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Activists Forever? explores the consequences of political involvement on an individual's life. While much of the research in this area has focused on the motivations of entire protests groups, the editors of this volume propose an approach that focuses on actors. This book examines political involvement's socio-biographical effects, or the ways in which political commitment generates or modifies dispositions to act, think, and perceive, in a way that is either consistent with or in contrast to the results of previous socialization. The contents explore what political involvement leads to rather than what causes involvement. Using a variety of case studies, this collection of essays provides global coverage with a focus on participation in major protests in the 1960s and significantly broadens our understanding by looking outside the United States. These essays look at the lasting effects of activists' knowledge, connections, and symbolic capital on their future participation in politics, as well as their personal and professional lives.
Previous studies have found similarities with presidential candidates or party leaders to be an important factor in explaining voting behaviour. However, with the exception of gender, few studies have structurally studied voter-candidate similarities in intra-party electoral competition. This study investigates the Belgian case and argues that voter-candidate similarities play a role in the decision-making process of citizens when casting preferential votes. Moreover, it investigates whether underrepresented groups, and especially women, are more guided by these voter-candidate similarities than overrepresented groups. To achieve this aim voter and candidate characteristics are modelled simultaneously. This enables an investigation of the decision-making process of voters while taking into account structural inequalities at the supply side. The results demonstrate that citizens are indeed more likely to cast preferential votes for candidates similar to themselves and that these effects are stronger for underrepresented groups. Hence, preferential voting could ultimately pave the way for better descriptive representation.
European law has come to influence almost all fields of national law, including administrative, constitutional, contract, criminal and even tort law. But what is the European Union? How does it work? How does it produce European law? This book uses a clear framework to guide readers through all core constitutional and substantive topics of EU law. New content includes: a Brexit chapter covering the negotiation process and the possible future relationships between the United Kingdom and the European Union, new EU private international law and EU criminal law sections, and extended coverage of delegated legislation, human rights and free movement of persons. All chapters reflect judicial and legislative practice up to 31st December 2017. Key features include case extracts accompanied by extensive critical discussion of the theoretical and practical aspects of EU law, over 100 figures and tables clarifying complex topics and a companion website with full 'Lisbonised' versions of cited cases and many extra materials.
Considerable research shows the presence of an economic vote, with governments rewarded or punished by voters, depending on the state of the economy. But how stable is this economic vote? A current argument holds its effect has increased over time, because of weakening long-term social and political forces. Under these conditions, short-term forces, foremostly the economic issue, can come to the fore. A counter-argument, however, sees the economic vote effect in decline, due to globalization. Against these rival hypotheses rests the status-quo argument: the economic vote effect remains unchanged. To test these claims, we estimate carefully specified models of the incumbent vote, at both the individual and aggregate levels. Western European elections provide the data, with particular attention to Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. Perhaps surprisingly, we find the economic vote to be stable over time, a ‘standing decision’ rule that voters follow in national elections.
Which of the new political parties that emerged in advanced democracies faded away and which ones managed to survive and why? Considering a party as dead once it ceases to nominate candidates in any elections, we develop two sets of hypotheses to account for party death derived from two conceptions of political parties. One conceptualizes parties as vehicles formed by career-oriented politicians eager to maximize individual rewards. Failure to deliver seats or government access is therefore expected to predict an earlier death. The other conceptualizes parties as societal organizations that serve representational functions valued in themselves by elites and members alike. This conception stresses the importance of roots in society or ideological novelty. Using survival analysis, we test our hypotheses in 17 advanced democracies based on a new data set covering 144 new parties from birth until their (potential) death. Arguments derived from both conceptions have significant support stressing the complexity of the drivers underpinning parties’ very existence.
Recent societal conflicts over immigration, free trade and EU membership testify to the controversiality of globalization in Western societies. Brexit, Trump, the refugee crisis, and the debate around transatlantic trade and investment partnership (TTIP) are clear illustrations of the salience of globalization in politics. Many argue that neoliberal ideology supports and drives globalization. This raises the question whether opposition to globalization is also ideological, and how. This contribution investigates the existence of ideologies of globalization. It does so presenting a novel rigorous version of Freeden’s analytical morphological approach to ideologies, with deductive conceptualization drawing on political philosophy combined with inductive correlational analysis at the level of individual arguments. It presents original representative claims analysis data on debates over climate change, human rights, migration, trade, and regional integration in the United States, Germany, Poland, Mexico, Turkey, the European Parliament, and the United Nations General Assembly between 2004 and 2011. It shows that we are witnessing the making of four ideologies of globalization: liberalism, cosmopolitanism, communitarianism, and statism. Each has its own distinctive grouping of concepts. Their emergence may solidify a globalization cleavage in Western societies, shape democratic politics for years to come, and affect the course of globalization itself.
The chapter provides an introduction to topic and its relevance, a summary of the argument and findings as well as a discussion of the core contribution. It also summarizes each chapter.
The chapter provides a discussion and a historical overview of the changing motives for EU governments to act responsively in EU negotiations. Employing a variety of different data sources at the national and the European level, I demonstrate that European incumbent governments are increasingly pressured to signal that their conduct in the European Union is responsive to the preferences of their citizens. In particular, incumbents are increasingly worried about their reelection chances because of the increasing partisan dealignment and electoral volatility. These governments dearly want to appear responsive to their electorates for this very reason, but they face mounting challenges to use policies at the national level to achieve this goal. At the same time, European integration has politicized domestically, and consequently EU level negotiations and policies have become electorally more relevant to domestic voters. In turn, they have become more likely to hold their governments accountable for their policy choices and the negotiation outcomes they can achieve in the EU.
The books concludes by evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical argument in light of the qualitative, experimental, and quantitative evidence. The chapter provides a discussion of the results in the context of the European Union, but also discusses the contributions of the findings in the broader context of comparative politics and international relations. While the conclusion provides a synthesis of the different parts of the book, and also discusses its relevance in a broader setting, the central theme focuses on its implications for the EU's current legitimacy crisis. In particular, I discuss how responsive governance in the shadow of national elections affects the democratic legitimacy of the EU, and what my results can contribute to the answer on how to fix this crisis.
In this chapter, I employ a unique data set on annual EU budget negotiations in the Council from 1970–2013 and test the main empirical implications of my argument using quantitative research methods. The analysis demonstrates that EU governments that face elections at home receive significantly larger budget shares than EU governments that do not face elections at home. Consistent with the theory, I show that signaling responsiveness has become more relevant with the historical politicization of the EU since Maastricht. In addition, these signals are particularly strong when elections are very competitive (i.e., when public support is low or uncertain, and when the economy is not doing well), when EU governments are able to secure the hidden cooperation of other EU governments, or when they use their formal bargaining leverage to influence the negotiation outcomes. With these findings, the chapter provides first evidence that EU governments try to signal before national elections that they are responsive to their citizens in European negotiations. Ialso use aggregated Eurobarometer data on citizens' approval of their national governments and analyze whether responsiveness in EU budget negotiations is relevant to voters' approval of their government.
The chapter analyzes whether governments signal responsiveness more broadly in the EU's legislative decision-making process. The findings suggests that the bargaining strategies and outcomes crucially depend on the electoral cycles at the domestic level. Governments that face elections signal that they are responsive to their voters: they are less likely to move from their initial bargaining position and they are more likely to achieve bargaining outcomes that are close to their ideal positions. Supporting the theoretical argument, I further find evidence that credit-claiming behavior becomes stronger when governments have ample motives and opportunities to posture. Consistent with my findings on the EU budget negotiations, governments are more likely to achieve successful bargaining outcomes when unemployment rates are high, and when they can use hidden cooperation to signal responsiveness. Whereas the likelihood of credit-claiming depends on motives and opportunities, this is not the case for position-taking and position-defending strategies.