This chapter provides an overview of each of the book’s chapters and summarizes a key objective of the book, which was to identify three broad phases or periods in the modern history of international commercial arbitration: the Age of Aspirations, the Age of Institutionalization, and the Age of Autonomy. It also asks whether we are entering a new age in the modern history of international commercial arbitration – an Age of Disruption, where the tension between the mercatocracy and the State is exacerbated by unfamiliar circumstances that could threaten the integrity of the arbitration system as a whole. These circumstances include such phenomena as the rise of nationalism, the reemergence of protectionism, and broader fears about globalization. It points to what Judge Crawford described as a “risk of erosion in the current political climate,” and asks whether this “erosion” could signal a shift from the Age of Autonomy to the Age of Disruption.

In the era of climate change and sustainable development, the main task of China’s power sector is not to expand production, but to promote the transition to a low-carbon energy system. On the generation side, the power sector needs to reduce the share of thermal power, especially coal power, and increase that of nonfossil energy sources; on the demand side, the power sector needs to support electrification of residential and transportation sectors to achieve deep decarbonization and air quality goals. This will significantly increase the uncertainties on both the generation and consumption ends, since nonfossil energy sources, such as photovoltaics and wind power, are highly unpredictable, and large-scale electrification of heating and transportation can increase the volatility of power demand. Therefore, the future power system requires a high degree of technological and operational flexibility to cope with uncertain supply and demand. Our analysis suggests that market-oriented reforms in electricity dispatch and pricing are critical to provide the right incentives to electricity generators and consumers, as well as to promote the adoption of new technologies to facilitate China’s transition to low-carbon energy.

This chapter explores the evolution of the governance of so-called “fragile states” as a case of change in the architecture of global governance. Reduced funding from states and broader ideational trends about managerialism and effectiveness have rendered international organizations (IOs) less important in defining policy responses and assigning roles to other actors. This change in the governance architecture has engendered more networked and market-based forms of governance, with different stripes of professional networks becoming more important. The chapter argues that this transformation helps explain substantive changes in how fragile states are governed: in the 1990s and into the early 2000s, the treatment of fragile states was dominated by a “peacebuilding” approach focused on building institutions to support the rule of law and democracy, and with IOs such as the UN and the World Bank in authoritative roles. Gradually, over the course of the 2000s and 2010s, this approach became bifurcated, which reflects the prominence of professional networks and the reduced authority of IOs to define an overarching framework: military professionals in states advanced “stabilization” and counterterrorism – focused on fighting insurgents and conducting anti-terrorism operations – while networks consisting of humanitarian and human rights professionals advanced a focus on protection of civilians.

Legal enforcement of international obligations under domestic law is a contradiction in terms because the same state that has the conclusive obligation to protect human rights also has exclusive control of the means of legal enforcement under domestic law. The impulse for the state to obstruct or hinder the domestic enforcement of its international obligations under routine trade and international relations is effectively precluded by fear of retaliation by other states and/or international organizations that have the power and resources to secure their economic, trade, security, and other interests under international law. Unfortunately, human rights treaties are unlikely to have similar benefits for states when they implement or enforce the treaty or international custom on which a human rights claim is based.1

Though relatively young, the climate regime has already exhibited a profound transformation. “Old governance”, embodied by the Kyoto Protocol, was largely state-focused and hierarchical. The 2015 Paris Agreement represents “new governance,” with an emphasis on transnational actors and bottom-up approaches. The bet is that new governance is better suited to both the realities of domestic politics and profound uncertainty surrounding climate change than the old governance model. If we are correct, then we have created the enabling conditions for decarbonization. The question is: will it happen fast enough? The answer to this question is critical both for the future of the planet and the legitimacy of global governance. Climate change will likely exacerbate existing problems in world politics such as armed conflict and mass migration. Worse still, those least capable of adapting to a changing climate will be most affected. A shift to a “new” global governance architecture means little if climate change continues apace. To preserve the legitimacy of the climate regime, as well as much of the fabric of the current liberal international order (such as it is), actors will have to move more swiftly and decisively toward a fossil-free world.

The heavy reliance on coal for energy contributes to both air pollutants and CO2 emissions in China. As air pollution control becomes one of the top government priorities in recent years, many measures to tackle air pollution, such as curbing coal consumption, increasing energy efficiency, and encouraging renewable energy investments, can simultaneously reduce carbon emissions. However, air pollution abatement measures are not always aligned with carbon mitigation goals. For instance, installing sulfur scrubbers on coal power plants can significantly reduce air pollutant emissions, but does not mitigate carbon emissions. Given the political saliency of air pollution concerns, it is critical for policymakers to understand the potential synergies and trade-offs between these two objectives: improving air quality and protecting human health in the near term, and achieving deep decarbonization to tackle climate change in the long term.

The conclusion I find appropriate and credible for this book should be about practical action instead of theoretical abstraction. With human rights as the ultimate measure of our humanity, our focus should be on strategies for action by the most inclusive measures. Working on cultural transformation requires engaging issues of public ethic and socializing children to instill appropriate values of transparency and accountability in public service. The key factor in this process of cultural transformation is the intuitive and spontaneous manner by which the promoters of these values practice what they preach. The object should be to internalize and promote values of compassion and empathy with minorities and marginalized communities. Yet, the objective should never be to excel or prevail over others because that will diminish the communal values needed to accomplish the task.

The premise of this book is that, like everything else in life and human experience since the beginning of time, evolution is the key for understanding how the world works. For me, as a Muslim, only God is the permanent reality, while everything else evolves with time and in response to changing circumstances. Since human rights are rendered in the service of human beings, they must evolve with the life experience of their subject, namely, human beings on the ground everywhere, for each person and community on their own terms. This is the true meaning of universal human rights which are worthy of global struggle for their realization and protection. By the principle of the concept itself, no other person, group, or entity can impose their view in defining, interpreting, or elaborating human rights norms and institutions for others. The way remains open for respectful debate, contestation, suggestions, and recommendations, but these should never violate the dignity and freedom of the human subject. This is what we all know as the Golden Rule, or the principle of reciprocity. If in doubt as to whether a debate or challenge is in violation of this fundamental principle, imagine the situation with you as the subject of violation of human dignity and freedom.1