The 1962 Sino-Indian War was not just a border war over disputed territory (or the outcome of the Sino-Indian spatial rivalry alone) as is generally argued because issues related to their positional rivalry were also at stake. Sino-Indian positional rivalry in the Himalayan states and in Burma was linked with the Tibetan issue, and Tibet itself was at the nexus of Sino-Indian spatial and positional rivalries. Furthermore, the 1962 Sino-Indian War proceeded as wars between positional rivals tend to: with the near multilateralization of the war as India sought help from the United States (and that it was favorably considered). While China’s unilateral ceasefire that was accepted by India precluded overt American participation, India’s massive defeat also had positional consequences as it removed India as a contender for Asian leadership. Although this did not result in Chinese leadership in Asia, China continued to remain more important than India to the wider Asian strategic dynamic in the decades after 1962.

Given China and India’s claims to Asian leadership, the positional dimension of the Sino-Indian rivalry was central to their relationship in the 1940s and the 1950s. This positional contest played out in three venues: (i) in various Asian multilateral fora (such as the 1947 Asian Relations Conference and the 1955 Bandung Conference) and in India’s attempts to mediate in conflicts involving China and other players; (ii) in the Himalayan states (Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim) and in Southeast Asia; and (iii) in Tibet. The Tibet issue was particularly fraught with strategic consequences. As China sought India’s help to consolidate its own rule in Tibet, it gave India an exalted but much-resented position in China’s internal affairs (pertaining to Tibet). Matters related to Tibet also entangled the positional and spatial dimensions of the Sino-Indian rivalry because the territories in dispute between China and India had complex historical links with Tibet.

This chapter introduces a conception of rule that takes resistance rather than obedience as the constitutive element of rule. Based on an eclectic reading of different theories of rule, we argue that there is no rule without resistance. Even though rule might aim at suppressing resistance or might take such a subtle shape that it hardly encounters resistance, conceptually, rule is bound to resistance. Without a minimum of opposition, a recourse to rule would not be necessary. Even legitimate rule, which Weber calls authority, is legitimate only to a certain degree. As a consequence, not only obedience and the will to comply, but also dissent and the will to resist are part of rule. This chapter therefore sheds light on the relational dimension of rule, by analyzing the dynamic relationship between (forms of) rule and (forms of) resistance at the global level. To this end, we distinguish between two forms of resistance – opposition and dissidence – in order to show how resistance and rule implicate and influence each other. To demonstrate this relationship, we discuss four illustrative case studies on state and non-state forms of resistance and how they indicate and influence different forms of rule.

The simultaneous rise of China and India is exacerbating their strategic rivalry. The aim of this book is threefold. First, we describe and analyze the Sino-Indian strategic rivalry and its implications for rivalry escalation. We also pay attention to the spatial and positional contests that characterize their rivalry. Second, we examine how their material and cognitive asymmetries are shaping their conflict behavior. Third, we show that the Sino-Indian rivalry is consequential for the regional order in Asia and for the global order.

This chapter demonstrates how the genesis, growth, and evolution of the Sino-Pakistani nexus has impinged on India’s security interests since the early 1960s. Since then, the Sino-Pakistani strategic partnership has steadily deepened. By the late 1980s, for all practical purposes, Pakistan had emerged as a strategic surrogate for the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) in South Asia. Given the PRC’s reliance on Pakistan to pursue its security interests in South Asia and Pakistan’s goal of balancing against India, the relationship is likely to persist in the foreseeable future.

This chapter adds a regional perspective to the study of rule in the international system by exploring the region as a site of rule, formalized in the growing authority of regional organizations to define governance principles for their member states. Concretely, the chapter analyzes the connection between international authority and authority in/of states, thus offering a relational reading of authority which focuses on the constitutive connections between different sites of authority. With a case study on the African Union’s (AU) anti-coup policy, the chapter analyzes how the authority to define what counts as legitimate authority in states both reproduces the state as a locus of legitimate authority and denies it that very authority. Unlike most of the existing literature, which studies the authority of international organizations by focusing on the sources of IO authority, the chapter offers a reading of IO authority through the practices of enacting authority and the effects this has in specific locations.

Multiple asymmetries characterize the Sino-Indian rivalry. India’s slow and fitful (absolute) rise over the past three decades has happened in the context of relative decline vis-à-vis China because the latter has grown faster and more comprehensively. Despite this asymmetry, newer functional areas – economics, nuclear, and naval – have appeared in this contest. These areas are riddled with domain-specific asymmetries and domain-specific pathways to conflict escalation. While there is no reason to believe that war is inevitable, the Sino-Indian relationship has entered a troubled phase because further asymmetry as well as strategies to address these asymmetries are both conflict-prone. There are three specific pathways (which are not mutually exclusive) that cut across these different domains and point towards heightened conflict: any Chinese attempt to create a new status quo reflective of the power gap in its favor; any Indian endeavor to redress this power gap in order to be taken more seriously by China; and the United States’ promotion of the rise of India.

Anti-globalist leaders form a distinct set of challengers to the global system because they share a common motivation: the desire to regain national sovereignty and reduce the power of international institutions. This chapter considers three different forms of anti-globalist resistance: (1) attempts to dismantle status quo regimes through unilateral action that challenges existing rules; (2) joining coalitions across states to transform existing multilateral institutions and reduce rules or obligations; (3) building new institutions or seeking alternative venues that favor state sovereignty over interconnectedness. Each strategy could transform the content of international rules, but with different implications for how we understand the nature of institutional authority. If international authority has moved beyond state consent and international institutions themselves now constitute a legitimate source of authority, anti-globalist leaders will find it difficult to escape the confines of institutional commitments through unilateral action. For strategic anti-globalists, then, the optimal way to undermine cooperation may be to work within the system itself, shaking the foundations of the post-1945 international order.

In this chapter, authority and rule are considered as analytical concepts to capture different forms of domination based on recognition. Both concepts involve the social paradox of voluntary subordination, particularly evident concerning global governance and International Organizations (IOs). The chapter discusses three theoretical solutions to the social paradox, thus three conceptualizations of authority. While contracted authority and inscribed authority represent the dominant conceptions in IR, they suffer from several shortcomings. Building on a critique of these variants, the chapter introduces reflexive authority as a third response, which understands authority in global governance as deriving from epistemic foundations that include the permanent monitoring of authorities. Reflexive authority relations involve enlightened and critical subordinates recognizing authority because they acknowledge their limitations. Instead of commands, authority holders send requests to constituencies, who monitor the authorities closely. This recognition of authority as worth observing leads to deference. Primary forms of contestations include non-compliance, delegitimation, and dissidence, which aim at different targets.

The China–India rivalry could be the key to global stability in the coming decades even though this may not be apparent at first. In Asia, the hotspots of Korea, Taiwan, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea tend to receive more attention, while the China–India militarized disputes are perceived as the backwaters of the regional theater. However, a Sino-Indian confrontation – whether on land in the Himalayas or in maritime realm in the Indian Ocean – may very well be the trigger that leads to a systemic war involving the United States. The China–India rivalry for power and influence at the regional level in Asia is in the process of fusing with the US–China rivalry in Asia and consequently at the global level. Given that the Sino-Indian spatial contest has intensified in recent years, the probability of escalation in the Himalayas is a distinct possibility. In fact, the presence of the more consequential positional dimension of the Sino-Indian rivalry suggests that there would still be a strong Sino-Indian rivalry even if the spatial dimension were to disappear. The Sino-Indian rivalry is now a part of the larger mosaic of regional and global power competition.

The way in which major power wars have escalated into general or systemic wars is less straightforward than one might think. They start for various reasons and then become something else when other major powers join the fray and turn them into systemic wars. The initial grievances in these systemic wars may seem like acorns that become mighty trees. How, for example, does a bungled assassination of an Austrian archduke or even an attack on Poland mushroom into war on multiple continents? One answer is in the ways rivalries are linked. While it is true that the specifics of each systemic war have unique components, there are also some general features as well. One is that decision-makers do not tend to see general wars coming. They make decisions based on short-term considerations without necessarily seeing the big picture. That bigger picture includes linked or fused rivalries that blow up relatively local concerns into global wars. This chapter uses the Seven Years and Crimean Wars as examples. Rivalries like the Sino-Indian rivalry can be conduits to widening the local concerns that have the capability to become transformed into something far greater and more damaging.