Since the 1962 war, in which India suffered a disastrous defeat, a series of crises have punctuated Sino-Indian relations. The most serious of these probably took place in 1967 and in 2020. Both of these crises led to actual clashes between the Indian Army and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) exacting material and human costs on both sides. Within the past decade, the PLA has made several limited probes along the Sino-Indian border, largely to test Indian resolve. These actions are unlikely to end, especially as the PLA has improved its infrastructure along the disputed border and is also bolstering its military capabilities. Consequently, there is every likelihood that further crises are likely to ensue.

The ecology of governance organizations (GOs) matters for what is or is not ruled. The array of actors who comprise the current system of global governance, and especially private governance organizations (PGOs), has grown dramatically in recent decades. Drawing on organizational ecology, I posit that the rise of PGOs is both required and facilitated by disagreements between states that block the creation of what might be otherwise effective intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). In a form of “double-negative regulation,” states block IGOs which in turn leave open niches that are then filled by PGOs, which then both complement and sometimes substitute for state law. The organizational ecology approach outlined here extends and refocuses inquiry in systematic ways that give us a fuller understanding of how and why PGOs have emerged as one of the most striking features of the contemporary world order. The key innovations in this paper are to a) shift the level of analysis from single agents or populations of agents to the entire field of GOs, including states, IGOs, and PGOs and b) draw on principles of ecology to understand the composition and dynamics of systems of governance.

Global governance entails a “transnationalization” of what is conventionally described as international authority, vested in multilateral organizations such as the UN. This process entails an increased reliance on private or non-state actors, and on voluntary and marked-based mechanisms of governance. In many cases, so-called “private” authority is central to global governance arrangements. This aspect of contemporary global governance raises questions about how the authority to govern is established. If authority is not delegated by states, but seized by private actors, our theories for explaining its emergence becomes important. I develop an argument about how authority can be established from scratch, without prior authority, by virtue of the sheer facticity of political rule. In this conception, authority is not the basis for political rule, but a result of it. I explore this dynamic with regards to different issue-areas in multilateral settings.

There are disagreements about when the Sino-Indian rivalry began, what it is about, what its potential for escalation might be, and how significant the rivalry might be for the course of world politics. It is argued that this rivalry began with the advent of Indian independence, given that the earliest time point at which a rivalry between two states can commence is when both states are independent. There is not surprisingly a great deal of emphasis on disputes along the Tibetan border. They are not insignificant, but they may prove to be the least important part of the Sino-Indian rivalry. The positional contest between the two Asian giants seems more central to the rivalry overall. We think the rivalry has considerable potential for escalation – perhaps even more than the Sino-American rivalry does. If that is indeed the case, the rivalry may hold one of the most critical keys to world peace and stability. It is not something that can be dismissed as a minor tempest in a frozen region.

International Relations scholars are increasingly studying different forms of sub- and superordination in the international system through analytical lenses such as hierarchy, hegemony, or authority. Drawing on these debates, this introduction sets out to establish the concept of rule as the defining feature of order in the international realm. More specifically, we argue that the manifold conceptual approaches to sub- and superordination in the international should be understood as rich conceptualizations of one concept: rule. We define rule broadly as constellations of formally or informally institutionalized sub- and superordination with the aim of affecting the distribution of basic goods and influence and of stabilizing expectations, regardless of whether these constellations are primarily of sociocultural, economic, or military nature. With this, we aim at advancing a research agenda that defines rule as a systematic approach to studying international politics. By promoting the concept of rule, we aim to show that rule can serve both as an integrating and a diagnostic tool for the study of the international “beyond anarchy.”

The ideology of the rule of law posits a hierarchical relationship with law and rules in a position of authority over the subjects. In international affairs, this is represented by the popular view that international order follows once governments accept the authority of international law and institutions. The idea that states are subordinate to international law is central to the international rule of law, but it directly contradicts the equally popular image of international affairs as a domain of anarchy. Anarchy presumes that governments are not subordinate to any source of authority while the rule of law says that they are. The fact that two apparently fundamental assumptions of international theory are incompatible with each other suggests an urgent need to look closely at both. This chapter examines the ideology of the international rule of law and compares it with domestic notions of the rule of law and with the idea of international anarchy. Once the rule of law is understood as a language of political justification, we can begin to make sense of its position as a source of authority that is superordinate to governments.

International law (IL) draws its legitimacy and authority from public affirmations and diffuse support for the rule of law, yet contestation about IL is to be expected. States collectively rule and contest international politics through the crafting, invocation, and interpretation of IL. The chapter explores both ordinary and extraordinary contestations of IL authority. Ordinary contestation takes place within a legal field, when lawyers, stakeholders, judges, and government officials debate, contest, and disagree about the meaning of IL. Political tactics are also part of ordinary contestation, but because the curators of IL authority are transnational, a state may be unable to impose its preferred IL interpretation. Instead, states can use three extra-ordinary contestation strategies to escape IL authority: they can 1) seek to replace international law’s authority with domestic law’s authority; 2) pit different international laws against each other by maneuvering within and around international regime complexes; and (3) attack the legitimacy and authority of international law altogether. Extraordinary contestation can make IL more accountable, but it can also undermine the permissive conditions that make IL both constraining and effective.

Over thirty years ago, Frank Klink and I wrote a paper on anarchy, authority, and rule—the first of its kind and a touchstone for subsequent theorizing about states and their relations. We sought to rebut prevailing claims about anarchy as the absence of authority and replace these concepts with a scheme centered on conditions of rule in every society. We identified three forms of rule: hegemony (inspired by Gramsci), hierarchy (drawing on Weber), and heteronomy (inspired by Kant, drawing on liberal theory). We argued that the relations of states exhibit elements of all three forms of rule to the abiding advantage of some few states. There is today a great deal of interest in rule in international relations but less interest in our three-part conceptual scheme. Looking back, I believe it holds up in its own terms but works even better when situated in an overarching framework linking three types of speech acts, derivative types of rules, and correlative forms of rule. I erected this framework in World of Our Making (1989) and reprise it here. I conclude by showing how modernity has reinvigorated status to support sovereign equality, thereby conjoining hegemony and hierarchy in a durably heteronomous world.