This account of Jordan's role in the 1967 Arab–Israeli war has highlighted many aspects of the difficulties imposed upon Jordan as a result of the contradictions arising from its impoverished state, its pro-Western policies and its commitment to Arabism. It has also stressed the deep divisions within the Arab world that characterized the 1950s and 1960s, as well as revealing aspects of the 1967 war which have only previously been fleetingly described.

The intimate relationship between foreign and domestic affairs in Jordan has been evident throughout this study. Two reasons for this coalescence can be discerned: Jordan's political and economic dependence on other nations and its Palestinian population. Political dependence stems from its weak military capability and fear that its powerful neighbour, Israel, had never forsaken its desire to expand its territory. Consequently, Jordan turned to other nations for financial support for the maintenance of its army and sought to belong to a regional defence system. Jordan's economic dependence stems from its meagre natural resources and its underdeveloped economy, forcing it into a position of dependence on foreign financial aid. Its limited internal market also made it essential for Jordan to seek markets abroad, particularly in neighbouring Arab states. As a result Jordan has been vulnerable to external pressures.

Jordan's Palestinian population is also responsible for the intimate relationship between Jordan's foreign and domestic affairs. Over half of Jordan's citizens are Palestinians and, prior to 1967, many were highly susceptible to the propaganda of Egypt, Syria and the PLO which accused the Jordanian government of failing to meet its commitments to the Palestinians and to the ideal of Arab co-operation.

King Hussein's values and images and their relationship with Jordan's foreign policy aims

In view of the central role played by King Hussein in the formulation of Jordan's foreign policy throughout the period leading up to the 1967 war it is useful to examine the values and images which influence him. These are: his Hashemite heritage; his commitment to Arabism; his commitment to Arab solidarity and co-operation; his commitment to the cause of Palestine; his commitment to the West and antagonism to communism. A further point examines Jordan's foreign policy aim of survival, which at times overrides all others because without the survival of the state all the other values are meaningless.

King Hussein's Hashemite heritage

In a sense all King Hussein's values can be seen to be rooted in his Hashemite heritage. The Hashemites have stood for, inter alia, Arab unity and co-operation, commitment to the needs of the Palestinian people and commitment to the West. All of these have been central elements of Jordan's foreign policy aims from the time of King Hussein's accession to the throne until the present day. King Hussein's image of himself as a Hashemite and great-grandson of the man who instigated and led the Great Arab Revolt is therefore one of the keys to understanding the objectives behind Jordan's attitude to other Arab countries.

King Hussein was strongly influenced by his grandfather King Abdullah and was ‘brought up to believe in the manifest destiny of the Hashemite family’. Prime Minister Zaid Rifai and Nussaibah confirm that the King is acutely aware that his heritage has imposed on him a total commitment to the ideals for which his family has struggled.

The road to Samu

In 1967 Glubb wrote that ‘ever since her repulse by the Jordan army in 1948 Israel had longed for an opportunity to overrun the remaining Arab part of Palestine, but as long as Jordan was the friend of Britain and the United States and offered her no pretext, Israel could not move’. This view of Israel was shared by Jordan's decision-makers who were convinced that Israel's leaders had never given up hope that one day the whole of historical Palestine would belong to the Jews. They recalled the fact that at the time of the Balfour Declaration in 1917 the Zionists had claimed the whole of mandatory Palestine, including present-day Jordan, as the territory on which the Jewish national home was to be established. According to Abu Odeh, ‘Jordan's exclusion from the Balfour Declaration was decided in spite of Zionist opposition to this. Hence Jordan was always conscious of Zionist strategic ambitions over its territory. Accordingly it was constantly aware of the dangers posed by Zionist progress … This historical point always remains alive in the Jordanian mind when treating the subject’.

King Hussein had no doubts about Israel's desire to expand into the West Bank. In a speech made on 25 January 1967 King Hussein declared that ‘the enemy's present objective is the West Bank; after that it will be the East Bank and after that they will expand throughout the Arab homeland to achieve their aims and ambitions’.

The position of leader in the Arab world

In contrast with many Western nations where the political party plays a primary role in determining a nation's policies, in many Middle Eastern countries the personality of the leader is of over-riding importance. There are several reasons for the dominating role played by one individual, including the absence in the Middle East of a popular consensus on the nature of political processes, the close relationship between the ruler and the means of coercion, and the absence of a historical tradition of popular participation in political life. Historically, traditional Arab society has always reserved a place for a single dominating figure in social, political and religious affairs. Sharabi points out that the Arab world's tribal pattern of strong civil or political leadership was in existence before the birth of the Prophet Muhammad, who lived in the seventh century A.D. The establishment of Islam strengthened this tradition through the institution of the Caliphate. The Caliph is the supreme leader of the Muslim umma or nation and combines in his person religious and political leadership. Even though the Caliphate died with the Ottoman Empire, the tradition of reverence surrounding the position of leader is still strong at every level of contemporary Arab society.

The assumption that there should be a leading figure in religious, civil and political affairs remains implicit in many Arab communities. In many countries of the Fertile Crescent, including Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, the mukhtar (village head) and tribal leader have positions of considerable authority.

This pattern of according a prominent role to religious and other leaders is not necessarily conducive to the development of nations.

Jordan and the Arabs

Despite strong ties of culture, religion and language the period after the Second World War saw the Arab world deeply divided. Different ethnic groupings, different religious sects, a variety of political parties, disputes over national boundaries, competition between political leaders and the issue of Palestine, led to friction between the nations that made up the area of the Middle East. These divisions, which existed within nations as well as between nations, can be divided into two main blocs: revolutionaries and conservatives. Syria and Egypt belonged to the revolutionary bloc, while Jordan and Saudi Arabia were regarded as conservatives. Following the 1958 revolution Iraq was generally regarded as revolutionary although the rival faction of the Ba'ath Party that ruled Ba'athist Syria denied this.

One of the key issues which divided the conservative and revolutionary states was their attitude towards the West. The revolutionary Arab states condemned association with the West on the grounds that in the past Western countries had exploited the Arab world and continued to do so. The more radical Arab states regarded the destruction of imperialism in all its forms as one of the key objectives of the Arab revolution. This attitude to the West was in contrast with Jordan's and Saudi Arabia's who maintained friendly relations with Western countries, particularly America and Britain, whom they regarded as allies. They did not feel that there was any contradiction between association with Western nations and the advancement of the Arab world.

Analysis of military operations in Jordan

The universal feeling amongst the Jordanian and military leaders who were either observers or actively involved in the 1967 war was that their major mistake was to rely on the help and leadership of other Arab nations. Although they do not believe that Israel could have been prevented from seizing the West Bank they do feel that they would have put up a harder fight on their own. King Hussein later commented:

The seeds of the idea for this book, and indeed the seeds of the war itself, were sown at the first Arab summit conference in Cairo in 1964. Like many fellow Arab journalists, I was excited to be covering an event that marked, for all intents and purposes, the beginning of a new era of Arab politics, and more importantly, of joint Arab action. I had grown up in the 1950s and early 1960s with feelings of great frustration over the fragmentation of Arab opinion on the Palestinian question and the total lack of understanding of Jordan's legitimate defence problems against Israel.

To most Arabs, the summit represented a real opportunity of overcoming these problems, particularly as Nasser himself had called for the conference. Nasser was seen at that time, by the Arab masses and intellectuals alike, as the only leader capable of uniting the Arabs in their common goal of facing up to the Israeli danger.

While talking to some officials who had attended the closed sessions, I had discovered that the Syrian head of state had accused the Arab leaders of cowardice because they refused to confront Israel. He claimed that Palestine could be liberated in six hours if they did decide to fight. Even with my little knowledge of military logistics, this exaggeration was difficult to swallow. To drive a car from Safad in the north to Gaza in the south, would probably require twice as long. How then, I thought, could an Arab leader think he could overrun Israel in six hours? I left Cairo with grave doubts, despite the general euphoria surrounding the summit.

This unease remained with me, and on the morning of 5 June 1967 it proved fully justified.

Prelude to war

An aerial dogfight between Syria and Israel in early April further divided the Arab world as well as increasing Arab–Israeli tension. It began with Israel's attempts to cultivate land in the Demilitarized Zone bordering Syria. The Syrians responded by firing on an Israeli tractor. This was answered by fire from the Israeli forces. Soon artillery, tanks and aircraft joined in. Six Syrian aircraft were shot down by Israeli fighter-planes, one of which went on to sweep over Damascus, triumphantly driving home Israel's victory over the Syrians.

The ease with which the Israelis had defeated the Syrians aroused grave concern in Jordan. It revealed the extent of Syria's military weakness and emphasized how hollow was its claim to be ready to fight a war of liberation on behalf of the Palestinian people.

At the same time, the Jordanians realized that the incident provided them with valuable ammunition against Egypt. They immediately grasped the opportunity to highlight what they saw as the hypocrisy of Egypt in failing to come to the aid of its ally, Syria. Radio Jordan condemned Nasser and pointed out that his boasts about the strength of his forces and his readiness to defend his Arab brethren were meaningless. The fight between the Syrians and the Israelis had lasted several hours yet Nasser had done nothing to help his ally. Even the Syrians accused him of failing to come to their aid. The Jordanians argued that for all his ranting Nasser was doing very little against his enemy.

Defence of the East Bank

By 8 June 1967 most elements of the Jordanian army stationed on the West Bank had retreated across the bridges of the River Jordan. Shattered and having suffered a stunning defeat at the hands of their enemy, their war was over. For their commanders at GHQs, including Riad, the next urgent task was to deal with the threat that the Israeli army would continue its offensive to Amman. The remaining forces under Riad's command were redeployed on the East Bank. On 7 June the only forces left to defend Jordan were the Eastern Command troops (the Al-Hussein and Yarmouk brigades), the Royal Guard brigade, the Iraqi forces (the 8th mechanized brigade and the 1st infantry brigade) and a Syrian mechanized infantry brigade which had arrived at 2.00 p.m. that day. These forces were concentrated in the areas of Naur and As-Salt, west of Amman, with the purpose of preventing an advance of Israeli troops to the capital.

By 12 June the situation had improved. All the Iraqi forces promised to Jordan had arrived. These Iraqi troops (the Salahudin Forces) were composed of Iraq's 1st infantry, 8th mechanized, 6th armoured and 27th infantry brigades. Three Jordanian brigades which had been stationed on the West Bank had also regrouped on the East Bank. Two of these brigades, the Qadisiyeh (stationed in the Jordan Valley) and Hittin (stationed in the areas of Hebron), had escaped heavy fighting and suffered limited losses. They had withdrawn to the East Bank ready to occupy new defensive positions. What was left of the 60th armoured brigade had also succeeded in crossing the River Jordan and elements of it were still functional.

The signing of the Egyptian–Jordanian Mutual Defence Treaty

On the morning of 30 May 1967 King Hussein flew to Cairo to meet Nasser. He was accompanied by his Prime Minister, Saad Juma'a, his Foreign Minister, Ahmed Toukan, his Chief of Staff, Lt General Amer Khammash, the commander of the Royal Jordanian air force, Brigadier Saleh Al-Kurdi and an air force captain as aide de camp. At Cairo airport the Jordanians were met by Nasser and his four vice-Presidents. They went immediately to the Kubbeh Palace for talks. The Egyptian delegation included Nasser, the foreign minister, Mahmoud Riad, the Secretary-General of the Egyptian President's Office, Abdul Majid Farid, and the four vice-Presidents of the UAR, including Field Marshall Amer. Later they were joined by General Abdul Munim Riad, the Chief of Staff of the UAC, and Ahmed Shukairy, the leader of the PLO. The result of these talks was the Egyptian–Jordanian Mutual Defence Treaty. The signing ceremony of the Treaty was broadcast live over Cairo Radio and was followed by a press conference attended by the two heads of state and Ahmed Shukairy.

According to the Treaty, ‘the two contracting powers consider any armed attack on either state or its forces an attack on both. Consequently … they commit themselves to hasten each to the assistance of the attacked state and immediately take all measures … including the use of the armed forces to repulse the attack’ (Article 1). In the event of military operations the Jordanian Armed Forces were to be placed under the command of the Chief of Staff of the United Arab Republic (Article 7), the Egyptian General Muhammad Fawzi.

Women of the peasant and urban lower classes in Egypt lived through a period, from 1800 to 1914, of economic, political, and social transformation. The integration of Egypt into a European economic system, entailing the conversion of a significant part of Egyptian agriculture to cotton exports and the erosion of the indigenous craft industry, was accomplished in these years despite the abortive attempt of the Egyptian State under MuḤammad ‘Alī to harness production to its own ends. Consolidation of land, the establishment and subsequent diminution of large-scale industry, and the migration of significant sections of the population were actually abetted by the policies of a centralized and bureaucratic State under MuḤammad ‘Alī and his successors, and, after 1882, by British colonial rule.

The four dimensions of women's roles and status – access to property, family relations, participation in social production and the public sphere, and ideological definitions – both reflected and structured the impact of these changes on women and the family. First, women's access to property was buttressed by Islamic laws which acknowledged women as heirs to family property and by marriage customs which bestowed the mahr (bridal gift) upon the bride. These claims to family property rested on the woman's identity as a family member, an identity ostensibly based on bonds of blood or marriage; in the actual determination of women's rights to property, however, the family and courts also weighed the woman's contribution to family production. Daughters of peasant families who had married into other households found that their rights to the property of their natal family might be restricted or bypassed altogether, while their claims to property in the marital household were mediated through their husbands.

Throughout the nineteenth century, Egypt remained a predominantly agrarian society: most of the country's wealth was produced, and the majority of its people lived, in the countryside. While the population multiplied over threefold between 1800 and 1900, from roughly 3,800,000 to 11,000,000, the percentage of the population inhabiting cities or large towns increased more modestly, from 10 to 14–15 per cent during the same period. The vast majority of Egyptians continued to live in the many small villages found along the banks of the Nile and throughout the fertile Delta where they worked the land for their own subsistence and for production of the agricultural surplus which constituted the bulk of the country's earnings abroad as well as the livelihood of its citizens at home. During the century, as new crops and technology, changes in land tenure patterns, increased state intervention, and, above all, accelerated integration into a world economy transformed the face of the Egyptian countryside, the peasant family endured as the basic social and economic unit.

It was this family, more than the State or corporative unit, which assigned work roles and regulated most aspects of its members' lives. The peasant family was producer, reproducer, and consumer; its internal logic was not, however, that of the capitalist enterprise. As Chayanov pointed out, the peasant producer strove not toward maximization of profit, but rather the achievement of a “-consumer balance” where and equilibrium is struck between meeting family demands for consumption and the drudgery of the labor required for additional consumption.