Contestations about the contents and validity of laws and legal principles are fundamental to the (international) legal profession. After all, when engaging with legal norms, disagreements about their meaning and validity a central part of the day-to-day work of legal professionals specialising in international law, including legal counsel representing governments, international judges, legal officers working for international organisations and non-governmental organisations, and legal academics. We propose a practice-oriented approach to empirically research such interpretive legal contestations by groups of legal professionals. Using an interdisciplinary perspective, we contribute to IR norms research by drawing on not only IR practice theory, but also Bourdieu-inspired research within the Sociology of International Law and ongoing discussions on legal realism in International Legal Theory, including what we have called European New Legal Realism. After outlining how to implement our approach using either a Bourdieusian perspective or the concept of communities of practice, we use normative contestations in and around climate change law to illustrate its added value. Such an approach not only promises to make interpretive legal contestations visible empirically, but also emphasises how interpretive legal contestations matter as they reflect underlying power dynamics and may result in normative legal change in practice.

The Charter of the United Nations presents governments with authoritative rules for international politics. The Charter also defines the power and the limits of the United Nations organization. This chapter describes the main rules, limits, and powers of the United Nations from a close reading of the text of the UN Charter. We see the authority of the United Nations in balance with the sovereignty of member states. Two case studies, on the Goldstone Report on Israel’s 2009 invasion of Gaza and on the UN’s legal immunity for the cholera epidemic in Haiti in 2010, show the ambiguity, dilemmas, and politics that arise when these rules are applied in practice.

Dominant approaches to norm development have shaped and limited the direction and impact of the norm research programme. While early work tended to characterise norm development in relatively teleological and progressive terms, more recent work has explored how a norm’s meaning changes through processes of interpretation, contestation, and violation. In spite of this important corrective and the rich debates that have emerged from it, understandings of norm development have continued to be hampered by a focus on behavioral measures and on changes in norm content. As a result, approaches to norm development remain incomplete, most notably in their neglect of norm strength. To address these shortcomings, this chapter critically reviews existing scholarship on norm change and development, highlighting the need to consider norm content and norm strength as distinct and constitutive elements in processes of norm development. The chapter proposes a typology that identifies four forms of norm change, along with an updated conceptual framework for understanding norm development. This conceptual framework overcomes existing conceptual gaps and inconsistencies in the study of norm processes. In so doing, it promises to advance existing theoretical debates, open new directions of inquiry, and contribute to the further accumulation of knowledge about international norms.

Does the US administration exercise more informal influence over the World Bank when it has less control over US bilateral aid because of opposition from Congress? Replicating four studies of the World Bank, we show that years with a divided US government account for earlier findings of informal influence. This link between donor domestic politics and the exercise of influence in multilateral settings is important for understanding informality in international organizations and provides an alternate explanation to persistent questions about the role of international organizations in the international political economy.

Complex global and regional governance includes both the informality of governance institutions and informality around those institutions. National governments are only one category of actor, though an important one, among a more heterogeneous group of governors. The dynamics and evolution of globalization over time explain the emergence of complex governance in recent decades, an explanation that is complementary to those based on functionalism or domestic politics. Globalization alters actor incentive structures and reduces border effects, allowing nonstate and subnational actors to collaborate and reducing costs of participation in governance. Globalization has empowered actors: Emerging economies, INGOs, and MNCs. Globalization's future will continue to shape the prospects of complex governance.

Chapter 5 analyses the three challenges facing international tribunals considered in this book in investment treaty arbitration. Regarding the challenge of managing change, investment treaty arbitration displays similarities and differences with the inter-State tribunals studied. Using the example of the minimum standard of treatment, the chapter shows that like the inter-State tribunals studied, investment treaty tribunals contribute to broader processes of change in international legal norms. Yet differently from the other tribunals studied, investment treaty arbitration has an overriding focus on determining the permissible degree of change in host State regulation. In relation to scrutinising State conduct for compliance with international law, investment treaty arbitration raises comparable questions to the other international tribunals studied regarding the appropriate intensity of review and the methods of review used by adjudicators. Finally, the chapter considers why, unlike the inter-State tribunals studied, investment treaty tribunals rarely adjudicate in a facilitative, forward-looking manner that aims to complement post-adjudication cooperation between the parties.

Why do states choose informal organizations to govern global challenges? Using the global development regime as a piloting case, this article argues that different informal organizations serve different purposes. Informal intergovernmental organizations generate “club benefits” for member states, which arise from executive policy coordination behind closed doors. In contrast, transnational governance initiatives allow states to reap “risk-sharing benefits” in the production of global public goods by involving stakeholders. Using regression analysis for a set of development-related institutions, the analysis demonstrates that the two types of organizations are driven by different motivations. Complementary evidence is provided through case studies of two institutions: The IBSA Dialogue Forum (an informal intergovernmental organization) and the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (a transnational public-private partnership). The findings inform conceptual discussions of the informality of institutions while contributing to a better understanding of the design determinants of informal organizations.