Does the conventional wisdom about the relationships between economic, cultural, and political party variables and democracy stand up in the Latin American experience of the 1990s? This study, utilizing new data sets for the region, finds that some traditional hypotheses are upheld better than others. It sustains the conventional wisdom that economic development, economic growth, democratic values, and (with a two-year lead) education correlate positively with the level of democracy. Surprisingly, however, neither social trust nor the number of political parties is significantly correlated with the level of democracy. The study suggests various possible explanations for the weak or nonexistent relationships for social trust and number of parties, in the hope that these surprising results will stimulate further research.

Chile's military government replaced the country's universalistic social policy system with a set of market-oriented social policies. Taking evidence from three areas (pensions, education, and health care), this study seeks to explain why the military advanced a policy of deep retrenchment and why reform of health care was less thorough than it was in pensions and education. The radical transformation of policy relates to the breadth of power concentration enjoyed by General Pinochet and his economic team, the policymakers' ideological positions, and the role of veto players. The more limited reform of health care is linked to the actions of a powerful veto player, the professional association of physicians.

The Catholic Charismatic Renewal (CCR), the Latin American church's largest and most dynamic lay movement, demands scholarly attention for its extraordinary appeal among Catholic laity and its unanimous approval by national episcopacies. If the church is finally using mass media and other Protestant techniques for evangelization, it is because of the Charismatics, whose missionary zeal rivals that of their chief competitors, the Pentecostals. This study uses the tools of religious economy to analyze the reasons for the Renewal's rapid growth and acceptance. In attempting to explicate the CCR's success, the study also examines the major ecclesial trends during the movement's three decades in Latin America.

Current explanations of taxation levels have identified a host of factors, such as levels of economic development and GDP per capita, tax handles, tax morale, and political regimes. But none of them can account for Argentina's exceptionalism. Using a “transaction cost politics” approach and the case of Brazil for comparison, this article argues that the key to explaining low taxation in Argentina is political instability. Systemic instability affects the tax behavior of governments. Facing an uncertain future, incumbent governments choose to extract resources from society through inflation rather than normal taxation. This article argues that political institutions, particularly federalism, contribute to instability and thereby reduce the discount rates of government policymakers.

Using original data from the period 1999–2011 on federal infrastructure investment for all subnational units in two federations, Argentina and Brazil, and a unitary nation, Colombia, this study shows that in developing federal countries with strong governors, presidents use nonearmarked transfers as a tool to compensate governors for sizable and secure territorial political support. The study argues that in these cases, resources do not make electoral power but chase it. In the unitary case, conversely, governors do not influence distributive politics. Variation also was found in the relevance of Congress, legislative overrepresentation, and programmatic criteria across cases. The article discusses possible reasons for these results and their implications for the comparative debate on distributive politics.

Although there is a substantial literature examining public confidence in the judiciary in developed nations, scholars have paid scant attention to analyzing judicial confidence in developing countries. Building on extant work regarding developed nations and introducing original hypotheses in the context of developing nations, this research explains influences on public confidence in Latin American judiciaries by developing a theory that focuses on the potential influences of institutional quality, experiences, and individual attitudes. The hypotheses are empirically tested with the rich individual-level data compiled by the Latin American Public Opinion Project 2006 survey. The results indicate that a variety of factors influence public confidence in Latin American courts; the role of context explains points of consistency and divergence with research on developed nations.

Latin Americans have been voting for a surprisingly large number of ex-presidents and newcomers in presidential elections since the late 1980s. This article looks at both the demand and supply sides of this phenomenon by focusing on economic anxieties and party crises as the key independent variables. Sometimes the relationship between these variables is linear: economic anxieties combined with party crises lead to rising ex-presidents and newcomers. At other times the relationship is symbiotic: the rise of ex-presidents leads to party crises, economic and political anxieties, and thus the rise of newcomers. This article concludes that the abundance of ex-presidents and newcomers in elections—essentially, the new face of Latin America's caudillismo—does not bode well for democracy because it accelerates de-institutionalization and polarizes the electorate.

A long process of free-market reforms and gradual democratization seems to be dismantling Mexico's corporatist system of labor representation. A thorough analysis of the country's corporatist institutions yields theoretical reasons to believe that Mexico's practice of labor relations is indeed changing. An empirical examination of the nation's labor congress and ruling party during the two previous presidential administrations (1988–2000) demonstrates that corporatism is being transformed at a practical level, although the process of reform has been complex and uneven at best. The continuing strength of an officialist labor sector will complicate the task of establishing a new system of labor representation, a problem that may have important implications for future democratic consolidation.