Most trade agreements are ratified with overwhelming support by legislators throughout the world. This lack of opposition is surprising given the strong distributional consequences of trade and the expectation of conventional political economy theory that parliamentary votes on trade policy should be closely contested between winners and losers of globalization. To analyze the driving forces behind legislators’ voting behavior while avoiding the obscuring effect of party discipline, I analyze under which circumstances legislators decide to rebel against their party’s position when voting on the ratification of trade agreements. I put forward two hypotheses: First, rebellions are more likely when the trade agreement is with a larger trading partner and when the liberalization through the agreement is more comprehensive. Second, legislators will rebel when their party’s position does not align with their constituency’s economic interests. These hypotheses are supported by a series of multinomial regression analyses based on an original dataset comprising votes of several thousand legislators from multiple countries on the ratification of trade agreements.

How do the media describe the intersectional identities of elected politicians? Our study focuses on parliamentarians in the Netherlands who fall outside the prevailing norm in politics: women and female and male ethnic minorities. Drawing on 2,783 newspaper articles published between 1994 and 2012 and matched samples, we find that the media structurally emphasize the identities of all parliamentarians who are not white men. Women politicians are more often described in terms of gender, ethnic minorities in terms of ethnicity and Muslim politicians in terms of religion. Ethnic majority men, meanwhile, are most often described by their political ideology. We find that this works already for one minority identity, as well as multiple identities. By continuously highlighting the identities of politicians that diverge from the norm, the media, we argue, paint pictures of women and ethnic minority politicians as different and out of place.

According to partisan theory, variations in policy choices and outputs originate from the party composition of the government studied. In this study, we take a novel approach to address such assumptions by linking changes in municipal taxes with local government changes. We also add a baseline scenario in which we examine whether the composition of the local government affects tax levels. Drawing on a dataset that contains official Swedish statistics from 1994 to 2018, we find convincing support for the partisan effect. Tax levels are higher under left-wing rule, and more specifically, tax cuts particularly occur when left-wing governments are replaced by right-wing ones. These results do not vanish when controls are accounted for, while it can be particularly noticed that the condition of the municipal economy influences partisan ambitions. These findings thereby contradict prior theoretical assumptions that the local arena is free from ideological battles.

Although often theorized, empirical research on the relationship between MPs’ parliamentary behaviour and their chances to realize career ambitions is relatively scarce. This article holistically analyses the effect of MPs’ (1) party loyalty, (2) activity level and (3) the quality of their parliamentary work on MPs’ prospects for re-election and their promotion to higher parliamentary office. Based on a unique combination of behavioural and peer assessment data on 325 federal and regional MPs in Belgium (2014–2019), we find that particularly MPs’ loyalty and activity level improve their career prospects in the subsequent term, in contrast to more qualitative aspects of their parliamentary work. These findings provide important new insights into how and to what degree legislators are rewarded for their parliamentary performance.

Whereas individual-level studies find that encompassing welfare states might in general be incompatible with large-scale immigration, studies on welfare spending find inconclusive results. We address this puzzle by pointing to the moderating role of social program design. We separate programs according to their degree of natives’ interest based on coverage, generosity and stratification characteristics for the social areas of unemployment, sickness/disability, and pensions for 18 OECD countries. We then test the moderating effect of natives’ interest on the impact of immigration on individual support for social spending and actual social spending in the three areas. Our results indicate that programs do react to immigration by decreasing support and budgets when natives’ interest is low, whereas programs where the interest of natives is high tend to increase individual support and spending.

This article explores how women’s descriptive representation affects legal gender equality of economic opportunity. Building on existing studies on women’s descriptive and substantive representation, we argue that as the proportion of female legislators and ministers increases, legal gender equality of economic opportunity improves. Additionally, we expect that a country’s institutional context significantly shapes the influence of women in different positions of power on legal gender equality. The higher the legislature’s law-making power, the greater the effect of female legislators on legal gender equality; under the same condition, its relative influence compared to female cabinet ministers is also greater. Similarly, we hypothesize that the higher the level of democracy, the more effective female legislators compared to female ministers. To test these arguments, we draw on the database that provides cross-national information on legal discrimination against women in economic opportunities and provide supporting evidence for our arguments.

When mainstream parties accommodate radical-right parties, do citizens grow more concerned about immigration? Based on a rich literature, we argue that challenger parties’ ability to affect mainstream party positions, particularly on immigration, is associated with greater public salience of immigration and voter positivity towards challengers exists. We use Comparative Manifesto Project and Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data in order to show that challenger issue entrepreneurship, and mainstream accommodation are associated with greater public concern for challenger issues. These factors do not result in greater public positivity towards challengers. Our findings thus support the argument that a mainstream party accommodative strategy might not be as beneficial for them as often expected by pundit and political scientists alike. This has implications for understanding the effect of indirect party strategies on public attitudes, since mainstream accommodation changes public concern regarding issues, which may bolster challengers’ positions, including radical-right parties.

One of the growing constituencies of populist movements has been those facing labour market risks. These individuals are hypothesized to be the most likely to find themselves in need of government protection or service provision as their occupations face challenges from abroad through global competition, domestically through competition from immigrant labour, or technologically from automation. Nations, however, vary in how their populations experience such risks. Some nations expend greater effort on job placement or retraining programmes. Others provide legislative protections for workers that shield them from the potential of lost employment. Using data from the latest three rounds of the European Social Survey, this paper seeks to examine how individual-level preferences towards populist radical right parties are mediated by the visibility/size of contemporary county-level efforts to ameliorate labour market risk in a sample of 14 West European nations. The analysis distinguishes whether occupational characteristics and/or government policies have a differential impact on supporting populist radical right parties. While labour market policies might be designed to mitigate labour market risk, for many individuals, they have the effect of intensifying support for populist parties.

Why do parties appoint outsiders and experts to ministerial positions? Extant research offers explanations based on institutional arrangements and external shocks (e.g. political or economic crises). We go beyond such system-level variables to argue that the characteristics of ministerial appointees are a function of the portfolio they are being appointed to. Drawing on theories of political delegation, we argue that outsider and expert appointments to ministerial office are affected by a portfolio’s policy jurisdiction, its financial resources and appointment powers, and the partisan leanings of the ministerial bureaucracy. We test these arguments on all appointments of senior and junior ministers in Austria between 1945 and 2020. The analysis shows that outsiders are more likely to be appointed to ministries with greater party support in the bureaucracy, while experts are more likely appointed to portfolios dealing with high-salience issues.

This paper investigates why some attempts at pacted transitions from non-democratic rule fail, while others succeed. It determines the composition of opposition organizations that enable pacting. The paper draws on a data set compiled by the author comparing forty-five attempts at negotiations. The qualitative comparative analysis shows that those negotiations that include the opposition with strong organizational capacity succeed and end up with democratization. This strong organizational power of the opposition can be drawn from trade unions or the Catholic Church participating in negotiations, even if the initial regime is personalistic.

This paper explores the potential of elections to change our emotions and modify the relevance that voters assign to self-interest and group-identity issues. We examine this question by analyzing the 1998–2016 period of the Catalan and Basque regional elections. The analysis exploits that Basques pushed to leave Spain in the early 2000s, and Catalans pursued independence about fifteen years later. When the separatist goal emerges, two issues gain relevance. First, there is a significant rise of identity politics, associated with the territory’s culture and language, to the detriment of other issues that traditionally explain vote choice, such as the left-right ideology, the degree of regional autonomy, or the economic discontent. Second, the territory becomes more divisive, big cities align against dominant separatist parties, and rural areas align with independentists. We conclude that material self-interests dilute and group-identity factors emerge to determine vote decisions in times of national dissolution.