Air power played a central, if uneven, role in the US military response to the September 11 attacks during Operation Enduring Freedom. For many, the successes of the air campaign in Afghanistan heralded a “New American Way of War” – a strategy characterized by the precise application of long-range air power, ISR support, and special forces coordinating with local allies against the enemy. However, air operations over Afghanistan generated mixed levels of effectiveness against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, with success often tempered by the degree and quality of teaming between air and ground components. This chapter explores the legacy of air power during Operation Enduring Freedom, carefully examining the origins and context of the air campaign, key characteristics and events of air operations throughout the conflict, whether air power in Afghanistan ultimately proved effective, and finally how applicable the experiences of the air campaign might be for future conflicts.

In 2011, the Arab Spring led to numerous uprisings against authoritarian leaders across the Middle East. While the reactions of governments varied, Libya sparked the most interest given its notoriety as a pariah state and Colonel Qaddafi’s provocations against the regime’s domestic enemies. This chapter examines how the anti-Qaddafi coalition formed under the guise of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and how the imposition of a no-fly zone to protect civilians slowly transitioned into a mission to destroy pro-Qaddafi forces while defending rebel positions. Momentum shifted as anti-regime forces developed innovative ways of communicating with NATO air forces, which provided more precise targeting. However, the downfall of Qaddafi – aided by air power – was a short-lived victory as the country fragmented along numerous political and tribal lines, with a full-blown civil war reigniting in 2014. To this day, numerous countries are backing different rebels that claim to represent the Libyan government.

Fast-growing trade and investment agreements in the Asia-Pacific have attracted tremendous academic and government attention. This book introduces theoretical lenses and assesses major regional economic initiatives and institutions, as well as trade policies of Asian powers, the EU and the United States. Distinct from the conventional country-specific approach to understanding regionalism, the book focuses on the ASEAN Plus Six framework and its international implications. Building on case studies in preceding chapters, this final chapter summarizes key findings and recommendations for the Global South and the multilateral trading system.

Chapter 8 adds to Chapter 7 by examining the special WTO cases of multiple respondents. It argues that Member States act as co-respondents when their restorative actions are necessary for compliance purposes. That depends on the nature and scope of the claim which, in turn, defines the remedy.

Chapter 5 explores the nature of international economic obligations. It suggests that remedies in international economic regimes have a restorative rather than punitive purpose. It is argued that attribution of breach may not be relevant, or that relevant, in the international economic law context. This study posits that what international courts and tribunals ask is not who is responsible for a breach but rather who is best placed to bear responsibility. In international economic law, shared responsibility typically raises the question of the proper respondent(s).

The book explores how the diffusion of the nation-state outside the West was associated with the exportation of the immanent/transcendent and secular/religious divides embedded in the Western conception of religion. It contends that this diffusion is a significant factor in the politicization of religion.

Moscow’s air power success in Syria presents an opportunity to assess Russian inter- and intra-war adaptation in kinetic counterinsurgency. New technologies and tactics have enhanced the Russian Aerospace Force’s battlefield lethality and resilience but have not yet triggered a fundamental transition in operating concept. Russia’s air force has yet to actualize a reconnaissance-strike regime or advanced air-ground integration. Instead, situational and strategic factors appear to be more powerful contributors to its superior performance in the Syrian conflict. The way in which Russia has chosen to leverage its improvements in accurate munitions delivery, moreover, highlights key differences between its warfighting philosophy and that embraced by major Western powers. The resultant findings provide insight into Moscow’s coercive campaign logic, force-planning imperatives, and the likelihood that it might re-export the Syria model elsewhere.

Against weaker states and nonstate actors, powerful air forces working with competent proxy ground forces have been militarily effective in almost all cases, but their political effectiveness has varied by ambition and target. Air power was most likely to be politically effective in denial strategies against weak states but least effective when attempting to coerce nonstate actors by punishment. Air power was far more effective in breaking armies and toppling regimes than restoring political order in the aftermath of regime change. Some but not all of the strategies of the age of primacy will survive the transition to an age of great power rivalry. The persistence of small wars against nonstate actors will leave space for refinement of advisory models, close air support, and counter-network targeting. But missions that were feasible in an era of unchallenged air supremacy – CAS and persistent ISR – may become extinct against enemies possessing resilient IADS and long-range strike capabilities of their own.

No corner of the globe is exempt from the scourge of conflict. Every year, hundreds of thousands of civilians die as a consequence of armed conflict, and millions more are displaced. These conflicts are brutal, durable, and global. Oftentimes, they are characterized by genocide, as in Bosnia, Darfur, Iraq (ISIS), Myanmar, and Rwanda, or widespread atrocity crimes, as in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. As is often said, it is easy to start an armed conflict, but excruciatingly difficult to end one. In any given year, there are nearly four dozen active armed conflicts around the globe. While some of these conflicts may transpire over a relatively short time (3–5 years), others remain active for a decade or more, and still others are “frozen” for decades on end, continuing to contribute to instability and insecurity.

This chapter explores the dynamics of renewal and anxiety in the context of the French school of international arbitration. It shows how, in the 1980s and 1990s, a new generation took the helm within the French school. Members of this second generation – who had been the students of leading members of the first generation and envisioned international commercial arbitration as a field of both research and practice – felt that the debates over lex mercatoria had led to important insights but did not sufficiently address fundamental questions, such as the source of the arbitrators’ power to adjudicate or the “juridicity” of international arbitration. At the same time, arbitration scholars – not just in France, but also in places such as England, Switzerland, and the United States – argued vigorously for and against the enforcement of awards set aside in the country of the seat. As explained in this chapter, the major contribution of the second generation of the French school was a theorization of the arbitral legal order, which led to a deeper sense of renewal for some and anxiety for others.