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The Brexit debate in the UK focuses almost exclusively on the UK's own position within the European Union and largely ignores the reaction and opinion of the other 27 member states. The UK's negotiations will, however, involve each and every member state, as well as the EU institutions, and their past relationships with the UK will be critical for shaping any future international relations.
This book offers an in-depth analysis of the attitudes and opinions of the rest of Europe towards the UK's decision to leave. Covering the period from David Cameron's attempt to renegotiate the UK's EU membership prior to the Referendum and closing with the triggering of Article 50, the book charts the individual member-states' response to the UK's referendum process and result.
Each essay draws on the research of country experts and together they provide essential context for understanding the likely negotiating position of the European nations towards the UK at this historic juncture and a fascinating insight into their likely future relations with the UK.
The 2016 Brexit referendum result has been portrayed as the consequence of various short-term phenomena: the financial crisis, austerity, migration and UKIP, to name a few. Overnight the political future of the UK took an unprecedented and unexpected turn against EU membership. Since then, the UK's government has been charting unknown waters in its negotiations to disentangle the United Kingdom from its membership and obligations to the European Union.
In this book, Martin Westlake argues that focus on the short-term, reflex action of the Brexit vote has overshadowed a series of longer-term trends that were inexorably leading, or pushing, the UK away from full membership of the European Union. He shows that the UK was an increasingly semi-detached member, requiring ever more elaborate and ingenious fixes with opt-outs and rebates to keep its involvement in the project. Rather than a sudden, impulsive act of rejection, Brexit should be seen as having taken place over a number of years at various levels: a gradual slipping of the ties that bound the country to the European Union.
Scholars of European integration are primarily interested in explaining change and variation over time. Indeed, given that integration has progressed over 50 years and competences have been transferred to the European level in policy fields, including energy, fast and coordinated action in the face of a major external threat might have been anticipated. Yet, as this article documents, member states struggled to establish a cohesive and solidary European response to the 2022 gas crisis, just as they had failed to cooperate effectively during the 1973 oil crisis. Building on recent literature on European polity development and integration through crises, this article argues that differences in national crisis affectedness and energy structures hampered cooperation. Such asymmetries became particularly visible on the part of France and Germany, the Union’s two largest member states, who could have provided regional political leadership. Consequently, both the 1973 and 2022 energy crises led to very limited steps in European integration and collectively suboptimal policy outcomes, such as high energy prices and uneven access to energy resources.
How does media exposure relate to support for radical right populist parties (RRPPs)? We contribute to this classic debate by analyzing the web browsing histories and survey responses of six thousand study participants in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK during the 2019 European Parliament election. Linking direct measures of online news exposure to voting behavior allows us to assess the effects of the salience of issues politicized by RRPPs on their electoral support. The likelihood to vote for RRPPs was higher when the EU was more salient in individual media diets, while exposure to the less salient issue of immigration did not increase the propensity to vote for RRPPs. Alongside consistent results for other party families and interactions with pre-existing voting intentions, the findings indicate that the electoral effects of online media are contingent on the overall salience of a specific issue and voters’ predispositions.
Specialized anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) aim to address corruption problems when conventional institutional mechanisms are dysfunctional. Yet, we still lack thorough understanding of the conditions that enable ACAs to withstand undue influences of the overarching political regime. Informed by the judicial politics literature, we examine the value of public opinion in empowering ACAs. Leveraging the evolving political conditions of Hong Kong, we argue that a lack of public support for other government organs offers opportunities for an ACA to distinguish itself from the rest of the regime and establish operational independence. We find that a signature ACA of Hong Kong, created by the British colonial government, has been uniquely sensitive to public complaints of corruption. The agency is the most responsive when other government branches are perceived to be lacking integrity. Also, negative appraisals of the political regime encourage the ACA’s institutional functions and increase the degree of enforcement discretion entrusted to it. Our findings suggest a mechanism of ACA empowerment whereby the public is committed to sustaining agency independence because of their distrust and the unpopularity of other government organs. Therefore, potential institutional threats posed by an unpopular regime to the ACA may actually strengthen the latter’s power and autonomy.
Crisis after crisis has beset the European Union in recent years - Greek sovereign debt, Russian annexation of Crimea, unprecedented levels of migration, and the turmoil created by Brexit. An organization originally designed to regulate and enforce rules about fishing rights, wheat quotas and product standards has found itself on the global stage forced to grapple with problems of identity, sovereignty and solidarity without a script or prompt. From Paris to Berlin, London to Athens, European leaders have had to improvise on issues that the Union was never set up to handle and which threaten to engulf this unique political entity. And they have had to do so in full view of an increasingly disenchanted and dissonant public audience.
In this candid and revealing portrayal of a Europe improvising its way through a politics of events and not rules, Luuk van Middelaar makes sense of the EU's political metamorphosis over its past ten years of crisis management. Forced into action by a tidal wave of emergencies, Van Middelaar shows how Europe has had to reinvent itself by casting off its legal straitjacket and confronting hard issues of power, territorial borders and public authority.
Alarums and Excursions showcases the fascinating relationship between the Union and the European heads of government, and the stresses it must withstand in dealing with real world events. For anyone seeking to understand the inner power play and constitutional dynamics of this controversial, but no less remarkable, political institution, this book provides compelling reading.
The party–money nexus has long excited concerns about corruption and undue influence. However, much of the scholarship in this area has focused on the funding parties receive from external donors or the state. One area of party financing that is underexplored is that of party-controlled commercial enterprises. We examine the nature and scale of the commercial activities engaged in by the two major governing Australian parties: Labor and the Liberals. We find that while commercial activities are long-standing practices, they have diversified over time, becoming more sophisticated and professionalized. Importantly, some of these activities have become decoupled from the proper purposes of parties. The upscaling of party fundraising practices introduces new tensions for parties – both normatively and practically.
Electoral systems fulfill different functions. Typically, they cannot meet all demands at the same time, so that the evaluation of specific electoral systems depends on subjective preferences about the single demands. We argue that it is the electorate which transfers its power to representatives and, therefore, its preferences should be considered in debates about electoral systems. Consequently, our contribution presents results of citizens’ demands regarding electoral system attributes. Specifically, we rely on a large-scale conjoint experiment conducted in Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK in which subjects were asked to choose between two electoral systems which randomly differed on a set of attributes referring to electoral systems’ core functions. Our results show that all core functions are generally of importance for the respondents but reveal a higher preference for proportional electoral systems. These preferences are largely stable for citizens in different countries but also for other subgroups of subjects.
Populist supporters have been found to take cues from populist incumbents. Yet, little is known about how they incorporate party cues in their political beliefs when populists are in office. This research note argues that (1) citizens who identify with populist parties engage in partisan motivated reasoning – that is, they are driven by the desire to be consistent with their partisan allegiances – and that (2) they engage in partisan motivated reasoning more intensely than their non-populist counterparts because populist party cues strongly prompt them to process biased information. Drawing on data from the European Social Survey, it is evidenced that populist supporters express much warmer economic views when their parties hold power. Warm economic views are also found to increase significantly more in accordance with strength of partisanship and exposure to political information for populist supporters than for non-populist supporters when their respective parties govern. Results highlight a mechanism by which populist incumbents are likely to remain attractive despite their poor economic record. They have implications for our understanding of the mainstreaming of populist parties in Europe.
The Covid-19 pandemic placed responsibility on the European Union (EU) to effectively mitigate this common challenge. An important aspect of the common fight against the virus was the collective procurement of vaccines. The initially slow process of vaccine delivery may have caused overall frustration within societies and may also have had a profound effect on people’s assessment of their country’s EU membership. This paper examines this assumption via unique panel data collected in Germany in three waves between November 2020 and August 2021. We show that citizens evaluated their country’s EU membership negatively especially when the EU’s progress on vaccinations was in its early stages. In addition, public assessment was particularly negative when vaccination progress was compared to the situation in the United Kingdom (UK). Overall, our findings point to volatile levels of EU support depending on respondents’ perceptions of the success of the UK outside the EU.
This Element documents long-term changes in the politicalattitudes of occupational groups, shifts in the salience of economic and cultural issues, and the movement of political parties in the electoral space from 1990 to 2018 in eight Western democracies. We evaluate prominent contentions about how electoral contestation has changed and why support for mainstream parties has declined while support for challenger parties has increased. We contribute a new analysis of how the viability of the types of electoral coalitions assembled by center-left, center-right, radical-right, and Green parties changes over these decades. We find that their viability is affected by changes over time in citizens' attitudes to economic and cultural issues and shifts in the relative salience of those issues. We examine the contribution these developments make to declining support for mainstream center-left and center-right coalitions and increasing support for coalitions underpinning radical-right and Green parties.
The ancient heritage that I sketched in the previous chapter became part and parcel of the later medieval traditions. A series of key authors, including St. Augustine, Orosius, Cassiodorus, and most importantly Isidore of Seville with his Etymologies, transmitted central aspects of this knowledge to the post-Roman world. At the same time, the slow assertion of Christianity inevitably led to significant changes in attitude towards the individual aspects that the notion of Europe evoked. While the geographical element was quite unproblematic—in fact, it fitted into the intellectual framework of a religion whose God had a tripartite nature—the mythological motifs were quite different. This chapter will first present how early Christian authors reacted to the myth of Europa, before turning to their treatment of aspects of geographical structure and administrative order. It will conclude with a brief presentation of the surprising increase of references to Europe in a religious context.
Against Paganism: Christian Reactions to the Myth of “Europa”
The important Christian thinkers of the fourth and fifth centuries were well-versed in canonical knowledge of the ancient world. St. Augustine received an excellent education in the sense of classical paideia and the same holds true for others, who also did their best to collect and transmit the canon of knowledge. Cassiodorus, who founded the monastery of Vivarium towards the mid-sixth century, organized much of this canon in his Institutiones, and Isidore of Seville's Etymologies assembled a wealth of information in quasi-encyclopaedic form in the early seventh century.
Well acquainted as they were with the traditions in “pagan” texts, we can observe how Christian authors reacted to the myths and stories they encountered. In the case of Europa, two separate strategies can be identified: On the one hand, several authors tried to rationalize the story of the abduction (as did Herodotus). Lactancius (d. ca. 320), for example, interpreted the “bull” as imagery on the sail (a tutela) of the abductors’ boat (BE 101). Most Christian authors, on the other hand, used the story of Europa's abduction to demonstrate the moral inferiority of the pagan gods.
The title of this short monograph merits explanation. Although the name “Europe” has enjoyed immense popularity in medieval studies from the mid-twentieth century onwards, it is by no means obvious what an analysis of “‘Europe’ in the Middle Ages” might comprise. What's more, the use of the term in medieval studies is far from obvious, as we shall see. On the most general level, recent publications on “Europe in the Middle Ages” can be divided into two categories: the majority seek to describe events and developments that took place in the geographical unit that we now identify as “Europe.” Sometimes they analyze and identify the formation of what is often called a “European culture” or even a “European identity.”
Another series of studies, smaller in number, focuses on the development of the concept (or the idea) of Europe. They do not so much ask “What happened in Europe during the Middle Ages?” or “What were the characteristics of medieval societies in Europe?,” but instead focus on whether the notion (or a concept) of Europe played a role during the period we call the Middle Ages and how this role can be described.
It is the historians’ role to probe sources for answers—but the questions they choose to ask are inevitably informed by the present day. Many authors have searched for the “roots” of the idea of European political unity in the Middle Ages, but the first historians to do so, from the late 1940s onwards, were somewhat disappointed by what they found. Around 1990, when the fall of the Berlin Wall sparked renewed interest in all questions concerning the history and identity of “Europe,” medievalists began synthesizing the findings of these pioneering works. They asserted that the word “Europe” was used quite rarely in the medieval period and that it remained a “purely geographical” notion for most of the time between the fifth and the fifteenth centuries.
In the following pages I will argue that both assumptions are distorted, if not wrong. In order to make a convincing case for the modification of this well-established picture, I would have to present the available sources in much more detail than is possible in this book.
As is often the case with topics that pertain to a “history of ideas” of the Middle Ages, an analysis of the notion of Europe in this period is not possible without considering the foundations in Antiquity. In the case of Europe this begins with the word itself, whose origins are still not entirely clear. Some research-ers propose a (reconstructed) Phoenician root ‘rb, related to the Hebrew ‘ereb and referring to the “evening.” Others prefer a genuinely Greek etymology, based on eurý- (broad) or eûros (breadth), which coincides with interpretations by antique authors. Equally, a connection with eurós (mouldiness, decay) might be possible, though it seems rather unlikely.
Medieval authors, who were often fascinated by the origins of words and their etymology which they took to represent “real” meaning, hardly ever commented on Europe from this perspective. They mostly limited their reflections to the more factual observation that Europe was the third part of the world and received its name from the princess Europa—a tradition that is already attested to in Roman sources: Europam tertiam orbis partem ab Europa, Agenoris filia, certum est appellari (Europe, the third part of the world, is certainly named after Europa, the daughter of Agenor: Sextus Pompeius Festus, second century CE; BE 83). Only a few medieval texts commented on the Greek origin, such as, for example, one anonymous glossator who commented on Orosius's work and explained, at some point between the seventh and the ninth century CE: Eurupa grece tellus (Europe means “land” in Greek) (BE 84). It is only at the beginning of the fourteenth century that we find more elaborate etymological explanations: Referring to the combination of eu and ripa, for example, the author of an Ovide moralisé stated that “Europe means good shore,” and Bernhard of Kremsmünster proposed an analogous explanation at roughly the same time (BE 85).
At the end of this brief overview—which has covered no less than an entire millennium!—many questions necessarily remain open, not least what all this means for us today. In recent years, the idea(l) of the nation-state has once again become prominent. So prominent, in fact, that it visibly endangers the accomplishments of a long-term process of political, administrative, and cultural unification in Europe that had and has several objectives—including securing peace between the member states of the European Union (and beyond).
As we have seen, the experience of the World Wars was a major motivation for historians of the post-war period to analyze the Middle Ages in European terms. Several decades after the first pioneering works, the results remain ambivalent: analyses that consciously apply a European framework to medieval history are no longer rare, but many publications still tend to choose the modern borders between nationstates as their frame of reference. As to the more conceptual approaches that seek to analyze the history of the “idea” of Europe, the outcomes are equally hard to gauge. Some of the initial results presented by Fischer, Hay, and others, clearly must be revised: Europe was neither a “rare” notion in medieval texts (especially since it is hard to evaluate exactly how many—or how few—appearances might justify such a qualification), nor was it “purely geographical.” The latter insight is of some importance if we want to adequately describe the mental landscape of the people who lived in the period that we call the Middle Ages. In a cultural setting where the material world was interpreted as God's creation and where everything could acquire symbolic value as a representation of the creator's work, the very idea of the “purely geographical” seems out of touch. And while Europe basically never became a clear-cut political concept during the Middle Ages (in this respect Fischer and Hay were certainly right), it still acquired significant and wide-ranging cultural connotations.
But what might the insights into these connotations tell us today? For one thing, they allow us to avoid misunderstandings that often lead to the misuse of history: Charlemagne certainly did not perceive himself as a “European” ruler, though historians and politicians of the mid- and late twentieth century were quite successful in presenting him as such.
For a medievalist who lives and works in the early twenty-first century, writing about Europe is a highly ambivalent undertaking. Some readers might be tempted to argue that the topic hardly merits our attention, since they consider the medieval evidence too sparse or too inconclusive. Others might think that the choice of subject constitutes per se an unwelcome relapse into Eurocentric tendencies. In any case, it seems clear that the subject inevitably evokes current political debates. Whether one subscribes to the conviction that Europe merits becoming the framework for an increasingly interconnected and profound political and cultural community or, to the contrary, clings to the, historically speaking, relatively new belief that people are best organized in the form of nation-states, talking about Europe has political overtones.
Having studied the use of the notion of Europe for quite some time now, I am very conscious about these effects. It might thus be helpful to clarify my own position: Born and raised in late twentieth-century Germany, I was seventeen years old when the Berlin wall fell. I grew up to be deeply convinced that the European Union (EU) constitutes a vital means of overcoming the numerous problems that the nation-state entails—and I still stand by these convictions. As an historian, however, I am also convinced that political questions and problems cannot be solved by looking backwards: history does not furnish ready-made answers. What it can do, is provide alternative perspectives and information that helps us to better understand our problems in the first place. What we choose to do remains our own responsibility.
In this sense, I would like to stress that the material and the interpretations I present in this little book should neither be read as an affirmation of current EU-policies—nor as their rejection. My work as an historian focuses on analyzing and understanding how people used the notion of Europe in the medieval past and which ideas they connected with that term. I can see no convincing argument that would force us to accept that the phenomena we can see here determine or justify any specific modern interpretation of “Europe”.
While it is not surprising that the notion of Europe became part of the vocabulary of medieval authors—after all, it was a central element of the geographical knowledge and the mythological lore they inherited from Greek and Roman Antiquity—the fact that it was used in contexts that transcended the ancient traditions is noticeable. Although early medieval sources rarely contain any kind of overtly “political” connotation, Europe was integrated into discourses that must be considered as religious, and it also served as an instrument to perceive, describe, and interpret the surrounding world.
Without becoming central for the description and analysis of societies and their organization, Europe continued to be used in a relatively broad range of situations, including contexts that come close to what modern readers might perceive to be political. A first apogee of this development is usually identified with the Carolingians between the mid-eighth and the early tenth centuries, and more specifically with the dominant figure of Charlemagne: modern authors after 1945 often repeated that he was called “Father of Europe” (pater Europae) by his contemporaries.The first section of this chapter will demonstrate that this is not entirely false, but not wholly true either. Still, the use of the notion of Europe in the Carolingian period seems significant.
Nostalgic from the Outset—Remembering Charlemagne
Most modern historians of the medieval notion of Europe agree that the Carolingian period witnessed a first peak in the use of the term. The most prominent example certainly is the famous Paderborn Epic, which describes the encounter between Charlemagne and Pope Leo III at Paderborn in 799. Attacked and mutilated by his rivals in Rome, Leo fled to the king of the Franks to ask for his support, and Charlemagne's ensuing campaign to Italy culminated in his coronation as Roman emperor on Christmas 800. In the Paderborn Epic, the preceding events are described in detail and with lavish laudatory terms. The poet describes his king as “precious light” (cara lux—certainly a pun on Carolus) and refers to Europe in several instances. Charlemagne thus becomes the “lighthouse that illuminates Europe with his light” (Europae quo celsa pharus cum luce coruscat), the “venerable apex of Europe” (Europae venerandus apex) and finally, in the most famous phrase, the “Father of Europe” (pater Europae) (BE 138).