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In 2009, Greece entered an unprecedented economic crisis, well beyond the scale that other countries faced during the same period, in terms of duration and productive decline. The cumulative loss of around 26% of GDP during the 2009–2016 period, the skyrocketing unemployment that reached 27% in 2014 (nearly three times the previous 10 years’ average) and the bankruptcy of 200,000 small and medium enterprises were just the tips of the iceberg.
The crisis in Greece was an integral part of a broader structural crisis that was described as a crisis of neoliberalism, perceived as the insistence on private enterprise and on the weakening of the broader public sector (Dumenil and Levy 2011). The crisis showcased the weaknesses and the frailty of an economic structure that depended on the excessive growth of fictitious capital (Harvey 2010). The increase of public and private debt, and the dependence of consumption on lending as a counterweight to the austerity policies, was not a Greek peculiarity. It became a common characteristic of all Western economies immediately after the structural crisis of the early 1970s. In the United States, the economy was shaken by the securitisation of structured bonds that included an unknown amount of high-risk loans of the mortgage market (Krugman 2012). In Ireland and Spain, the overdeveloped mortgage market was also at the heart of the financial crisis. In Cyprus, the banks themselves and in particular their risky investments led the state to emergency lending to prevent their collapse. Greece was led to the memorandum of understanding (MoU) (conditionalities) imposed by the IMF and the EU as a prerequisite for its lending, due to its inability to borrow and service the public debt, which was the trigger of its economic crisis. Thus, public debt proved to be the weak link in a long chain of structural imbalances (Bofinger 2012).
A common feature of all these different crises was the reproductive incapacitation, under its working terms, of an economic model based on two pillars. The first pillar was continuous austerity and low wages (Blyth 2013). The second pillar was borrowing by employees, households and businesses, which facilitated the expansion of commodity production, the realisation of surplus value and the expanded reproduction of capital (Streeck 2014).
In the euro area in particular, the distorted structure of the monetary union was made obvious (Lapavitsas et al. 2012).
This chapter looks at how the newspapers that position themselves as politically close to the government portrayed and presented the health sector agenda of the government. The chapter is based on a scan of two major pro-government newspapers of the period, Zaman and Yeni Şafak, between 2002 and 2011.
These two dailies were scanned for news articles and columns on health policy changes in particular and the Turkish health sector in general. The aim of this chapter is to show how the pro-government media portrayal of the health sector complemented a broader discursive narrative of the government on health. This portrayal positions the government determined to end victimisations caused by the pre-AKP (Justice and Development Party) era healthcare system, presents changes introduced to the healthcare system by the AKP as unprecedented developments and depicts opponents of the reform – namely doctors – as driven by self-interest.
In the AKP's populist discourse, serving the people, treating all citizens as equal, being just, representing a radically different approach from previous governments and the claiming to introduce a total change of mentality in the country emerge as central themes. This populist politics rests on a discursive opposition constructed between the ‘Old Turkey’, where the AKP claims the citizens were victimised by the elites, and the ‘New Turkey’ that the AKP offers to construct on the basis of equality.
Day-to-day issues such as health and transformation are areas through which the populist politics are constructed as the short-term consequences of those issues are compatible with the short-term result-oriented agenda of populist politics. This study will look at how the populist politics of AKP is constructed through health reform. In this broader political picture, healthcare emerged as a key discursive space where the AKP's populist claims to end ‘Old Turkey’s’ social inequalities and ‘victimisations’ materialised. Furthermore, the AKP's changes to the healthcare system were presented as steps that symbolised the creation of a ‘New Turkey’ where previously victimised people are saved from privileged elites.
In other words, it was not only structural changes that the AKP insistently aimed to introduce into the health system through the Health Transformation Programme (HTP) but also a strong discursive determinacy to propagate these changes as the end of the inequalities of ‘Old Turkey’ that created a rupture in Turkey's larger political field.
As the world continues to linger in the gloom of COVID-19, the narrative of the epidemic has been flipped in China where the virus controversially originated. With the public memories about the missteps took by the Wuhan government in handling the outbreak fading away, the mass media adapted the tragic story to a national victory achieved by the central government (Case 2020). Proactive diplomatic strategies, such as providing masks and vaccines to other countries, have been taken to boost the soft power of China in the global sphere (Verma 2020). Accordingly, it is argued that instead of being weakened by the ‘blundering initial responses’, Xi Jinping managed to present himself as ‘a forceful and triumphant leader on the world stage’ (Huang 2020). Such reversal was accomplished through ‘a tremendous behind-the-scene effort’ made by the domestic media (Yuan 2021a). Facilitated by the tightened censorship during the pandemic (Shibu 2020), state media abiding by the party line has been the dominant sources of information that has been shaping the mainland audiences’ perception of the crisis. It is revealed in a recent study that by ‘sharing positive stories and promoting the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) pandemic response, rewriting recent history in a manner favourable to the CCP as the coronavirus pandemic evolved, and using targeted ads to spread preferred messages’ (Molter and DiResta 2020) the state media frames the onslaught of COVID-19 as an ‘extraordinary and historic test’ that the Chinese nation led by the CCP eventually passed after hard fighting (Zhao and Liu 2020).
Among the heroic figures that constitute the epic narrative of conquering the contagion, medical professionals seem the most outstanding group highlighted by the government and the media (Stanway and Pollard 2020). In September 2020, on a ceremony celebrating the victory over the crisis held at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Xi Jinping awarded four medical experts who are regarded as the ‘role models in the country's fight against the COVID-19 epidemic’ (CGTN 2020). As the awardee of the highest honour in China – ‘Medal of the Republic’, respiratory expert Zhong Nanshan along with many other scientists and specialists contributed significantly to rewriting the tragedy of the COVID-19 pandemic into an inspiring story of the central government leading its people to overcome disasters.
If there is something that we have learned as an international community during the past few (and not only) years is that in today's interconnected world, a crisis is never ‘far away’ from us. From the recent paradigms of the international financial crisis in 2008 and its aftermath to the pandemic of COVID-19 and the war between Russia and Ukraine, we have all experienced the effects of a crisis in different contexts and depths.
Research on crisis and crisis communication involves many models and definitions, but with the common denominator that a crisis is a major occurrence with a potentially negative outcome (Coombs 2015). A basic condition of a crisis is a non-specific event, which has a strong effect on the entire social tissue and creates feelings of uncertainty (Seeger 1998). In this environment, political communication is expected to highlight clear leadership with the aim of alleviating the symptoms of this crisis and strengthening the structures so that the next crisis will have milder effects. Along with the term ‘crisis’, that is both experientially and scholarly defined, the term ‘political communication’ has been widely researched and sometimes vaguely defined. For example, Pye (1993: 422) follows a social-constructivist definition by arguing that political communication is ‘the flow of messages and information that gives structure and meaning to the political process’. In addition, Blumler (2014: 39) highlights the importance of the media organisations suggesting that political and media organisations ‘show a horizontal interaction while on a vertical axis, they separately and jointly engage in disseminating and processing information and ideas to and from the mass citizenry’. Other scholars (Jamieson and Kenski 2014; Powell and Cowart 2003) with a wider approach define political communication as a communicative activity of citizens, individual political figures, public institutions, media and social movements. Perloff (2018: 12) defines political communication as a ‘complex, communicative activity in which language and symbols, employed by leaders, media, citizens and citizen groups, exert a multitude of effects on individuals and society, as well as on outcomes that bear on the public policy of a nation, state or community’, highlighting the notion of political leadership.
At this point, Kahn (2020) identifies two models of leadership, namely the Political Prominence Model, where the political protagonist receives advice from experts but still reserves the decision-making process and the Expert Appointee Prominence Model, where the politician focuses on delegation of the decisionmaking process.
In January 2019, the increased borrowing needs of Greece, which signalled the concept of ‘public debt crisis’, led the rating agency Standard & Poor's to downgrade the country's credit rating from A to A–. Under such pressure, the prime minister of Greece, K. Karamanlis, affiliated with New Democracy (ND) (the Greek right-wing party), announced early elections for 4 October 2009, where PASOK (the Greek centre party) emerged as the winning party with a percentage of 43.92% with the party leader G. Papandreou uttering the characteristic words ‘The money's there’. Sixteen days later, on 20 October 2009, the – at the time – Minister of Finance G. Papakonstantinou announced to ECOFIN that the deficit for 2009 would be around 12.7% as a percentage of GDP and not 6%, as had been calculated by the previous government of ND. At the same time, on 22 October, the rating agency Fitch downgraded Greece's credit rating from level A to level A– and on 8 December, from A– to BBB+. Eight days later, the Standard & Poor's agency downgraded Greece from status A to status BBB+ and, on 23 December, the Moody's from level A1 to level A2. At the same time, the European press appeared to be aggressive towards Greece (see the cover of the German magazine Focus, on 22 February 2010, with the title ‘Swindlers in the Euro Family’ and the statue of the Goddess Aphrodite (Venus de Milo) ‘making an obscene gesture’ against Europe or the cover of The Economist reminiscent of the movie Apocalypse Now with the modified title Acropolis now, which depicts the Acropolis surrounded by military helicopters and Angela Merkel on the right side of the cover next to the subtitle ‘The horror, the horror’). In this context of solid European pressure, Greece was called upon to comply with the European labour market reform and fiscal consolidation, which has begun since the 1990s, with the main aim of strengthening competitiveness.
Second memorandum
Following Papandreou government's first memorandum and the severe social unrest, Papandreou resigned. Before that, he had announced a referendum on the new loan agreement that was cancelled four days later, following the stance of the European partners, who jointly decided that in the event of a referendum, the question should be whether Greece will remain in the EU or not.
Crisis is an opaque term, applicable to a range of different domains and practices. Its origins lie in the progression and treatment of disease, where crisis indicates a turning point at which the disease becomes more serious (Kamei 2019). Central to many definitions that are shared across different disciplines is that a crisis is an unexpected disruption that will, or is perceived by some, lead to adverse outcomes. In sociology and political science, a crisis is characterised as a ‘period of discontinuity, marking the breaking point in a patterned process of linearity’ (Boin 2005).
Crises and their effects have been conceptualised at different levels at which they occur. First is the micro level. These are crises that affect or are a result of errors made by an individual. Next is the meso level, which are the crises that impact on organisations or are a consequence of organisational failures. Finally, there is the macro level, the crises that have widespread repercussions for society. The focus of this chapter is these crises that have a wider societal impact. While some may appear more limited in their geographic or temporal latitudes, with their acute impacts experienced by a particular state or country, many reflect the accumulation and intersection of vulnerabilities that lead to crisis. This includes those that connect to or are a consequence of global challenges, the climate crisis, pandemic risks and structural inequalities, for example.
This chapter seeks to illuminate the concept of crisis. It addresses questions concerning the nature of crisis, their different forms and the underlying processes and actors that shape crisis and their outcomes. To this end, it begins by evaluating the contrasting definitions and the common characteristics of crises. At a macro level, a crisis is often understood as a disruptive event or process that will have a significant impact on society. These may be slow burning, evolving gradually and over time, environmental degradation and persistent conflict are two evident examples here, and, as a consequence, there may be uncertainty about the appropriate course of action (Nohrstedt 2008). Others, such as disaster and financial shocks, are characterised as acute events. While this typology of crises is well established within the literature, it is unable to encompass the breadth of risks, vulnerabilities and underpinning processes that precipitate crisis.
The European Union is a key player in determining policies and politics in Europe, and yet understanding how it works remains a challenge. The Politics of the European Union introduces students to its functioning by showing the similarities and differences between the EU and national political systems. Fully revised and updated in its third edition, this introductory textbook uses the tools of comparative politics to explore the history, theories, institutions, key actors, politics and policy-making of the EU. This comparative approach enables students to apply their knowledge of domestic politics and broader debates in political science to better understand the EU. Numerous real-world examples guide students through the textbook, and chapter briefings, fact files and controversy boxes highlight the important and controversial issues in EU politics. A companion website features free 'Navigating the EU' exercises to guide students in their analysis of EU policy-making.
This study investigates populist radical right (PRR) influence on aid amid widespread concerns about a potential connection between its rise and the reduction of aid allocation. Previous studies failed to address these concerns owing to the disuse of immigrant inflows as an intervening variable and a bilateral framework capable of investigating properties in donor and recipient countries. By analyzing panel data on Western European parliamentary democracies, the study demonstrates the PRR’s reducing effect via a coalitional pathway on bilateral aid to the recipients, failing to stem emigration into the donor countries. Further, analysis shows that such reduction intensifies in conjunction with the donors’ weak pluralistic institutions and the recipients’ sociocultural characteristics different from the ordinary citizens represented by the PRR. The findings make a novel contribution to the expanding literature on the PRR to integrate insights on the aid–immigration nexus, strategies for policy influence, and ideational profiles.
What has caused the marked, cross-national, and unprecedented trends in European electoral results in the 21st century? Scholarly explanations include social structure and challenger party entrepreneurship. We argue that these electoral changes more proximally result from public issue salience, which results from societal trends and mainly affects rather than is caused by party agenda setting. We use aggregate-level panel data across 28 European countries to show that the public issue salience of three issues—unemployment, immigration, and the environment—is associated with later variation in the results of the conservative, social democrat, liberal, radical right, radical left, and green party families in theoretically expected directions, while the party system issue agenda has weaker associations. Public issue salience, in turn, is rooted in societal trends (unemployment rates, immigration rates and temperature anomalies), and, in some cases, party agenda setting. We validate our mechanism at the individual-level across 28 European countries and using UK panel data. Our findings have implications for our understanding of the agency of parties, the permanency of recent electoral changes, and how voters reconcile their social and political worlds.
While conventional wisdom connects crises and external threats to increasing support for populism, several questions remain unanswered. Following insights of affective intelligence theory (AIT), we posit that anger and fear elicited by pandemic threat relate differently to populist attitudes. While such relations have already been explored in the context of other hazards (such as financial turmoil, terrorism, or immigration), our study allows us to evaluate the emotional bedrocks of populism in the context of a threat that is not apparently connected to the classical political grievances underlying populism. Expanding the literature on psychological underpinnings of populism and on the political consequences of the pandemic, our analyses of original survey data support our contentions that pandemic threat-induced anger is positively related to populist attitudes while fear is negatively linked to populist stances. This holds in particular for anti-elitism and the Manichean outlook inherent in populism. Altogether, we provide new comparative evidence to the puzzle about the emotional bedrocks of populism by illuminating a domain that has not been systematically explored before.
Previous research shows that violence is an important factor driving ethnic identification and grievances, but most works that explore micro-level effects focus on specific cases and have limited external validity. This article looks at the individual-level consequences of civilian victimization in a large sample across Africa. Combining georeferenced survey data from several rounds of the Afrobarometer, victimization events from the UCDP-GED, and data on collective targeting from the ethnic one-sided violence dataset, it studies the effect of exposure to violence on ethnic identification and self-reported ethnic grievances. Results show that violence increases ethnic identification and ethnic grievances particularly when it is committed by state forces and among individuals who belong to an ethnic group that was collectively targeted in the past.
This article is the first to show that gender shapes the degree to which legislators use formal mechanisms to oversee government activities. Extensive scholarly work has analysed the use of oversight instruments, especially regarding who monitors whom. Whether, how, and why the conformity of men and women with institutional roles differs, has not yet received scholarly attention. We hypothesise that women become more active than men in overseeing the executive when in opposition while reducing their monitoring activities even more strongly than men when in government because of different social roles ascribed to men and women as well as differences in risk aversity between sexes. We analyse panel data for three oversight tools from the German Bundestag between 1949 and 2013 to test this proposition. Our findings imply that characteristics of political actors influence even a strongly institutionalised process as oversight and further clarify the gender bias in political representation.
Most literature finds a detrimental effect of amalgamation on voter turnout in municipal elections. Some other studies reveal instead null or even positive effects. We argue that this inconsistency derives from the fact that previous research has only analysed the amalgamation/turnout relation in single case studies. The contribution of this article is therefore twofold. First, it proposes a unified framework to investigate the amalgamation/turnout relation in comparative perspective, which clarifies the shortcut between size and amalgamation, disentangles the multifaced nature of municipal amalgamation, and outlines clear testable hypotheses related to its implementation – both at the national and at the local level. Secondly, it provides an original 10-European-country dataset of municipal amalgamations in the last decades (comprising Albania, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway) to empirically verify such hypotheses concerning the effects of the amalgamation features on voter turnout. Our study crucially reveals the relevance of the characteristics of the amalgamation process. When the amalgamation is imposed by the national government, turnout is particularly low, similarly to when the amalgamation occurs independently from a wide reform scheme. On the other hand, municipal turnout after amalgamation is higher when a larger number of municipalities are merged and when the amalgamated municipalities had a similar population before being merged. Moreover, our empirical evidence confirms the importance of traditional second-order predictors of turnout in municipal elections, even with specific reference to the post-amalgamation elections. Conversely, in such elections, the overall size of the (final) municipality is not a significant predictor of voter turnout.
Most countries deployed their military in some capacity to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. We present original data on early pandemic-related deployments, identifying seven types of deployment: logistic operations, enforcement, international involvement, border protection, information provision, intelligence operations, and domestic protection. We find that military deployments are shaped by capacity and electoral considerations, even after accounting for cross-country differences in perceptions of the military. Countries with elected leaders were significantly more likely to deploy the military for border protection. Incumbents facing reelection were especially sensitive to electoral concerns, becoming significantly less likely to deploy the military for domestic enforcement when facing an imminent election.
New perspectives on the relationship - or the perceived relationship - between the German language and the causes, nature, and legacy of National Socialism and the Shoah.
Political trust matters for citizens’ policy preferences but existing research has not fully understood how this effect depends on policy design. To advance this research area, we theorise that policy controls that limit or condition policy provision can function as safeguards against uncertainty, thereby compensating for a person’s lack of trust in generating support. Focusing on public preferences for asylum and refugee policy, we conduct an original conjoint experiment in eight European countries. We find that individuals with lower levels of trust in European political institutions are less supportive of policies providing unlimited or unconditional protection and more supportive of restrictive policies. We also show that policy design features such as limits and conditions can mitigate perceived uncertainty for individuals who are less trusting in European political institutions. These findings have important implications for the theoretical understanding of how political trust pertains to citizens’ preferences.
Previous research suggests that Europeans want more experts in government, but which experts do they want and why? Using survey data collected in 15 European countries, this study compared citizens’ preferences for high-ranking civil servants, university professors, and business executives over traditional political actors (MPs and former ministers) as ministers in government. Overall, university professors were rated more positively than MPs or former ministers in almost all countries, whereas civil servants and business executives were only rated more positively than politicians in Poland, Italy, Spain, Greece, Ireland, and Belgium. While political distrust is a key predictor of preferring political outsiders, we also found that civil servants are not as appealing to politically distrusting individuals, depending on the country. Furthermore, while the demand for more expertise in government mainly influences preferences for university professors, the demand for more government by the people is connected to preferences for business executives and (to a lesser extent) civil servants. The latter finding challenges the common distinction between citizen and expert-oriented visions of democracy and the alleged ‘elitist’ underpinnings of empowering non-elected outsiders.