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The Treaty of Maastricht signified an end to the permissive consensus that had characterised the first decades of the European integration project: the European Union (EU) as a political issue not only became more salient, but also aroused more public discontent. From the perspective of the political elite, the 1990s were a decade of optimism focused on deepening and widening the European project, with, for example, the imminent introduction of the euro and the EU enlargement with central and eastern European countries. At the level of the general public, European integration became increasingly contested, and claims about a ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU became ubiquitous. Although the Maastricht Treaty was not the starting point,1 it substantially amplified the democratic debates about the EU.
This chapter focuses on the development, practice and contestation of the European Communities (EC)/European Union (EU) as a global power in the light of ever-more advancing globalisation and European integration. It focuses particularly on the EU’s Common Commercial Policy (CCP) or EU trade policy in the context of a larger set of external actions undertaken by the EU. Thus, this chapter concerns the development of the EC/EU as a global power in terms of its external actions, especially in trade. As this chapter will show, it is especially thanks to the EC/EU’s so-called ‘low’ level of external action, especially its trade policy, that the EC/EU developed as a global power long before the EU contributed to global governance through the so-called ‘high’ foreign policy. At the same time, the ability to perform as a global power in trade – to harness the opportunities of globalisation, but also to answer the challenges of globalisation – has become increasingly dependent on four key dimensions: the EU’s actorness, the EU’s effectiveness, the EU’s coherence and the EU’s democratic legitimacy.
European integration is not the result of a preconceived plan. It rather consists of messy procedures and heated discussions. Ad hoc decision-making, crises and even utter chaos have been constants in the history of the European Union (EU). This complex reality has induced scholars to zoom in on its infamous ‘muddling through’ to better understand what is going on in European integration. Consequently, the primary focus of research has been on ways, means and outcomes: inter-state bargaining, and the resulting treaties and European institutions. However, this focus on institutional ways and means, and on the outcomes of inter-state bargaining has implied that ideas about Europe’s future mostly have been treated as proxies of specific, rather one-dimensional, state, or institutional, interests.
The beginning of European integration was portrayed as a process of reconciliation among former enemies, Germany and France most prominent among them. Extending cooperation in various functional fields was seen as a step towards eventual unification. Throughout the Cold War, this project was confined to the western part of the continent; the events of 1989, however, changed both the scope and the meaning of integration. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, a broad agreement arose that Europe should be made ‘whole and free’. The eastward enlargement of the European Union (EU) became the main instrument of the continent’s reunification. There was always a clear discrepancy, however, between the political rhetoric of Europe’s reunification and the nitty-gritty of integration. In daily politics, regulatory realignment, expressed in an ever-growing body of laws dealing with disparate issues, dwarfed initiatives in the fields of Europe’s memory, culture and inheritance. While the requirements of institutional integration were clearly spelled out (and imposed on the new candidate states), the question of what a reunified Europe should amount to faded rapidly away.
International migration regimes refer to the way states interact when there are flows or pressures for flows of people with the prospect of lasting settlement across their borders. States generally enforce border checks, recognise only a limited right of residence, reduce social security rights outside the country of employment and deny civic rights for migrants. In Europe in the late 1940s, states routinely responded to migration flows with such cumbersome and arbitrary administrative practices. Today, in contrast, the regime of migration between the member states of the European Union (EU) displays openness. Migrants’ social security rights are exportable, and they benefit from civic rights. Deep closure towards low-skilled migration from outside Europe also characterises this regime, however. During the post-war decades, change has defied continuity, and today’s liberal migration regime has achieved depth, width and longevity, making it without equivalent in modern history.
In November 1968, the finance ministers of the Group of Ten, comprised of the leading industrial nations, convened in Bonn for an emergency meeting. It focused on recent monetary turbulence in the markets, particularly the rampant speculation against the French franc and the British pound, but also on the weakness of the American dollar, a core issue of international monetary diplomacy throughout the 1960s. The finance ministers of France, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States, representing the major Western allies of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), exerted strong pressure on the Germans to revalue their currency so as to stop the speculative movements against the weaker currencies. (Throughout this chapter, unless specified otherwise, ‘Germany’ and ‘Germans’ refer to the FRG.) Their efforts were to no avail. The proceedings, humorously described in many ex-post accounts, soon bordered on the farcical and ended with complete disagreement.
This chapter argues that the European Communities (EC) and then the European Union (EU) rapidly became an international political actor which, despite the lack of military tools, did not limit its actions to the exercise of soft or civilian power.
Since the 1990s, numerous political scientists have debated the nature of the EU as an international actor, proposing the similar concepts of civilian power, quiet superpower, normative power, transformative power and liberal power. Many debated and reappraised these definitions. In the last 20 years, several historians have added their contributions to studies about the international political role of the EC/EU, revealing how the EC polity increasingly asserted itself as more than just an international economic heavyweight, with some successes, some failures and several limitations.
According to the economist Amartya Sen, there are at least two ‘moral’ defences of the market. The first, and most common, is instrumental: we should protect the market because of the ‘goodness of the results achieved’. The market produces goods, contributes to collective utility and increases our freedom of choice. The second, less common, defence is based on fundamental rights: the right to property and the freedom to transact prevail and are valid notwithstanding the outcome they produce. Accordingly, the market derives its procedural value from rights, which exposes this second defence to significant criticism if, in reality, these rights are exercised only by the few.
Research on intra-coalition control shows that monitoring increases with the ideological distance between coalition partners. However, the focus of scholarship has been primarily on parliamentary regimes, not mixed regimes. In mixed regimes, intra-coalition control becomes more complex due to a dual executive. Parties must simultaneously monitor each other and the directly elected Head of Executive (HoE). This article examines intra-coalition control in mixed regimes by analyzing parliamentary questions from 21 German city councils. The German local level resembles a mixed regime. The executive consists of the coalition cabinet supported by the council majority and the directly elected mayor as the HoE. The results show that the division of governmental responsibilities affects intra-coalition control. When a coalition party is aligned with the HoE, the balance of power within the coalition is affected, and the other partners intensify controlling the aligned party. Additionally, policy divisiveness and issue salience are driving factors for intra-coalition control.
Ministers may be powerful policy initiators, but they are not equally powerful. Cabinet control mechanisms have become a crucial part of cabinet governance, which can serve to contain agency loss and consequently constrain ministers in the policymaking process. However, empirical studies have not focused on the impact of such control mechanisms on individual ministers’ political outcomes. I turn attention to certain cabinet committees as intra-cabinet control mechanisms and argue that members of these enjoy a policymaking advantage compared to nonmembers. Analyzing ministers’ number of laws proposed to parliament in Denmark from 1975 to 2022, I look beyond parties as unitary actors and provide evidence for this causal relationship. Membership of the Economic Committee increases ministers’ legislative activity. Thus, even within parties in cabinet, ministers have unequal possibilities to act as policy-seeking. These findings offer new insights into political parties in governments, cabinet governance, policymaking, and legislative processes.
Recent research on clientelism has focused on the varieties of clientelism. They suggest that clientelistic exchanges differ in terms of the expected length of iterations, whereby politicians deliver benefits to voters in exchange for political support. Using newly collected V-Party data (1,844 political parties from 165 countries, 1970–2019), we identify two prominent types of clientelism that recent studies have suggested: relational clientelism and single-shot clientelism. By demonstrating that our measures of clientelism outperform existing cross-national indices, we suggest that it is important to unpack clientelistic linkages at the party level to grasp the fine-grained differences in clientelism across parties within states. We then apply our measures to the analysis of the relationship between economic development and clientelism, one of the major topics in the clientelism study. Our analysis finds that relational clientelism persists even in relatively developed countries, whereas the effect of economic development on single-shot clientelism has a curvilinear relationship. Our applications of the new measures of clientelism also show that the gap in clientelistic practices between ruling and opposition parties varies depending on the types of clientelism, tenure lengths of incumbents, and the degree of political centralization.
Recent theories of democratic representation push beyond ‘minimalist’ notions that only rely on periodic elections to connect officials and constituents. For example, Jane Mansbridge (2019) calls for ‘recursive representation’, which seeks ongoing, two-way interaction between representatives and their constituents. Given the scale and complexity of modern representative democracies, how can such ambitious proposals be translated into practice? We analyze two Deliberative Town Halls (DTHs) convened with a Federal Member of Australian Parliament in 2020 to discuss a complex issue, mitochondrial donation, ahead of a parliamentary debate and conscience vote on this issue. Drawing on interviews with participants, we argue that democratic innovations such as DTHs can contribute to realizing recursive representation when three criteria are met: authenticity, inclusion, and impact. We discuss the significance of each criterion and the role of DTHs in advancing recursive representation in a parliamentary system.
Volume I examines the history of the European Union from an outside-in perspective, asking the following questions: how does the European Union look from the outside, and which outside forces shaped and guided the process of European integration? Split into three parts, the first addresses the main external events that have steered the European integration process, with emphasis placed on critical junctures following the Second World War, such as the division and reunification of Germany and the Eastern enlargement. Part II considers the various international trends that have shaped European integration, with particular focus on globalisation and geopolitics. While the first two parts pay special attention to institutions, countries, international organisations and the main actors, Part III focuses on the role of ideas, networks, public opinion and memory that influenced the development of the European Union.
The role of the president varies between political systems, and so does public opinion on presidents. One of the most evident factors distinguishing presidents in different systems is the constitutional strength of the presidency, which should impact how presidents are perceived by the people. Public opinion on presidents has mainly been studied in the context of classical presidential regimes such as the USA and Latin American countries, and we lack systematic empirical research on presidential popularity in other regime types and in the context of the presidents’ constitutional powers. This article addresses this research gap by analysing whether the level of presidential powers explain variation in presidential popularity across different constitutional settings. Drawing on public opinion surveys and relevant contextual data from 15 countries, the results show that a higher level of presidential popularity is associated with weaker presidency and that the impact of the economy and electoral cycle is conditioned by the level of presidential powers.
Volume II examines the history of the European Union from an inside-out perspective, focusing on the internal developments that shaped the European integration process. Split into three parts, Part I covers the principles that have defined European integration, exploring the treaties and their changes through time, with Brexit being a core milestone. Part II considers the different instruments within the architecture of European integration, with special focus on the development of policies, the euro and enlargement. Part III concentrates on the various narratives surrounding European integration, in particular the concepts, goals and ideas that both spoke and failed to speak to the hearts and minds of Europeans. This includes the 'longue durée' concept, peace, European culture, (the absence of) religion, prosperity and (a lack of) solidarity and democracy.
The notion of ‘place’ has become a central concern in research on the populist radical right (PRR), but scholars seem to have different things in mind when talking about how geography affects individual political attitudes. In our paper, we therefore aim to structure the debate on the impact of place and to understand exactly how place affects PRR attitudes (nativism, right-wing authoritarianism, and populism). Conceptually, we identify four potentially relevant aspects of ‘place’ that underpin much of the current literature: place-related attitudes (localism and resentment), place-specific living conditions, socio-demographic composition, and characteristics unique to a particular place, i.e., its local history and culture. We also discuss how these aspects are related and how they may interact. Empirically, we assess the relative importance of these four aspects of place for PRR sentiment in Germany, a country that is particularly well suited to this type of analysis. Using fine-grained geocoded survey data collected prior to the 2017 election, we find that (1) there is considerable spatial variation and clustering in PRR attitudes, (2) a place’s socio-demographic composition and (3) place resentment account for much of this, while (4) localism has weaker effects. We find (5) no relevant interaction between localism and place resentment, (6) no substantial evidence that mediation through place-related attitudes leads to an underestimation of the other aspects, and (7) no evidence for effects of the unique culture or history of the places we studied. Moreover, (8) location in the former GDR still has a substantial impact, whereas (9) other place-specific conditions (deprivation, demographic decline, migration, rurality) that could be addressed by policy interventions have no or rather weak effects. We conclude that PRR sentiment in ‘places that don’t matter’ results also, though by no means exclusively, from a lack of recognition.
Electoral engineering strategies in majoritarian electoral systems, in particular the possibility to contain insurgent parties by manipulating electoral districts for partisan gain, are key determinants of parties’ positions on the adoption of proportional representation (PR). Providing both qualitative and quantitative evidence, this paper demonstrates that partisan districting can be an effective strategy to protect incumbent parties’ dominant political positions. In addition, it shows how insurgent parties push for the adoption of PR to end the practice of partisan districting. Finally, it demonstrates that incumbents – in the face of increasing electoral threats – cling to the existing majoritarian system if partisan districting allows them to influence vote-seat distortions in their favor. Together, these findings suggest that the possibility to contain insurgent parties by means of partisan districting is an important but overlooked alternative to the adoption of PR. Moreover, by demonstrating that vote-seat distortions moderate the relationship between district-level electoral threats and legislators’ support for PR adoption, this paper offers an important corrective to Stein Rokkan’s influential electoral threat thesis.
Political parties commonly experience internal disagreements. Recently, evidence is accumulating that outright internal discord makes a party much less attractive to voters. However, we do not understand well when citizens perceive a party to be internally conflicted in the first place. We here explain citizens’ perceptions from a democratic life cycle perspective: Factors related to the periodic conduct of elections induce higher levels of intra-party conflict and make it more visible to citizens. To test this argument, we combine survey data on citizens’ perceptions of political parties in Germany spanning 16 years with indicators moderating (the visibility of) intra-party conflict. The analysis shows that citizens perceive more internal conflict when parties are heterogenous, when they are governing, when election day is distant, and when electoral losses accumulate. This demonstrates the recurring patterns in citizens’ perceptions of political parties and suggests self-reinforcing dynamics between citizen assessments and election outcomes.