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Whereas most books emphasize cases of expansion, this chapter focuses on cases in which the United States does not expand. These cases - Fiji, Kiribati, Tahiti, Tokelau, and Tuvalu- challenge grand narratives of America’s path in the Pacific. The islands had strategic value, large markets, and souls to save. Yet, there was little if any interest from the US government in annexation. Using a structured, focused comparison, we attribute these instances of non-expansion to three causes: an island lacks commodities or labor for the entrepreneur to exploit; the entrepreneur dies or is arrested before the imperial lobby matures; or the entrepreneur establishes themselves in territories already controlled by foreign empires who can offer protection from local threats. These cases are interesting, brief stories about the American commercial experience abroad that have been ignored by scholars of American imperialism.
The conclusion discusses the main findings of the book embedded in the latest developments related to the Covid-19 pandemic and the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It discusses the two main arguments presented in the book, provides detailed answers to research questions of the monographs and presents avenues for further research.
Within this chapter the book goes beyond the discussion on the region and EU and provides an examination of how specific positions of CEE countries towards energy and climate policy fit within global energy transitions. It highlights the ability of regional experience to provide insights into global energy transition challenges, and the lessons the region can offer for discussions about how to approach the pathways towards carbon-neutral economies; many challenges of CEE countries are shared internationally. As the region has to adapt to EU climate and energy policies, but is at the same time able to shape these, it provides insights into the process of developing and implementing decarbonisation policy. Our analysis of how EU enlargement has shaped mid- and long-term EU climate and energy policy is a contribution to understanding the EU’s role as an international actor.
In 1889, almost a decade before the Spanish-American War, the United States, Germany, and Great Britain agreed to enter into an imperial condominium in Samoa. Conventional wisdom credits American imperialism in Samoa to security motives and major economic interest groups within the United States. This chapter argues that American entrepreneurs shaped American imperialism in Samoa. It presents novel evidence that American entrepreneurs - especially H.J. Moors - entered the islands in pursuit of high copra prices and turned to lobbyists after facing threats from German competitors. They pressured officials in Washington and naval captains who visited the islands for action.
This chapter focuses on the impact of CEE countries on the development of climate and energy policies at the EU level. It is argued that states in the region demonstrate some shared preferences and utilise regional groupings to promote these at the EU level. The chapter discusses the contribution of CEE countries to the development of EU policy – such as Polish efforts to create an ‘Energy NATO’, CEE countries’ efforts to improve energy security following the 2006 and 2009 gas crises, the 2014 Energy Union, and the reaction to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The chapter argues that the security dimension was given priority by CEE countries at the EU level. They contributed to placing energy security on the EU’s agenda during accession negotiations and the immediate post-accession period; however, their preferences were often not shared by older members. It was the 2006 and 2009 gas supply disruptions that shifted the focus towards energy security in the region, and at the EU level. In 2022 the EU’s dependency on and vulnerability to high levels of energy imports from Russia were brought into sharp focus.
This book explores how the EU has attempted to balance its energy security objectives in the twenty-first century, to achieve security of supply, reasonable prices and ambitious climate goals. Specifically, the book focuses on how these challenges have played out in Central and Eastern Europe in the context of their accession to the EU, as members are both subject to and shape the EU’s agenda and legislative outputs. Here we introduce how general prioritisation of security of supply concerns has constrained and at times enabled energy transitions in the region, and how a consistent concern with import dependence on Russia was discursively adopted by the wider EU in the late 2000s, and as a policy goal from 2022. The introduction presents two main arguments of the book (priority of energy security of the CEE countries over climate goals and heterogeneity of the region) and its research design.
Written by an international list of contributors, this book presents highly nuanced accounts of children and childhoods across global political time. The analysis demonstrates how international relations is quite deeply invested in a particular rendering of childhood as, primarily, a time of innocence, vulnerability and incapacity.
Bringing together a team of experts, this volume sheds new light on inter-organizational relations in world politics. It demonstrates that, just as inter-organizations relations themselves are diverse and complex, research on this topic should also be pluralistic in order to draw new and valuable results and insights.
El giro dependentista latinoamericano: Los orígenes de la teoría marxista de la dependencia. Edited by Juan Cristóbal Cárdenas Castro and Raphael Lana Seabra. Santiago: Ariadna, 2022. Pp. 426. Open access e-book: https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/57860. ISBN: 9566095570.
Teorías del imperialismo y la dependencia desde el Sur Global. Edited by Néstor Kohan. Buenos Aires: Amauta Insurgente and Cienflores, 2022. Pp. 388. Free e-book online. ISBN: 9874066040.
The Dialectics of Dependency. By Ruy Mauro Marini. Edited by Amanda Latimer and Jaime Osorio. Translated by Amanda Latimer. New York: Monthly Review, 2022. Pp. 202. $26.00 paperback, $89.00 hardcover. ISBN: 9781583679821
Dependency, Neoliberalism and Globalization in Latin America. By Carlos Eduardo Martins. Translated by Jacob Lagnado. Chicago: Haymarket, 2020. Pp. ix + 349. $28.00 paperback. ISBN: 9781642593594.
Rethinking Development: Marxist Perspectives. By Ronaldo Munck. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021. Pp. xxiv + 213. $139.99 paperback, $139.99 hardcover, $109.00 e-book. ISBN: 9783030738136.
Reproducción del capital, Estado y sistema mundial: Estudios desde la teoría marxista de la dependencia. By Jaime Osorio. Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2020. Pp. 264. $1.99 e-book. ISBN: 9587831144.
Teoría marxista de la dependencia: Historia, fundamentos, debates y contribuciones. By Jaime Osorio. Los Polvorines: Ediciones UNGS, 2016. Pp. 336. Free e-book online. ISBN: 9789876302333.
Debates latinoamericanos: Indianismo, desarrollo, dependencia y populismo. By Maristella Svampa. Buenos Aires: Edhasa, 2018. Pp. 572. Free e-book online. ISBN: 6124760932.
Why might female leaders of democratic countries commit more money, equipment, soldiers, and other resources to interstate conflicts than male leaders? We argue that gender bias in the process of democratic election helps explain this behavior. Since running for office is generally more costly for women than for men, only women who place a higher value on winning competitions will choose to run. After election, they also devote more resources to pursuing victory in conflict situations. To provide microfoundational evidence for this claim, we analyze data from an online laboratory game featuring real-time group play in which participants chose to run for election, conducted a simple campaign, and represented their group in a contest game if elected. Women with a higher nonmonetary value to winning were more likely to self-select into candidacy, and when victorious, they spent more resources on intergroup contests than male elected leaders. The data suggest that electoral selection plays an important role in observed differences between male and female leaders in the real world.
Are publics in great power democracies more likely to approve of foreign armed combatants that comply with international humanitarian law (IHL)? There is a wealth of evidence that armed combatants with an incentive to seek the support of outside compliance constituencies are more likely to adhere to IHL. Yet a key mechanism underlying these claims—that people in great power democracies are more likely to support armed combatants that comply with IHL—has not been directly tested. We address this question using a series of experiments embedded in nationally representative surveys conducted in three democracies that have frequently been involved in foreign interventions: France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. We find that belligerents—both governments and rebels—that comply with the laws of war are significantly more likely to garner support from publics in likely intervening countries compared to those who do not comply. In all three countries, compliance with international law caused greater approval of armed combatants as well as greater support for economic or military intervention (although support for military intervention remained relatively low in the treatment groups). This lends support to arguments that, to the extent combatants seek support from outside audiences, this can serve as a mechanism by which international law constrains armed combat.
Conventional wisdom holds that open, collaborative, and transparent organizations are innovative. But some of the most radical innovations—satellites, lithium-iodine batteries, the internet—were conceived by small, secretive teams in national security agencies. Are these organizations more innovative because of their secrecy, or in spite of it? We study a principal–agent model of public-sector innovation. We give research teams a secret option and a public option during the initial testing and prototyping phase. Secrecy helps advance high-risk, high-reward projects through the early phase via a cost-passing mechanism. In open institutions, managers will not approve pilot research into high-risk, high-reward ideas for fear of political costs. Researchers exploit secrecy to conduct pilot research at a higher personal cost to generate evidence that their project is viable and win their manager's approval. Contrary to standard principal–agent findings, we show that researchers may exploit secrecy even if their preferences are perfectly aligned with their manager's, and that managers do not monitor researchers even if monitoring is costless and perfect. We illustrate our theory with two cases from the early Cold War: the CIA's attempt to master mind control (MKULTRA) and the origins of the reconnaissance satellite (CORONA). We contribute to the political application of principal–agent theory and studies of national security innovation, emerging technologies, democratic oversight, the Sino–American technology debate, and great power competition.
Why do rebel splinter groups emerge during peace processes, and who chooses to defect? Since Colombia's landmark peace agreement with the FARC in 2016, roughly half of the territory once controlled by the group has seen a resurgence of rebel activity by FARC splinter groups. I argue that the FARC's return to arms is a case of “middle-out fragmentation,” whereby opportunities for profit induce mid- or low-ranking rebel commanders to establish splinter groups. In Colombia, I argue that profits from the cocaine trade incentivized local-level FARC officers to defect from the peace agreement and allowed them to rapidly mobilize viable splinter groups. I offer several lines of evidence for this argument. I first construct a chronology of splinter group formation, which demonstrates that mid- and low-level commanders, rather than high-level commanders, were the key drivers of fragmentation. Second, I show that splinter groups emerged in areas where opportunities for profit were greatest. Among areas previously controlled by the FARC, those with coca cultivation prior to the peace agreement were up to thirty-seven percentage points more likely to see splinter groups emerge by 2020 than areas without significant production. Using soil and weather conditions to instrument for coca cultivation produces similar results. Further, I use a novel measure of how critical each municipality is to drug trafficking to show that areas that are theoretically most important for drug trafficking are also more likely to see FARC resurgence. I also address competing explanations related to state capacity, terrain, and popular support for the rebels. These findings highlight an important challenge to peacebuilding: satisfying the political demands of rebel leadership is a necessary but insufficient component of peace agreements in cases where opportunities for profit motivate fragmentation from the middle out.
While many scholars expect people's ideological orientations to drive their beliefs regarding the legitimacy of international organizations (IOs), research has found surprisingly limited support for this common assumption. In this article we resolve this puzzle by introducing the perceived ideological profile of IOs as a critical factor shaping the relationship between ideological orientation and such beliefs. Theoretically, we argue that citizens accord IOs greater legitimacy when they perceive these organizations as ideologically more congruent with their own orientations. Empirically, we evaluate this expectation by combining observational and experimental analyses of new survey evidence from four countries: Brazil, Germany, Indonesia, and the United States. We find that citizens indeed perceive IOs as having particular ideological profiles and that those perceptions systematically moderate the relationship between people's ideological orientations and their sense of IOs’ legitimacy. These findings suggest that political ideology is a more powerful driver of legitimacy beliefs in global governance than previously understood.
“Threat perception” is frequently invoked as a causal variable in theories of international relations and foreign policy decision making. Yet haphazard conceptualization and untested psychological assumptions leave its effects poorly understood. In this article, I propose a unified solution to these two related problems: taking the brain into account. I first show that this approach solves the conceptualization problem by generating two distinct concepts that generalize across existing theories, align with plain language, and are associated with specific brain-level processes: threat-as-danger perception (subjectively apprehending danger from any source) and threat-as-signal perception (detecting a statement of the intention to harm). Because both types of perception occur in the brain, large-scale neuroimaging data capturing these processes offer a way to empirically test some of the psychological assumptions embedded in IR theories. I conduct two such tests using assumptions from the literatures on conflict decision making (“harms are costs”) and on coercion (“intentions are inscrutable”). Based on an original analysis of fifteen coordinate-based meta-analyses comprising 500+ studies and 11,000+ subjects, I conclude that these assumptions are inconsistent with the cumulative evidence about how the brain responds to threats of either kind. Further, I show that brain-level data illuminate aspects of threat perception's impact on behavior that have not yet been integrated into IR theory. Advancing the study of threat perception thus requires a microfoundational approach that builds from what we know about the brain.
How do states as social actors cope with stigma-induced status anxiety? I propose the concept of “stigma shifting” as a way in which status-anxious states overcompensate for their stigma-induced inferiority and reaffirm their place in the world: by seeking identification with higher-status states and differentiation from lower-status states. In identifying with the desired group of states, stigmatized states engage in approval-seeking behavior and reaffirm their in-group status in areas where they feel discredited. In differentiating themselves from the undesired group, stigmatized states engage in distinction-seeking behavior, claiming their superiority over this “lesser” group in areas that gave rise to their status anxiety in the first place. Stigma shifting, in other words, allows a stigmatized state to take the role of a stigmatizer. To demonstrate the concept's depth and analytical utility, I draw on the case of East Asia in three disparate issue areas: colonial redress, nuclear disaster, and international order making. Japan, stigmatized in all three areas, has reaffirmed its status by shifting the stigma onto its significant but “lesser” others: China and Korea. Ultimately, stigma shifting solidifies status hierarchies in the world—not just the hierarchy as represented by the “Western” dominance of international society but also the regional hierarchies of the non-Western world.
Across countries and over time, support for economic globalization is strongest among individuals with the highest levels of education. Yet despite long-lasting debates on the sources of this correlation, reliable evidence that isolates the causal effect of education from the nonrandom selection of individuals into education is lacking. To address this fundamental issue, I exploit compulsory-schooling reforms that increased the minimum school-leaving age in eighteen countries. Employing a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, I find that the reform-induced added years of education substantially and durably increased support for trade liberalization. And using new data on the content of school curricula, I find that the effect of schooling largely stems from instilling tolerance and pluralism in citizens and reducing the perceived cultural threat of globalization. In contrast, there is little evidence that the effect of schooling reflects the distributive consequences of international trade, separating globalization winners and losers.