The two Governments of the Yemen Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen:

In the name of the one Yemeni people, and in the name of the Arab nation, arising from the reality of historical responsibility and national responsibility; in the belief that the people of Yemen and their land is one single entity which is indivisible and that this reality has confirmed itself across history, in spite of all efforts to strengthen separatism, create barriers and borders;

In fulfilment of the sacrifice and the struggle of the Yemeni people across history in eradicating the backward monarchical imamate system in the North of the country and imperialist domination in the South; being anxious to strengthen and consolidate the progressive national struggle in Yemen; stressing that the unity of Yemen is the foundation for the building of the modern Yemeni society; assuring democratic freedoms for all national forces which are hostile to imperialism and Zionism and are the foundation for the building of an independent national economy; to safeguard the independence and sovereignty of Yemen from any interference or external aggression; stressing that comprehensive Yemeni unity is also the cause of inevitable destiny, the cause of progress, civilization and prosperity for the Yemeni people, being confident that the comprehensive unity of Yemen, in addition to its being the hope of every Yemeni throughout the land of Yemen, is a basic need to strengthen the pillars of political independence and the building of an independent national economy and is a national necessity because it enables Yemen to participate in the struggle waged by the Arab nation against the imperialist-Zionist alliance, and also represents an earnest measure for the realization of the Arab nation as a whole …

The major revolutions of modern history, with the partial exception of the Mexican, involved the revolutionary states in alliance with opposition forces in, and armed conflicts with, their neighbours and other proximate states: France, Russia, Cuba, Vietnam, Iran all underwent this experience. South Yemen too followed this path. Indeed one of the most remarkable aspects of the South Yemeni case was the extent of its revolutionary ‘solidarity’ and embattlement in the post-revolutionary phase, the range and persistence of its conflicts with other states in the Arabian Peninsula and surrounding regions over more than a decade. Given its exposed strategic position, its economic vulnerability and limited resources, the extent of its persistence in such conflict with its neighbours and in a revolutionary foreign policy was striking.

This commitment to revolution in the Arabian Peninsula was not something given great prominence in the official documents of the preindependence period. The 1965 Charter had reiterated radical Arab nationalist themes of that period, calling for freedom from colonial rule and ‘progressive Arab unity’, but its only specific commitment was to support the Palestinians. The shift towards a more socially revolutionary position and to change in the Peninsula was, however, evident from independence itself, and especially when, after some initial optimism on the South Yemen side about establishing relations with Saudi Arabia, it became evident that the two states were in conflict. Speaking at the Fourth Congress, in March 1968, ˓Abd al-Fattāḥ Ismā˓īl stressed the role of the PRSY as a support of revolution throughout the Arabian Peninsula.

The question of Yemeni ‘unity’ is one of the most complex and important in modern Yemeni history. For most Yemenis, it has, since the 1950s, been an article of nationalist faith that the two Yemeni states should unite and that this could be attained in the foreseeable future. No political leadership has been able overtly to contradict this, and all political currents have sought to mobilise the popular sentiment on unity, for their own purposes. At the same time, the issue of Yemeni unity, like that of Arab unity more generally, has been a cause of considerable friction between the Yemeni states, both because of disagreements on how this unity is to be achieved and because each has used the commitment to unity as a legitimation for interference in the internal affairs of the other. The two revolutions produced states of diverging, contrasted character and each upheaval located within the other, refugee communities hostile to the orientation of the other state. The ideal of Yemeni unity is that the movement in favour of this goal can and should promote a reconciliation and fusion of the two states. The reality has been that each state, jealous of its own power, has used unity the better to strengthen its own position and contain the influence of the other.

The issue of unity has also been a source of disagreement within each of the two Yemens. In the YAR the Zeidi North has, in general, been less enthusiastic about unity than the Shafei South, whose ideological and religious orientation has been similar to that in the western part of the PDRY.

The presidencies of ˓Abd al-Fattāḥ Ismā ˓īl and ˓Alī Nāṣir Muḥammad

The defeat of Sālim Rubiyya˓ ˓Alī and the establishment of the YSP seemed, at first sight, to introduce a new, more stable, phase in the postindependence evolution of South Yemen. With the transformation of the NLF into a centralised ‘scientific’ socialist party, on the Soviet model, and the resolution of the main division within the leadership itself, the transformation begun in the early 1970s appeared to be complete. South Yemen faced the second decade of independence with a clear leadership strategy, and a more structured and comprehensive relationship with its main ally, the USSR. These prospects were, however, to be subject to severe strain in the years ahead. While the overall alliance with the USSR survived, as did the YSP regime itself, the pressures of regional issues, intersecting with continued factionalism in Aden, were to subject the relationship with Moscow to considerable strain, and to place the future of the whole regime in jeopardy.

At first, this process of strengthening USSR-PDRY links seemed to be continuing successfully in the period after the YSP Congress. In June 1979 the PDRY acquired observer status with Comecon and in September 1979 Soviet Premier Kosygin visited Aden. In October President ˓Abd al-Fattāḥ Ismā˓īl visited Moscow and signed a Twenty- Year Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with the USSR, as well as new agreements on economic and technical co-operation and on CPSUYSP relations.

The bombardment of Essaouira in 1844 by the French fleet was a decisive turning-point in the history of Essaouira. The pattern of trade that had evolved gradually over the previous twenty years was threatened. Morocco had timidly initiated an opening with Europe by developing a system of royal trade over which the Sultan was able to exercise close control. Such protectionism was to crumble under the weight of foreign pressure. The capacity of Europe to impose its will was demonstrated by the events of 1844. Within a period of fifteen years after the French attack, Morocco had embarked on a precipitous course towards foreign domination. Two decisive events made this inevitable: the treaty with Great Britain in 1856, and the Spanish invasion of Tetuan in 1859–60. Both of them permanently altered the relationship between the Muslim authorities and the foreigners and their protégés in Essaouira.

The revival of trade

The opening of Morocco to Europe began two decades before the war of 1844. Foreign trade was resumed by Sultan ʿAbd ar-Rahmān (1822–59), who had spent some time in Essaouira as governor prior to his succession to the throne. His interest in foreign trade was probably reinforced by his close ties to some of the merchants of the town. In contrast to the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān, ʿAbd ar-Rahmān viewed trade with Europe as a valuable source of revenue.

International trade was at the centre of Essaouira's economic life and the most influential men of the town were the merchants who were the Sultan's traders. Their special relationship to the Sultans gave them particular advantages over other traders, and at certain periods, they maintained a quasi-total monopoly of the import–export trade. The Sultan's merchants (tujjār as-Sultān) had the opportunity to make considerable profits, yet at the same time, they depended on the official recognition and patronage of the palace. The fact that the majority of them were Jews was also significant. As legally inferior members of the only religious minority in Morocco, they could almost never attain positions of political power or have a share in local government outside the confines of the Jewish community. For this reason, as a general rule, they were highly dependent on the Palace and, consequently, their loyalty was usually assured.

As merchants, however, they were able to exert considerable local influence since the prosperity of the town depended on their enterprises. In some ways, these royal merchants were similar to the ‘court Jews’ of central Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In both cases, elite Jews were economic instruments of the rulers. Equipped with foreign languages and international connections, the court Jews were used in diplomatic affairs as well.