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Since the economic crisis unfolded in 2008, the European Union economic governance framework has been profoundly transformed from a legal perspective. The EU has adopted new tools, institutions and rules to tackle the changes and is arguably better prepared to combat any future crises. This book analyses the basic legal framework of EU economic governance and considers the economic underpinnings which underlie legal institutions in this area. It uses analytical dialectics as a method of analysis and the paradigm of 'law as credibility' as the main model through which the substantive parts of EU economic governance are accounted for. Important issues such as access, exit and expulsion from the euro, the independence of the European Central Bank, the Stability and Growth Pact, bail-outs to member states, and the EU's economic strategy are addressed in a clear, critical and innovative way.
European Union (EU) member states are not unusual in granting a role to parliaments in the consent stage of treaty making, but the increased involvement of legislatures since 1950 is striking nonetheless. Simple majority voting was the norm when it came to the parliamentary approval of the EU’s founding treaties. Today, many member states rely on reinforced majority voting and many more parliamentary chambers are involved. This chapter offers a systematic comparison of the changing constitutional rules and norms governing parliamentary involvement in EU treaty making in each of the Union’s member states. On the basis of this analysis, we present the first of our three ratification scales.
The involvement of national courts in EU treaty making was once controversial, but it is now commonplace. This chapter takes a closer look at the rise of courts at the consent stage of EU treaty making. It provides a detailed examination of changing constitutional rules and norms concerning the prior constitutional review of treaties in each of the EU’s twenty-eight member states. This analysis focuses, in particular, on the question of who, if anyone, can trigger such reviews. On the basis of this analysis, we present the third of our three ratification scales.
The European Union (EU) is an important test case for scholars of treaty making because the manner in which the EU and its member states make treaties has changed significantly since 1950. The EU’s founding treaties were negotiated by governments in a tightly sealed intergovernmental setting. Today, parliaments, the people and courts play a prominent role in the various stages of treaty making. This introductory chapter situates our study of EU treaty making within wider historical and scholarly contexts. It introduces our theoretical and methodological approaches and central argument.
This book considers two explanations for the rise of the people, parliaments and courts in European Union (EU) treaty making since 1950. The first follows Robert Putnam’s classic two-level game approach by asking whether governments are tying their hands to gain tactical advantages in treaty negotiations. The second sees the transformation of treaty making as a response to – and reflection of – the crisis of legitimacy facing the EU and its member states. This chapter recalls the logic of tying hands in two-level games before offering a trust-based perspective on the EU’s legitimacy problems. It considers – from these theoretical vantage points – why the constitutional rules and norms surrounding treaty making have changed and how national governments might respond to having their hands tied too tightly.
European Union (EU) treaty making was once dominated by Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs), but the European Parliament, national parliaments and the Court of Justice of the EU have gradually acquired a role in the negotiation stage. This chapter explores this partial eclipse of the IGC, drawing on official documentation and historical accounts of EU treaty negotiations from the Schuman Plan Conference in 1950 to almost a decade of treaty making under the Lisbon Treaty. Member states ultimately involved other actors, it is argued, to address problems of trust facing the Union and its member states. EU heads of state or government drove such changes, it is noted, while increasing their own grip on the processes through which EU treaties are negotiated.