Free-market reforms in the last quarter of the twentieth century weakened the point of production—labor unions—as the source of effective nonparty political countermovement to liberal capitalism. Has another significant source of societal resistance arisen in association with the resurgence of market economics? Building on the work of Karl Polanyi, this article argues that circuits of exchange—the commodification of labor, land, and money—can be powerful sources of movement against contemporary forms of free-market capitalism. It draws on the cases of Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador to explore how Polanyi's exchange-based approach helps to elucidate three phenomena: the great variety of identities behind the myriad movements against free-market capitalism, the emergence of community as a powerful locus for organizing, and the proliferation of new forms of transgressive and highly disruptive direct action to reinforce the debilitated effectiveness of the strike.

This article analyzes the conditions that facilitate the ousting of Latin American presidents and the mechanisms that prevent their downfall. Drawing lessons from the impeachment of Paraguayan president Fernando Lugo, it extends previous arguments about the “legislative shield” to show that the same forces that sometimes conspire to terminate an administration at other times work to resist its demise. The argument underscores the interaction between legislators and social movements, two prominent actors in the literature on presidential instability. The article presents a two-level theory to identify possible configurations of mass and legislative alignments, and tests some implications of the theory with data for 116 Latin American presidents over 28 years. Multiple comparison tests based on random effects logistic models show that popular protests can be neutralized by strong support in Congress, and hint at the possibility that legislative threats can be neutralized by loyal demonstrators in the streets.

Cuba faces a development dilemma: it promotes equity and human capital while failing to deliver economic growth. For the government, the country's equity and human capital achievements are a source of pride, a sign that its priorities are right. This essay argues instead that this “equity without growth” dilemma is a sign of malaise. Theory and evidence suggest that high levels of equity and human capital should produce high levels of economic growth. Because growth is often weak or negative, some onerous barriers to development must be present. These barriers, it is argued, are restrictions on property and political rights. By comparing Cuba and China across two sectors, the bicycle industry and Internet access, this article shows how these restrictions have hindered growth. It also assesses how Cuba's latest economic reforms, the so-called Lineamientos, will address Cuba's development dilemma. The impact may be minimal, but perhaps more lasting than previous reforms.

Scholars concur that conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs have a strong proincumbent effect among beneficiaries. Although no study has properly focused on the overall effect of cash transfers on incumbents' national vote shares, most scholars have deduced that this effect is positive; i.e., that cash transfers lead to the expansion of incumbents' electoral bases. This article analyzes survey data from nearly all Latin American countries and confirms that beneficiaries of CCT programs are more likely to support incumbents. However, it also shows that CCT programs may induce many voters who were previously incumbent supporters to vote for the opposition. As a consequence, the overall impact of cash transfers on incumbents' vote shares is indeterminate; it depends on the balance between both patterns of behavioral changes among voters. This study is the first to report evidence that cash transfer programs may have significant anti-incumbent effects.

A longstanding scholarly debate asks what lasting changes revolution makes in political attitudes and behaviors. Scholars generally regard revolution as transformative, but research on revolution's behavioral and cultural legacies after transfers of state power has been limited. This study explores revolution's residual impact on individuals' electoral participation, civil society engagement, and social capital by comparing postrevolutionary Nicaraguans to their Central American neighbors. Using survey data on comparable samples of urban Central Americans, the research found higher electoral engagement in Nicaragua than in the other nations in the region that experienced major insurgencies but not revolution. It also found among Nicaraguans greater support for civil disobedience, greater school and union activism, and more frequent leftist political identification. Although revolution did leave residual effects in Nicaragua, more significant influence appears to have decayed rapidly.

Labor market dualism—the segmentation of workers between formal, legally protected employment and informal, unprotected status—has long drawn attention from scholars and policymakers in Latin America. This article argues that lasting patterns of economic and political segmentation of workers arose earlier in the region’s history than has previously been understood, well before the classic “incorporation” period. Late-nineteenth-century practices for the recruitment and retention of workers shaped Latin America’s first sets of labor laws, most notably those governing union organization and individual worker job stability. Subsequently, these first laws served as important templates for development, constraining and conditioning the labor codes adopted under mass-based politics. Using historical data drawn from Chile, Peru, and Argentina, this article shows how differing recruitment practices and variation in the extension of effective suffrage rights and electoral participation shaped early legal labor market segmentation and inequality in Latin America.