Chapter 1 shows that economic liberalization is contested in France in multiple ways. Liberalizing reforms are routinely met with strikes and demonstrations; they are often defeated by protest movements; and, in some cases, the leaders who launch such reforms lose their capacity to govern or subsequent elections as a result. The chapter demonstrates that economic liberalization – as measured by indices of fiscal policy, labor market policy, and business competition – has made less headway in France than in the leading European political economies. It also demonstrates that this limited liberalization is not the byproduct of a well-functioning alternative to the liberal economic model. Chapter 1 presents and critiques three explanations of French resistance and contestation of economic liberalization, centered on economic culture, political leadership, and the character of the welfare regime respectively. It then presents the central argument of the book, which is that the pervasive contestation of economic liberalization in France can be traced to the policy, party-political, and institutional legacies of France’s postwar statist or dirigiste economic model. Although the dirigiste model was largely dismantled decades ago, the legacies of this model continue to shape the politics of economic liberalization in the present day.

Chapter 2 analyzes the policy legacies fueling the contestation of economic liberalization. When French authorities broke with the dirigiste system in the 1980s, they deployed generous social and labor market policies to pacify and demobilize victims of the move. While this “social anesthesia” strategy, as I call it, humanized and facilitated de-dirigisation, it contributed to contestation in three ways. First, it transformed France’s liberalizing trajectory into a two-stage process – a shift from the dirigiste state to the social anesthesia state, then an overhaul of the social anesthesia state itself – fueling liberalization fatigue. Second, the high costs and labor market disruptions of the social anesthesia state partially offset the economic benefits of de-dirigisation, resulting in disappointing economic results that bolstered the sentiment that liberalization does not work. Third, the fiscal burden of the social anesthesia state limited governments’ ability to offer side-payments in return for acceptance of liberalizing reform. Chapter 2 shows how these factors combined to generate mass opposition to two labor reforms aiming to boost employment among French youths by reducing their wages and job protections. In both instances, French youths, skeptical of the benefits of uncompensated labor market liberalization, protested and forced the government to retract its reforms.

Chapter 6 analyzes Macron’s attempt to rebound from the yellow vest protests. On the one hand, signaling a shift in governance, Macron launched two initiatives, the Grand National Debate (GDN) and the Citizens’ Climate Convention (CCC), that offered an opportunity for ordinary citizens to voice their concerns and preferences. In the case of the CCC, 150 citizens were given the chance to craft legislative and regulatory reforms that Macron pledged to implement. Both initiatives were popular, revealing a strong desire among the French to be listened to and participate in key decisions affecting their lives. On the other hand, rather than serving as a template for a new agenda and mode of governance, the GDN and CCC remained isolated exceptions. In all other matters, Macron continued as before, pursuing an unpopular liberal economic agenda via top-down, skinny methods. Chapter 6 uses Macron’s two most important initiatives during this period, a tightening of unemployment benefits and eligibility conditions along with an overhaul of the pension system that included a controversial increase in the retirement age for many workers, to demonstrate the continuity of Macron’s agenda and approach to governing. Both reforms triggered significant contestation, and the pension reform was ultimately abandoned.

Chapter 4 analyzes the institutional factors fueling the contestation of economic liberalization. The dirigiste model was rooted in the premise that top-down governance, free of interference by interest groups, offered the best way to modernize the country. The institutions of the Fifth Republic reinforced this exclusionary orientation by centralizing power in the executive. While France’s top-down or “skinny” approach may be effective when governments are extending popular new benefits, it is problematic when they are trying to avoid blame for unpopular measures, as is generally the case with economic liberalization, since with concentrated power comes concentrated accountability. Despite this problem, Chapter 4 shows that French authorities have refused to break with skinny politics. In the late 1990s, the “social refoundation” tried to shift reform away from the contested political arena to negotiations among the social partners but was blocked by governments of left and right alike. Finally, through analyses of liberalizing initiatives during Chirac’s second presidency and the case of French pension reform, Chapter 4 shows that skinny politics almost invariably triggers popular contestation and, even when successful, tends to yield half-measures that antagonize the populace without fixing the fiscal and economic problems that motivated action in the first place.

Chapter 7 describes Macron’s statist response to the COVID-19 crisis. Macron’s statist turn, like that of Sarkozy in response to the 2008 financial crisis, went well beyond the imperatives of crisis management. Indeed, Macron embraced a statist-protective mission, symbolized by his pledge to spend “whatever it costs” to protect the French. Chapter 7 illustrates Macron’s shift through four sets of actions: (1) the projection of state power and spending in public health; (2) the creation of expensive new programs to keep French businesses afloat during the crisis and direct their strategies over the long term; (3) a recommitment to social anesthesia policies, including policies that Macron had sought to eliminate; (4) a dramatic increase in public spending, deficits, and debt. Chapter 7 also describes Macron’s illiberal response to a more recent crisis, the surge in energy costs beginning in fall 2021, which prompted him to freeze natural gas and electricity rates, launch a €50-billion plan to build a new generation of nuclear reactors, and renationalize the country’s main electricity operator. Finally, Chapter 7 discusses the ways in which the contestation of liberalization shaped the 2022 elections, both Macron’s reelection as president and his surprising setback in the ensuing legislative elections.

Chapter 8 teases out some of the broader theoretical lessons of the French case. The chapter distills the effects of dirigiste legacies in France into a general set of hypotheses about the sources of contestation of liberalization and shows how these hypotheses might apply to East Asia and Latin America. Chapter 8 also probes ways in which governments might diminish contestation by improving the process and substance of liberalization: the process, by moving away from skinny governance and enlarging the circle of participants to include an array of stakeholders; the substance, by ceasing to equate economic liberalization with giveaways to companies and the affluent and making more of an effort to ensure an equitable distribution of the costs and benefits of liberal reform. Chapter 8 concludes by discussing the links between France’s contested liberalization and the rise of illiberal populist parties. If Anglo-American neoliberalism is widely blamed for surging populist movements, French resistance to liberalization has likewise failed to keep populists at bay. For this reason, finding a version of economic liberalization that is fair, inclusive, and widely accepted is critical, not only for limiting contestation, but also for protecting the health and well-being of French democracy.

Chapter 3 analyzes the party-political legacies fueling the contestation of economic liberalization. Because of France’s dirigiste past, it is not just the left that is ambivalent toward economic liberalization, but also the right. The French right was in power during the heyday of the dirigiste system, so statist and nationalist principles became central to its economic outlook. In addition, leaders of the right emerged from the upheaval of May 1968 upheaval with a deep fear of strikes and protests. Finally, much like the left, the right never developed a legitimating discourse for economic liberalization, instead blaming it on external forces, notably European integration. Because of these legacies, the right has been an inconsistent backer of economic liberalization. Chapter 3 describes several characteristic behaviors of the right that foster the contestation of economic liberalization both in the streets and within governing circles: (1) a nationalist understanding of the economy that leads to extensive intervention to prevent foreign takeovers of French companies; (2) a fear of social upheaval that inclines conservative governments to retreat from reforms in the face of strikes and demonstrations, thereby encouraging further protests; (3) a fair-weather liberalism that gives way to statist revival in times of economic crisis.

Historical Context

The Prespa Agreement is considered as a critical incident in modern politics of Greece and North Macedonia. It basically ended the name dispute commonly referred to as the Macedonian issue that has been arguably one of the most incomprehensible issues in Europe. For more than 25 years after the dismantlement of Yugoslavia and the creation of a new State in the northwest of Greece the two neighbours failed to reach an agreement about its name. Macedonia, the name the new State chose for itself, had strong geographical and historical connotations that the Greeks could not accept, so they only recognised it as ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ (FYROM). But even though its official name stayed as such, over the years, the new country was commonly referred to as ‘Macedonia’ all over the world. Nevertheless, the potential of a NATO membership of ‘FYROM’ brought the name issue on the table in an urgent manner.

Political consensus was finally reached in June 2018 when the Agreement was signed by the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Nikos Kotzias and his North Macedonian counterpart, Nikola Dimitrov in the presence of PM Zoran Zaev and PM Alexis Tsipras at the lake of Prespa. The long-term dispute between Greece and North Macedonia (the name that replaced both FYROM and Macedonia) ended. It was a historical moment for both countries that entailed elements of an authentic compromise and common understanding.

The Prespa Agreement forced Greece to accept the existence of a ‘Macedonian’ nationality and a ‘Macedonian’ language and a commitment not to veto Northern Macedonia's entry in the NATO alliance. Macedonia in turn had to change its name to Northern Macedonia following a constitutional change and to abandon any historical references to the Ancient (Greek) history of Macedonia. The conclusion of the agreement was politically painful, as it was met with strong opposition by political parties and local communities in both countries. It further had to be adopted first by a referendum in North Macedonia and then by parliamentary votes in both countries in a context of intensified political turmoil.

The aim of this chapter is not to discuss the Prespa Agreement itself. Instead, the Prespa Agreement is used as a good case to critically analyse and theorise on the issue of modern political disinformation, propaganda and xenophobic populism.

Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic had all the hallmarks of any crisis: novelty and unusual circumstances; urgency and time constraints; conflicting, limited, or misleading information and a need for governments, leaders, and authorities to expedite a rapid and effective action plan under conditions of extreme pressure. The COVID-19 pandemic was, however, unlike any other crises in recent times. It was a healthcare, economic, humanitarian, and social crisis, presenting a multitude of challenges and effects and shaping the future global risk landscape (World Economic Forum 2020). It had the characteristics of a cascading ‘flash’ crisis (James and Wooten 2010), as well as of what D’Auria and De Smet (2020: 2) describe as a ‘landscape scale’ crisis: ‘an unprecedent disruptive event of massive scale, the sheer unpredictability of which results in high levels of uncertainty that leads to disorientation, a feeling of loss of control, and strong emotional disturbance’.

Against this backdrop, the present study examines the political pandemic rhetoric of five national leaders, all of whom were called upon to tackle the pandemic between February and November 2020. Based on a corpus of speeches from the leaders of five democratic countries around COVID-19, we aim to demonstrate how political actors responded to the pandemic's exigence and rhetorical situation (Bitzer 1968) and in a way that was deemed strategically ‘appropriate to the moment’ (Martin 2015). Furthermore, we attempt to identify the discursive, rhetorical, and argumentative modalities by which the leaders tried to build their legitimacy and authority in a crisis moment when it was particularly fragile and more needed than ever.

The characteristics of emergency crises communication

The COVID-19 pandemic exemplified a global emergency of far-reaching consequences and immense complexity, where communication and public discourse played a central role. As crisis communication scholars Leonard and Arnold (2007) explain, all emergent crises share certain features, such as ‘high stakes and urgency, as well as the likelihood of major, imminent losses to life, health, property, heritage, or other valued social or private assets’ (p. 1). They involve a high level of contingency, that is variability in possible outcomes from different actions, while ‘response leaders’, whether politicians or other operational officials, are called upon to improvise in the absence of tested scripts for action and ‘operate beyond the bounds of what they had planned, practiced, and are resourced for’ (p. 7).