Chapter 5 applies the argument of this book to the beginning of the Macron presidency. Initially, Macron implemented a series of liberalizing reforms, notably of taxation, collective bargaining, and the national railways, often over the opposition of strikers and demonstrators. However, after just eighteen months in office, simmering resentment erupted into the so-called yellow vest protests, a movement against higher gasoline taxes that spiraled into a broader contestation of the government itself. Chapter 5 shows that both the social anesthesia state and skinny politics contributed to the yellow vest movement. In a context of scarce fiscal resources due to the social anesthesia state, Macron’s desire to bolster French business through tax cuts while reducing France’s budget deficit necessarily entailed tax increases and cutbacks in public and social services for the general population. Further fueling contestation, Macron adopted an extreme form of skinny politics, disdaining negotiations with political elites and the social partners, and imposing reforms from above. The combination of unpopular reform, much of it liberal in nature, and skinny politics sparked the yellow vest protests. In the end, the yellow vests forced Macron to backtrack from his agenda, sent his approval ratings plummeting, and weakened his capacity to govern.

Chapter 1 shows that economic liberalization is contested in France in multiple ways. Liberalizing reforms are routinely met with strikes and demonstrations; they are often defeated by protest movements; and, in some cases, the leaders who launch such reforms lose their capacity to govern or subsequent elections as a result. The chapter demonstrates that economic liberalization – as measured by indices of fiscal policy, labor market policy, and business competition – has made less headway in France than in the leading European political economies. It also demonstrates that this limited liberalization is not the byproduct of a well-functioning alternative to the liberal economic model. Chapter 1 presents and critiques three explanations of French resistance and contestation of economic liberalization, centered on economic culture, political leadership, and the character of the welfare regime respectively. It then presents the central argument of the book, which is that the pervasive contestation of economic liberalization in France can be traced to the policy, party-political, and institutional legacies of France’s postwar statist or dirigiste economic model. Although the dirigiste model was largely dismantled decades ago, the legacies of this model continue to shape the politics of economic liberalization in the present day.

Chapter 2 analyzes the policy legacies fueling the contestation of economic liberalization. When French authorities broke with the dirigiste system in the 1980s, they deployed generous social and labor market policies to pacify and demobilize victims of the move. While this “social anesthesia” strategy, as I call it, humanized and facilitated de-dirigisation, it contributed to contestation in three ways. First, it transformed France’s liberalizing trajectory into a two-stage process – a shift from the dirigiste state to the social anesthesia state, then an overhaul of the social anesthesia state itself – fueling liberalization fatigue. Second, the high costs and labor market disruptions of the social anesthesia state partially offset the economic benefits of de-dirigisation, resulting in disappointing economic results that bolstered the sentiment that liberalization does not work. Third, the fiscal burden of the social anesthesia state limited governments’ ability to offer side-payments in return for acceptance of liberalizing reform. Chapter 2 shows how these factors combined to generate mass opposition to two labor reforms aiming to boost employment among French youths by reducing their wages and job protections. In both instances, French youths, skeptical of the benefits of uncompensated labor market liberalization, protested and forced the government to retract its reforms.

Chapter 6 analyzes Macron’s attempt to rebound from the yellow vest protests. On the one hand, signaling a shift in governance, Macron launched two initiatives, the Grand National Debate (GDN) and the Citizens’ Climate Convention (CCC), that offered an opportunity for ordinary citizens to voice their concerns and preferences. In the case of the CCC, 150 citizens were given the chance to craft legislative and regulatory reforms that Macron pledged to implement. Both initiatives were popular, revealing a strong desire among the French to be listened to and participate in key decisions affecting their lives. On the other hand, rather than serving as a template for a new agenda and mode of governance, the GDN and CCC remained isolated exceptions. In all other matters, Macron continued as before, pursuing an unpopular liberal economic agenda via top-down, skinny methods. Chapter 6 uses Macron’s two most important initiatives during this period, a tightening of unemployment benefits and eligibility conditions along with an overhaul of the pension system that included a controversial increase in the retirement age for many workers, to demonstrate the continuity of Macron’s agenda and approach to governing. Both reforms triggered significant contestation, and the pension reform was ultimately abandoned.

Chapter 4 analyzes the institutional factors fueling the contestation of economic liberalization. The dirigiste model was rooted in the premise that top-down governance, free of interference by interest groups, offered the best way to modernize the country. The institutions of the Fifth Republic reinforced this exclusionary orientation by centralizing power in the executive. While France’s top-down or “skinny” approach may be effective when governments are extending popular new benefits, it is problematic when they are trying to avoid blame for unpopular measures, as is generally the case with economic liberalization, since with concentrated power comes concentrated accountability. Despite this problem, Chapter 4 shows that French authorities have refused to break with skinny politics. In the late 1990s, the “social refoundation” tried to shift reform away from the contested political arena to negotiations among the social partners but was blocked by governments of left and right alike. Finally, through analyses of liberalizing initiatives during Chirac’s second presidency and the case of French pension reform, Chapter 4 shows that skinny politics almost invariably triggers popular contestation and, even when successful, tends to yield half-measures that antagonize the populace without fixing the fiscal and economic problems that motivated action in the first place.