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Why, and to what extent, are states more or less likely to comply with international law? No overarching state compels compliance, and the international institutional context is thin, yet states seem largely to comply. How do we explain this behaviour? Developed through interviews with eighty State Department senior officials from across five recent administrations, Philip Moremen provides a qualitatively and quantitatively rich study of the extent to which and under what conditions the United States and other countries comply with international law. US policymakers consider legal issues, national interest, and other factors together when making decisions-law is not always dispositive. Nevertheless, international law constrains states. In State Department policymaking there is a strong culture of respect for international law, and lawyers play a highly influential role. In this context, the book concludes by investigating the effect of the Trump Administration on the culture and processes of the State Department.
The contributors to this book represent a wide breadth of scholarly approaches, including law, social and environmental science, engineering, as well as from the arts and humanities. The chapters explore what environmental violence is and does, and the variety of ways in which it affects different communities. The authors draw on empirical data from around the globe, including Ukraine, French Polynesia, Latin America, and the Arctic. The variety of responses to environmental violence by different communities, whether through active resistance or the creative arts, are also discussed, providing the foundation on which to build alternatives to the potentially damaging trajectory on which humans currently find themselves. This book is indispensable for researchers and policymakers in environmental policy and peacebuilding. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
The distinctive features of regional organizations arise from the fact that they strive to integrate a smaller set of countries but they often aim to reach across a wider range of substantive issues than the other international organizations in this book. The regional organizations in this chapter are vastly different from each other but they face the same challenge of integrating members on an almost limitless range of policies. They approach this challenge diversely: the EU has created powerful central authorities, including a bureaucracy and a legal hierarchy between the center and the member states; in contrast, the AU, ASEAN, and the OAS leave most powers of decision in the hands of meetings of their heads of government. These are more typical of regional international organizations in that they could in theory make forceful collective decisions but in practice their main contribution is as a forum in which intergovernmental negotiation takes place.
In 2015, UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty Philip Alston stated that the World Bank treats “human rights more like an infectious disease than universal values and obligations” because of its understanding of what constitutes political interference. The World Bank’s interpretation, replicated by the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) in the development finance regime complex, has shaped how activists hold the Banks to account. This chapter examines how the international accountability norm emerged through contestation with the World Bank and spread to be taken as given for the MDBs, as distinct from international human rights and environmental elemental regimes. It then documents how activists seek to protect human and environmental rights through the banks’ international accountability mechanisms as quasi-legal processes with implications for the banks’ culpability. Although there is an increasing recognition of some rights such as free, prior and informed consent and labour, the banks continue to view these as internal standards not legal obligations. The chapter then examines the extent to which the norm needs to be backed by hard law to be enforced, with efforts by the banks to maintain their international organisation immunity given legal claims as to their implication in human and environmental rights abuses.
The WTO is founded on commitments that governments make to each other in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. These rules provide a structure for international trade in which governments are generally restricted in when they can raise tariffs on imports and whether they can discriminate among their trading partners. This chapter examines the contemporary framework for international trade and its main rules, including national treatment, bound tariffs, and most-favored nation, as well as the WTO’s dispute settlement process. The Shrimp-Turtle case provides an illustration of how these rules interact with international politics to create new political dynamics.
The biggest sports events in the world are the Olympics and the World Cup soccer tournament. These huge multinational spectacles are constructed around nationality: competitors represent their countries, each country gets one team, and national rivalries are encouraged. The Olympics and World Cup are remarkable examples of international cooperation and governance. And yet the organizations most responsible for global sports are not public international organizations. They are not public entities at all. The largest global sports spectacles, including the Olympics, the World Cup, the Tour de France, and many others, are controlled by private organizations that have governmental power in the sense that they regulate and constitute the domain of global sports. They have ultimate authority over who participates and on what terms. Their decision-making is usually invisible to the public and comes into view only at moments of unusual controversy such as the doping scandals and corruption. This chapter examines FIFA, the International Olympic Committee, and the Court of Arbitration for Sport. These are the private global agencies responsible for the football World Cup, the Olympic Games, and dispute resolution within the global sports domain.
The WHO is designed to take advantage of the benefits of cooperation on health. It provides a loosely centralized agency where governments can share information about health and threats to health and get assistance in dealing with both new emergencies and long-running problems. COVID-19 provides an illustration of the WHO’s capacity and limits in the face of new threats to health. More than any other organization in this book, the WHO has taken on partnerships with private organizations to fund and organize its programs, and the organization therefore provides an intriguing illustration of the hybridization of global authority between public agencies and private foundations.
More than three decades of the ‘constructivist turn’ in IR has led to clear insights about what the field gained and lost as ‘norms’ moved from the margins to the mainstream. What happened to the pathbreaking theoretical and empirical claims of the late 1980s and early 1990s? The critical edge dropped out, and the field fractured into silos, while an Atlantic divide deepened. Norms got reduced to an analytical factor to be tested. Can renewed attention to critical and holistic aspect of norms, help the world to craft better responses to climate change or pandemics? Not until the field confronts embedded hierarchies built on racism. I explore this overarching claim about racial hierarchy through the historically rooted themes of rights, migration, and nationality. I stress that IR mistakenly builds on the assumption of domestic jurisdiction as a fundamental feature of the inter-state system, rather than as a constitutive norm specific to the early twentieth century. With a conceptual stroke, the discipline eliminates imperialism, in theory and practice. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I do not privilege 1945, or 1648; our genealogical travels concentrate on the 1920s. Even a cursory glance at the diplomatic record reveals persistently fierce contestation over race.
My aim in this chapter is to contribute to what the volume calls the ‘third move’ in International Relations norm studies, which explicitly addresses the legitimacy of the norm being studied as well as its influence on practice. I build on the work of those who point to the relevance of classical American Pragmatism, which considers how we know that what we are doing is appropriate once we realise that norms are the product of social and historical practices rather than abstract moral foundations. I trace the Pragmatist’s commitment to deliberative inquiry through the ideas of Charles Peirce and John Dewey and relate it to Antje Wiener’s arguments that normativity is sustained through proactive contestation. While there are overlaps between the two approaches, I argue that Deweyan Pragmatism can help us understand when it is appropriate to defend a norm against contestation. It does this by drawing on what Dewey called a ‘stock of learning’, understood as the background knowledge that has epistemic authority because it is the product of a deliberative and inclusive process of inquiry. I develop this with reference to debates within Pragmatist philosophy before applying it to offer a preliminary assessment of global health norms.
This chapter introduces the concept of regulatory contestation as a lens for analysing the development of transnational normative orders. It critiques mainstream conceptualisations of regulation in International Relations (IR) and international law as unnecessarily narrow and advances a broader definition of regulatory governance as actions that steer the flow of events towards specified regulatory goals. This definition allows for the analysis of the creative and generative function of regulation and shows that the process of regulatory contestation facilitates the mediation of international norms into varied social and political contexts. Studying regulatory contestation provides insight into the power dynamics that are shaping fundamental institutions of international order at a micro-level. The chapter illustrates this process through a case study of the accountability turn in the implementation of human protection norms. The recent proliferation of juridical and institutional mechanisms to prevent, protect and prosecute mass violations of human rights is indicative of an emergent transnational human protection order. It applies the lens of regulatory contestation to these global efforts. It concludes by considering the value of regulatory contestation as an analytical lens in IR, contributing to an understanding of constitutive processes that build transnational normative orders.
The ICC launched in 2002 to judge cases against individuals accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. It is unique among international institutions in this book in that it imposes its obligations upon individual persons rather than governments. This chapter shows the powers and limits on the authority of the ICC to punish people for large-scale atrocities. The practical power of the ICC is shaped by both the difficulty of apprehending people and the active work of those who wish to remain insulated from accountability.
The significance of emotions is often implicitly addressed in norm research. Some International Relations (IR) scholars, for example, suggest a regulatory function of emotions when it comes to norm-based behaviour, norm compliance, norm persuasion, and norm contestation. Yet, the literature on norms often takes these affective dynamics for granted without making them explicit. This contribution seeks to address this imbalance by examining the relationship between emotions (as moral value judgements) and norms (as collective expectations about appropriate behaviour). Specifically, we extend the current analytical focus by proposing a framework for the empirical investigation of emotional resonance in norm research. We argue that emotional resonance is crucial to the impact and enforcement of international norms because emotions assign specific value to norms within normative orders. We identify pathways and build bridges between norm research and research on emotions in IR and develop a theoretical model to show how emotional resonance is helpful for explaining failures of norm compliance. The way in which the absence of emotional resonance facilitates non-compliance is illustrated by the example of the Bush administration’s reaction to torture allegations in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo.