedly the first woman in the world to pilot a Tristar); ‘The first Sudanese woman marine biologist’; ‘The first Egyptian woman film director’; ‘The first Arab woman earth satellite station manager’.

The pride and respect with which these Arab women were welcomed into the professional world was not restricted to the press. Any amazement that greeted their success was more likely to be expressed by non-Arabs than by Arabs.

The war record

On 3 June King Hussein received the Turkish Ambassador who informed him that Israel would start its offensive on 5 or 6 June with an air strike on Egypt's air bases. According to Juma'a this information was confirmed by the Iraqi Ambassador who visited him on 4 June and told him that according to their information Israel would open hostilities the following morning, that is, on 5 June. Juma'a and the Iraqi Ambassador then visited King Hussein to inform him of this development. King Hussein immediately told Khammash who informed Riad of the news. At King Hussein's request it was conveyed at once to the Egyptian High Command in Cairo. The Egyptians replied that they were expecting such an attack and were prepared for it.

This was the third time that Jordan had warned Egypt that Israel was likely to commence hostilities in this way. The previous occasions had been at the meeting with Nasser on 30 May and 3 June when King Hussein had told Nasser that all the information coming into Jordan pointed to a surprise attack by Israel on Egyptian airfields on 5 or 6 June.

At 7 a.m. the next day the Jordanian radar station at Ajloun showed intense aerial activity over Israel. This information was conveyed to Riad who immediately passed it on to the Egyptian High Command. However, the Egyptian High Command did not receive this message and consequently no alert was issued to its air force.