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The EU Treaties bind the Court of Justice of the European Union as an institution of the Union. But what does that mean for judicial lawmaking within the EU legal order? And how might any limits set out in the EU Treaties be effectively applied to the Court of Justice as lawmaker? This book interrogates these fundamental and underexplored questions at a critical juncture in European integration. It argues that the EU Treaties should be considered to function as the principal touchstones for assessing the internal constitutionality, and hence legitimacy, of all Union institutional activity - including the work of the Court. It then examines how far the Court of Justice complies with the EU Treaty framework in the exercise of its interpretative functions. The results of that analysis are striking and offer scholars powerful new insights into the nature and limits of the Court's role within the EU legal order.
This paper contributes to current debates on the politicization of international politics by examining party-political contestation of peace and security missions. It is guided by two inter-related questions, (a) to what extent deployment decisions are contested amongst political parties and (b) what drives such contestation. We examine data from a new data set on parliamentary votes on deployment decisions in France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom and from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey. Against conventional wisdom and in an effort to address the often-overlooked role of political parties, we find that military deployments have been systematically contested amongst political parties across Europe. Further, we find that contestation is driven by the left/right axis, as opposed to newer cleavages captured here by the so-called gal/tan axis. We also find evidence that patterns of contestation depend on parties’ positions in government or opposition, a factor we relate to bureaucratic and international pressures on the parties in office, and to political opportunities for opposition parties.
If transparency in political finance is part and parcel of democracy, why do some countries adopt internationally agreed standards to regulate political finance in a more transparent way, while others do not? This paper (a) suggests a theoretical framework to address this question, taking into account international obligations, existing party finance regulation, and demands for greater legitimacy of political institutions; (b) introduces a unique data set of 46 member-countries of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) project operated by the Council of Europe; and (c) concludes that unwillingness to pay the high domestic costs of changing national regulation is the prime impediment to compliance with transparency regulation proposed by GRECO. Right-of-centre cabinets are, on average, associated with a poorer level of compliance. Interestingly, compliance with recommendations which reduce the privileges of parliamentary parties does not deviate from the overall pattern.
Why is the exercise of political power highly concentrated in some polities and widely dispersed in others? We argue that one important causal factor is demographic. Populous polities are characterized by less concentrated structures of authority. To explain this relationship, we invoke two mechanisms: heterogeneity and trust. The theory is demonstrated with a wide variety of empirical measures in cross-country analyses including most sovereign states and extending back to the 19th century. The result suggests the possibility of a ubiquitous ‘law’ of politics.
The four Mediterranean EU member states listed here vary not only in size but also in their links to the United Kingdom and their place in the European Union. As a founding member, Italy has often been overshadowed by France and Germany. But its contributions and role have been considerable, with it often backing efforts towards further European integration. Greece’s accession to the EEC in 1981 was part of its move to becoming a democratic country. Its commitment to European integration saw it join the euro, a decision that since the global financial crisis of 2007 has plunged both Greece and the Eurozone into periods of crisis. The membership of Cyprus and Malta, which began in 2004, brought into the EU two smaller Mediterranean island member states, with both proving themselves to be formidable negotiators. Their links with the UK, maintained through the Commonwealth (and, additionally for Cyprus, in the form of two UK military bases), meant that they, along with the Irish Republic, were the only EU member states whose citizens resident in the UK were permitted to vote in the UK’s referendum.
All four states have shared some common challenges, most recently in the form of the migration and refugee crises from north Africa and the Middle East. In the case of Brexit, as we see in this chapter, their concerns ranged from the rights of their citizens in the UK through to the possibility of a shift in the balance of power within the Union that could, in the case of Greece, have seen it face renewed pressure over its future in the Eurozone. Italy has also been concerned by a possible shift in the balance of power. Without the UK as a counterbalance, France and Germany could in future define the EU integration process. It was these challenges, and more, that often overshadowed and shaped how these four states approached the UK’s renegotiation, referendum and vote to leave.
ITALY
Italy has often admired the British “third way” of dealing with the EU. The UK has long seemed able to pursue its own interests within the EU, while counterbalancing French and German influence over the development of European institutions.