INTRODUCTION

Much like across the rest of Europe, the vote by the British people to leave the European Union was not expected by the countries of south-eastern Europe. Amongst the newest members of the EU, they had all striven to become members of an organization that, along with NATO, had come to define European politics. This amplified the shock that the United Kingdom, a leading European state that had backed the enlargement of both organizations, had now decided to turn its back on the EU. Geographically, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Slovenia are part of a wider region in which geopolitics and history did not facilitate or encourage regional cooperation until quite recently. Before fulfilling their post-Cold-War strategic priorities – EU and NATO membership – the four countries had supported regional cooperation formats or initiatives only when they were sure the respective format would promote their accession agendas to the EU rather than delay them. Geographically, some of them are parts of other regions – the Danube (Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania), the Black Sea (Bulgaria and Romania) and the Mediterranean (Croatia and Slovenia). Despite this, and while not constituting a formalized format, the four countries covered here as south-eastern Europe have common interests that form the backdrop for understanding their approach to the UK’s renegotiation, and especially their common concerns about the outcome of the June 2016 referendum. They share common interests over the future terms of relations between the EU and the UK, as well as with regard to the future of the EU without the UK. Not belonging to the heavyweights in the EU, all four countries are interested in pursuing a common European position in the negotiations with the UK and did not join with those opposed to entrusting the negotiations to the European Commission.

Because of the UK’s strong strategic role with regard to security matters, bilateral relations between the four countries of south-eastern Europe and the UK have been much more important in terms of support for EU and NATO enlargement than in terms of economic and trade cooperation.

INTRODUCTION

As with the rest of the European Union, the United Kingdom’s decision to seek a renegotiated EU relationship and a referendum was greeted with a mix of irritation and concern in the central European states of Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. The renegotiation, the campaign, the result and the uncertainty and speculation that followed presented these four medium-sized EU member states with a variety of challenges and opportunities.

Despite their geographical proximity, these four states vary in both their levels of integration in the EU, their cooperation with one another and their relations with the UK. Austria, which was neutral during the Cold War but closely aligned with the West, and especially Germany, joined the EU in 1995 in the first enlargement after the Cold War. In 1999 it became one of the founding members of the Eurozone. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia joined in 2004, with six other countries – an enlargement that Britain had backed strongly, and is often seen as having gained from in terms of positive relations with the newer member states. In addition to Poland these three states form the Visegrad Group, working together to further their ideas for European integration. Slovakia joined the Eurozone in 2009, while Hungary and the Czech Republic retain their own currencies. While all four countries are members of the Schengen area, unease at the arrival of immigrants has been a common issue for them, helping boost Euroscepticism in all four. At the same time, citizens of the four states, but especially in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, have taken advantage of the EU’s freedom of movement. The future of their citizens resident in the UK quickly became one of the defining issues in the period covered here.

Membership of the EU has given all four countries an enhanced ability to shape European and international relations. As medium-sized EU members, the renegotiation and the challenge of dealing with Brexit has seen all four try to shape the position of a union of 444 million people. This was especially so for Slovakia, whose six-month presidency began only a few days after the Brexit vote.

Brexit is full of surprises. The result was a surprise even for the Leavers. For me and many others, it was a sad surprise. No longer was the European Union an irreversible project. It was established to create irreversible economic and political bonds for the sake of an ever-lasting peace. The Union embodied values, and the most important of all was: peace. The EU was and is much more than an economic added value. The Union is not an aim in itself. It is a peace project. Brexit has national sovereignty as a goal in itself. If the EU falls apart, peace is not guaranteed. It is a sad thing that the Brexit debate is mainly about trade and the City of London. Much more is at stake.

It was a happy surprise that support for EU membership amongst the citizens of the remaining 27 member states increased dramatically after Brexit. For a large majority of them, Brexit was not a template. It would add instability to an already unstable world. The EU had become part of our DNA, even if we lack enthusiasm for it. For young people, a return to the old world of borders and national currencies seems unworldly. If any Britons thought that Brexit would be the beginning of the end of the EU, the start of the unravelling process, this was not the case. It was the first in a long series of miscalculations on the part of some in Britain.

Another surprise was the unity of the remaining 27 member states during the first phase of the Brexit negotiations. Britain is negotiating with a bloc that speaks with one voice. It means that we have an answer to Henry Kissinger’s question “Who do I call if I want to speak to Europe?”. You can now call Brussels! By contrast, Britain speaks with many voices and is not so united anymore. It is obvious that in the talks on the future EU– UK relationship the EU has to work hard to remain united, but we are used to compromise. The EU is based on compromise.

On his first foreign trip after being elected German president in early 2017, Frank-Walter Steinmeier chose to visit the European Parliament to make a strong plea for European integration. In the speech he characterized Brexit, and in particular the conduct of the Leave campaign, as “irresponsible” (Steinmeier 2017). This notion of irresponsibility, of political brinkmanship for short-sighted political gain, best describes the impression of the German political elite towards the Brexit vote and former UK prime minister David Cameron’s decision to seek a renegotiated UK–EU relationship. This was reflected in Chancellor Merkel’s controversial statement in May 2017, when she argued that, after the election of Donald Trump and the Brexit vote, the “times when we could completely depend on others are, to a certain extent, over” (Henley 2017).

The story of British–German relations in the wake of the Brexit vote is therefore more than just about difficult negotiations at the European level. It is also a story about a misjudged relationship, when misconceptions on both sides led – and continue to lead – to miscalculations and, ultimately, disappointments and a distancing in relations. This is particularly damaging at a time when a functioning bilateral relationship could have been crucial to shaping both Europe and the wider world. These misconceptions go both ways. On the UK side, from the outset of the renegotiation Germany was perceived as the prime ally among the EU27, and one that would go a long way to secure British membership in the EU as a balance to France, and to keep a close economic partner in the Union. During and after the Brexit referendum, leading proponents of Brexit argued that, because of the close economic ties, the German government would take a soft stance on Brexit negotiations in order to protect its economic interests. In both cases, however, for the German government, the political interest in safeguarding the European Union trumped any other considerations, resulting in a hard and clear stance on the renegotiation and in the lead-up to the commencement of formal exit negotiations with the United Kingdom.

Cameron’s Brexit gamble made waves in Warsaw. The United Kingdom has been Poland’s long-time ally in the European Union and NATO, and Warsaw did not want to see London leave the EU.

The UK supported the eastern enlargement that paved the way for Polish membership of the EU in 2004. Warsaw and London have also taken a firm stance towards an increasingly assertive Moscow and pushed for sanctions after Russia invaded Crimea. Both countries also worked hand in hand in favour of further liberalization of the single market. Every relationship has its ups and downs, however, and so does the Polish–British partnership. The UK was one of the three EU member states (next to Sweden and Ireland) that opened its labour market for Poles and other central Europeans immediately after enlargement. The sharp inflow of EU migrants from central Europe contributed to an anti-migration narrative in the UK. Poland, under then prime minister Donald Tusk (the current European Council president) and his successor Ewa Kopacz, held it against the British government that it at times portrayed central Europeans in the UK as benefits scroungers.

But these tensions did not stand in the way of a pragmatic collaboration between Warsaw and London. From the earliest period covered in this book, many in Poland felt that Brexit would put this cooperation at risk. For Warsaw, the UK’s departure from the EU would shift the balance of power towards Germany and France. The exit of the largest non-Euro member would also make the non-Euro group less influential and bring increased pressure on Warsaw to adopt the euro. Poland is legally committed to joining the Eurozone, but its public has opposed the accession. Warsaw is in no rush therefore to adopt the common currency.

CHANGE OF GUARD IN POLAND: BAD NEWS FOR THE EU ENTHUSIASTS BUT GOOD NEWS FOR CAMERON

Warsaw wanted to help David Cameron keep the United Kingdom in the European Union but was reluctant to support reforms that would undermine its standing in the EU. Under Tusk and Kopacz, Warsaw relied on a partnership with the EU’s supranational institutions in its European policy.

The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union will reshape the EU and, in particular, the EU’s institutions. The European Parliament will lose 73 British members. The Commission will have one Commissioner fewer and will have to deal with the more than 1,000 British nationals it employs. The Council of the EU will see a change in its balance of votes – and consequently in its voting patterns. The Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions will lose their British members, and the future of thousands of Britons working in the wider EU policy-making community has become uncertain.

Britain’s decision is near-universally seen as a negative one for the EU, although opinion is also united in thinking it will likely be much worse for the UK. There was little the EU institutions could do to avoid this scenario, however: the UK was the main actor and the room of manoeuvre for EU institutions was limited. How, then, did the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council act and react during this process triggered by one of the EU’s member states?

From the moment the then UK prime minister, David Cameron, informed his counterparts of his intention to hold an in/out referendum and to renegotiate the UK–EU relationship up until the day he lost the referendum, the EU institutions played, at best, the role of a supporting actor. But, once the fate of the UK’s membership had been sealed by the vote, the EU institutions took centre stage in order to strengthen the unity of the 27 remaining member states. The UK progressively and rather quickly became de facto a “third country” for the EU. This was aided by the sense of distance that had been created during the referendum campaign, which the EU institutions felt was fought on misinformation and with only a half-hearted endorsement of EU membership by many key British political actors.

This chapter retraces the process that transformed a complicated but mutually beneficial relationship into a lose–lose situation, characterized by a rapidly growing estrangement between both sides.

INTRODUCTION

For Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, domestic and international policies are informed disproportionately by questions of the existential threat of neighbouring and openly irredentist Russia. The responses of the three Baltic states to the United Kingdom’s renegotiation, referendum and vote to leave have followed this logic. Indeed, the UK was a major power in each of the two strategic tracks that all three countries had used to make their removal from the Western security umbrella as unlikely as possible, namely NATO membership and rapid and deep integration into all European Union initiatives.

We argue that the similar existential threats shared by the three, and resultantly similar strategic approaches, have been mirrored in their fairly common responses to Britain in the period covered here. Above all, the three states were keen not only to maintain the UK’s security contribution across the Baltics but also to safeguard the integrity and unity of the EU. Strategically, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have – with success, thus far – aimed to ensure that the two issues are kept as separate as possible, most pertinently by keeping military commitments out of EU–UK negotiations.

Baltic reaction to the UK’s renegotiation, referendum and vote to leave has not been solely in security terms, however. The second major concern has been the future of the free movement of goods, capital and labour, particularly the latter, because of the large communities of citizens from the three Baltic states living in the UK. The reaction of the three states has also been partially informed by their nature as eastern, pro-free-market and small member states, particularly so after the referendum, as they turned their gaze towards the possible political dynamics of the post-Brexit EU. Overall, the potentially destabilizing security implications of Brexit for the EU and NATO meant that, as Article 50 was triggered, the three Baltic countries all sought a speedy, amicable and legalistic resolution of negotiations between the two parties that minimizes disruption to the status quo ante Brexit.

ESTONIA

When, in October 2015, the Estonian prime minister, Taavi Roivas, met with David Cameron he made it clear that “Estonia and the UK have a similar understanding of the changed security situation – we are very close allies in both NATO and the European Union”.

Chronology

No issue in peacetime has preoccupied the Irish elite and public to the same extent as the United Kingdom’s renegotiation, referendum and vote to withdraw from the European Union.

Although the Irish Republic’s accession to the then European Economic Community helped it move away from its dependence on the UK, the two countries have maintained close economic, social and political relations. They have also cooperated on many issues relating to the Northern Ireland peace process. The Common Travel Area that Ireland and the UK share – which allows for free movement and establishment across Ireland, the UK and some UK dependencies – has existed for nearly a century. The frictionless borders that came about as a consequence of the end of the Northern Ireland conflict, as well as joint membership of the EU and its customs union, have contributed to turning the islands that the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic share into an inextricably linked social space, ensuring that the two countries’ present and futures are entwined. The result is that the two countries share far more convergent interests than divergent ones.

It should come as little surprise, then, that the prospect of the UK’s renegotiations, and David Cameron’s ill-fated promise of a high-risk referendum on EU membership, was not warmly received in Dublin. Indeed, Irish policy makers recognized early on that both of these developments had the potential to fundamentally alter the nature of the bilateral relationship. Neither was seen as conducive to the furthering of mutual interests. Although the issue did not truly enter the public consciousness until the referendum campaign in 2016, the UK’s EU membership renegotiation and the potential for withdrawal were taken seriously by policy makers and analysts from the very beginning.

BACKGROUND

To understand why Brexit carries such importance in Ireland, it is necessary to briefly examine British–Irish relations in the EU context.

On 1 January 1973, fifty years after gaining independence, Ireland became a member of the EEC in the company of the UK and Denmark. The decision to join had been less an ideological conviction, however, and more an exercise in realpolitik: if the UK chose to join the EEC then Ireland had no option but to follow suit.

INTRODUCTION

Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg share a common history of close ties to Britain and pioneering European integration. All three governments went into exile in Britain during the Second World War. It was in London that they sowed the first seeds of European integration, by signing the Benelux monetary agreement of 21 October 1943. A Customs Convention followed in 1944, leading to the creation of the Benelux Union. Later, all three states became founding members of the European Economic Community.

Geographic proximity has meant that the Benelux countries share close political, economic and military links to the United Kingdom. Despite these commonalities, their perspectives on the UK and Europe differ. The Netherlands has a strong Atlanticist tradition and limited appetite for European federalism and is sceptical about Franco-German dominance in Europe. Luxembourg has a continental mindset, however, and favours deeper EU integration. Belgium stands somewhere in between, while also facing a complex domestic political landscape. The level to which Eurosceptic movements play a role in domestic politics also differs among the three.

With sizable financial sectors and large trade and investment flows between Britain and the Benelux countries, there is a lot at stake during the Brexit negotiations. The three countries are among the most exposed to trade disruption from a “hard Brexit”, but they may also attract new post-Brexit business. Politically, Brexit has raised different questions in Brussels, Luxembourg and The Hague about the direction of Europe and European Union reform.

This chapter looks at the way in which the three Benelux countries have approached the British renegotiation, the subsequent referendum debate and the run-up to the Brexit negotiations. Each country section is structured in the same way, exploring the three phases mentioned above. A conclusion follows, outlining commonalities and differences in how they approach Britain’s departure from the EU.

THE NETHERLANDS

“Brexit has created a shockwave, and we don’t yet know exactly what the consequences will be,” Mark Rutte, the prime minister of the Netherlands, declared in response to Britain’s vote to leave the EU (Rutte 2016). The Dutch government was unequivocal: Brexit is bad for business, bad for European politics and bad for the position of the Netherlands in the EU.

To understand Brexit requires not only an analysis of the result of the 23 June 2016 referendum or of the politics of the United Kingdom. We also need to look at how the other 27 member states and European Union institutions responded to it. UK–EU relations are, like any relationship, a two-way thing. By looking at how the rest of the EU responded to the renegotiation, the referendum campaign and its result we can gain a fuller appreciation of Brexit. As this book has shown, Brexit can be set against longer-term trends in EU–UK relations and has been shaped by, and in turn shaped, the national politics of 27 other member states and those of the EU’s institutions. The book has also shown how Brexit fits into a series of changes shaping the EU, Europe and, in turn, the UK.

This concluding chapter gives a brief overview in three sections of some of the key points from the book. It begins with an overview of how the rest of the EU have viewed EU–UK relations historically, before looking at the more recent developments of the renegotiation, referendum and reaction to the vote to leave, up to the triggering of Article 50. The second section looks at five themes notable throughout the book: the impact of the Brexit debate on populism and Euroscepticism; economic calculations; the importance of the UK; how significant a crisis Brexit is to the EU; and, finally, what lessons the rest of the EU have drawn from Brexit. The final section looks to Europe’s post-Brexit future, touching on debates that are ongoing as this book goes to press. Based on the analysis of how the EU responded to the renegotiation, referendum and result, what options are on the table for the future of EU–UK relations? Based on these recent events, what are the prospects for negotiating a new relationship? Finally, and most importantly from the perspective of the rest of the EU, how will Brexit play into reshaping the remaining EU as it moves forward?

INTRODUCTION

While the Nordic countries share many similarities, there are also significant differences between them. These similarities and differences are also present in the field of foreign policy, including in their relationships with the European Union and the United Kingdom. Denmark and Sweden took part in the creation of EFTA with the UK and others in 1960, whereas Finland became an associate member of EFTA in 1961 and a full member in 1986. Denmark followed the UK closely in its attempts to become a member of the EEC in the 1960s and became a member with, and because of, the UK in 1973. The UK’s rapprochement with the EEC from the 1960s played into the debate about membership in Sweden, but the Swedish government decided against an application for membership as this was seen as incompatible with Sweden’s status as a non-aligned state. In Finland, the EEC membership debate started in earnest only after Sweden announced its intention to apply for membership. The Finnish and Swedish memberships of the EU in 1995 were closely linked to their redefinition of non-alignment after the Cold War and were not in any direct way related to the position of the UK.

As militarily non-aligned states, Finland and Sweden are not members of NATO. Denmark, on the contrary, has been a member of NATO since 1949 and has worked with the UK in multilateral military operations; during the lengthy military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, Danish forces cooperated closely with the British. Finland and Sweden have taken part in NATO operations as partnership countries, and both have recently taken steps to intensify their cooperation with NATO.

The three countries also have different statuses within the EU. Finland, often said to be the most pro-integrationist of the three, is the only Nordic country to have adopted the euro. Denmark, in contrast, has opt-outs in four areas: European citizenship, defence, cooperation in justice and home affairs and the third stage of EMU, therefore not participating in the euro. Sweden does not have a formal opt-out but, as a result of a referendum in 2003, does not participate in the euro either.

INTRODUCTION

Spain and Portugal are both strongly pro-European countries. After decades of relative isolation and socio-economic backwardness under authoritarian rule, in 1986 they simultaneously joined the then European Economic Community as a way to support their democratization, modernization and international reorientation (see Royo & Manuel 2003). Since their “return to Europe” the two countries have been committed EU members, both being part of the Schengen area and Eurozone as well as supporting advances in foreign and security cooperation. Located on the southern fringe of Europe, with less developed economies than their northern partners but with rich national histories that give them special ties to many countries around the world, the two Iberian neighbours have often held similar views and worked closely together within the European Union, particularly for greater social and economic cohesion, as well as for stronger relations with countries around the Mediterranean and in Latin America.

Madrid has embraced deeper European integration in a more determined way than Lisbon, however, particularly on security and defence matters. While Spain has tended to be closer to a more Europeanist line as seen in countries such as Germany and France, Portugal has shown more affinities with the Atlanticist leanings of the Netherlands or the United Kingdom. Greater Atlanticism has been a way for Portugal to try and differentiate itself from its bigger and only neighbour as well as balancing more continentalist perspectives in Europe in general (see Algieri & Regelsberger, 1996; Rodrigues & Perez 2011).

Both countries also have important socio-economic links with the UK, especially in trade, migration and tourism. While Portugal has historical ties of friendship with Britain, however, based on a centuries-old alliance that is now mostly symbolic but still valued, Madrid and London have kept a relatively low-profile diplomatic relationship, in part a result of the deep-rooted dispute over Gibraltar. It is against this backdrop that Spain and Portugal approached Britain’s renegotiation, referendum and vote to leave the EU.

SPAIN

The debate in Spain about the UK’s departure from the EU must be viewed against the backdrop of two factors: first, the severe economic crisis that began in 2008 and took a toll on the lives of Spaniards; and, second, the inward-looking attitude towards EU decision making adopted in recent years by Spain’s government.

Britain’s vote on 23 June 2016 to leave the European Union came as a shock not only to many in the United Kingdom but also to many across the rest of the European Union. It was the first time that a member state had voted to withdraw from a Union that, since its emergence in the 1950s, had grown to encompass most of Europe and so become the continent’s predominant organization for economics, politics, social matters and non-traditional security (NATO remaining the key organization for defence). In the rush to analyse the meaning of the referendum result, the focus has been largely on the UK. Numerous studies and books have outlined the causes, consequences and meaning of Brexit for the UK. This book looks at the constituency it is leaving, and at how the rest of the EU has responded to Brexit. In particular, it analyses how the remaining 27 member states and EU institutions faced the UK’s attempted renegotiation of its membership terms, and its referendum campaign, and how they came to terms with the result and prepared for the formal Brexit negotiations triggered by Article 50, the section of the EU’s treaties that sets out how a member state can withdraw. It, therefore, covers the 21-month period from June 2015, when David Cameron informed the European Council that his newly elected government would seek a renegotiated relationship, through to March 2017, when Cameron’s successor as UK prime minister, Theresa May, informed Council president Donald Tusk that the UK was triggering Article 50. In reflecting on this period, the contributions also dwell on the history of UK–EU relations and give some hints as to how the rest of the EU has approached Brexit since March 2017.

The EU’s sheer size and diversity has meant that most analysis of the EU’s approach to Brexit to date has fallen back on offering a pan-EU view from Brussels, a focus on the big states such as Germany or France or a select sampling of certain member states, due to the consequences that Brexit holds for them – the most obvious case here being Ireland.

EU–UK Relations in Numbers