The chapter provides an introduction to topic and its relevance, a summary of the argument and findings as well as a discussion of the core contribution. It also summarizes each chapter.

The chapter provides a discussion and a historical overview of the changing motives for EU governments to act responsively in EU negotiations. Employing a variety of different data sources at the national and the European level, I demonstrate that European incumbent governments are increasingly pressured to signal that their conduct in the European Union is responsive to the preferences of their citizens. In particular, incumbents are increasingly worried about their reelection chances because of the increasing partisan dealignment and electoral volatility. These governments dearly want to appear responsive to their electorates for this very reason, but they face mounting challenges to use policies at the national level to achieve this goal. At the same time, European integration has politicized domestically, and consequently EU level negotiations and policies have become electorally more relevant to domestic voters. In turn, they have become more likely to hold their governments accountable for their policy choices and the negotiation outcomes they can achieve in the EU.

The books concludes by evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical argument in light of the qualitative, experimental, and quantitative evidence. The chapter provides a discussion of the results in the context of the European Union, but also discusses the contributions of the findings in the broader context of comparative politics and international relations. While the conclusion provides a synthesis of the different parts of the book, and also discusses its relevance in a broader setting, the central theme focuses on its implications for the EU's current legitimacy crisis. In particular, I discuss how responsive governance in the shadow of national elections affects the democratic legitimacy of the EU, and what my results can contribute to the answer on how to fix this crisis.

In this chapter, I employ a unique data set on annual EU budget negotiations in the Council from 1970–2013 and test the main empirical implications of my argument using quantitative research methods. The analysis demonstrates that EU governments that face elections at home receive significantly larger budget shares than EU governments that do not face elections at home. Consistent with the theory, I show that signaling responsiveness has become more relevant with the historical politicization of the EU since Maastricht. In addition, these signals are particularly strong when elections are very competitive (i.e., when public support is low or uncertain, and when the economy is not doing well), when EU governments are able to secure the hidden cooperation of other EU governments, or when they use their formal bargaining leverage to influence the negotiation outcomes. With these findings, the chapter provides first evidence that EU governments try to signal before national elections that they are responsive to their citizens in European negotiations. Ialso use aggregated Eurobarometer data on citizens' approval of their national governments and analyze whether responsiveness in EU budget negotiations is relevant to voters' approval of their government.

The chapter analyzes whether governments signal responsiveness more broadly in the EU's legislative decision-making process. The findings suggests that the bargaining strategies and outcomes crucially depend on the electoral cycles at the domestic level. Governments that face elections signal that they are responsive to their voters: they are less likely to move from their initial bargaining position and they are more likely to achieve bargaining outcomes that are close to their ideal positions. Supporting the theoretical argument, I further find evidence that credit-claiming behavior becomes stronger when governments have ample motives and opportunities to posture. Consistent with my findings on the EU budget negotiations, governments are more likely to achieve successful bargaining outcomes when unemployment rates are high, and when they can use hidden cooperation to signal responsiveness. Whereas the likelihood of credit-claiming depends on motives and opportunities, this is not the case for position-taking and position-defending strategies.

The chapter utilizes an in-depth case study, which draws from in-person interviews with administrative and political elites in the German government, archival work, and secondary sources, to illustrate the likely electoral effect when hidden strategic delay fails. I trace the history of negotiations leading up to the first bailout in Greece in 2010 to analyze the electoral effects of EU negotiations in Germany. The case study is particularly interesting, because it is a case of “failed” delay. Due to a large segment of the population opposing a financial rescue package for Greece and an important regional election, the German government had attempted to delay a bailout to Greece until after the election, publicly stating that it opposed such a bailout. Because of an unexpected and very rapid deterioration of the economic situation in Greece and the Eurozone, the German government agreed to a bailout just a week before the election. The case provides us with a rare chance to analyze the counterfactual in a situation where the delay did not work. In this situation, my theory would predict the German government would lose public approval as a consequence. Supporting this, I demonstrate in the case study that voters were opposed to the bailout and punished the German government for its decision to pursue it.

The chapter offers a test of a central assumption of my theory that voters hold their governments accountable for responsive behavior at least when policy issues are politicized domestically. I use a survey experiment to analyze how publics respond to different signals of government responsiveness. To examine how voters respond to different signals of political responsiveness, and to assess the internal validity of the demand side of political responsiveness, I conducted two conjoint experiments that were embedded in an online survey of over 2,500 Germans in the fall of 2016 on two salient policy areas – whether to agree to another financial rescue package for Greece and whether to allow for more immigration of refugees and asylum seekers into the EU. I find that voters are more likely to vote for politicians if they present the voters' favored policy position, if they defend this position throughout the negotiations, and if they are successful in achieving their preferred outcome. Similarly, voters blame governments for pursuing unfavored positions, and for their inability to achieve favored negotiation outcomes. Signals of responsiveness matter for vote choice even though respondents could have easily chosen politicians based on their partisan ideology; a trait that tends to be one of the strongest predictor of vote choice in Europe.

The chapter offers an in-depth qualitative study of the negotiations over the EU financial framework for the period 2007-2013, which is based on both archival research and secondary resources. The case studyillustrates how governments signal responsiveness before elections: that is, how governments decide on what strategies to pursue, and how cooperation and conflict can shape the negotiations and the policy outcomes. The study focuses on national elections in three countries that represented opposite positions at the bargaining table, and illustrates the variety of ways that EU negotiations work in the shadow of national elections. EU governments that faced elections used several strategies to signal responsiveness to their constituents. Some tried to ensure increased benefits that would make them look successful at home (i.e., Germany and Poland), whereas others tried to delay the negotiations or agreements until after elections to avoid being blamed for their lack of success in defending national interests at home (i.e., United Kingdom). Some used their bargaining leverage against the interests of other EU governments, whereas others relied on the hidden cooperation with other EU member states to secure better deals. Some governments were more effective in achieving successful outcomes for their country, whereas others were less successful in doing so.

The chapter uses data on the timing of all legislative proposals that were negotiated in the EU between 1977 and 2009 to analyze the conditions under which EU members delay negotiations until after national elections as a strategy of blame avoidance. The results provide support for the notion that governments attempt to delay the adoption of legislative proposals until after the elections. Proposals that are negotiated close to national elections are significantly less likely to be adopted than proposals that are negotiated in non-election periods. Consistent with my argument, delays are particularly likely when the issues are highly conflictual and when EU members expect unfavorable and unresponsive outcomes. I show that the delay of particular proposals can even affect legislative tides in European negotiations, as long as a sufficient number of proposals within a given time period fall close to a national election.

The chapter develops the main theoretical argument about signals of responsive governance in the European Union. My definition of political responsiveness draws from typical definitions of responsiveness in democratic systems, and is adapted to fit the European context. To take into account signals of responsiveness at different stages in European cooperation, I focus on the willingness and ability of EU governments to signal both input and output responsiveness in EU negotiations. Governments want to signal to their electorate that they take positions that are in the constituents' interests, and defend these positions throughout the negotiation process. They also want to achieve negotiation outcomes that are favorable for their constituents. But even though all governments would like to appear responsive, not all governments are equally competent at achieving this goal because they have to navigate the collective decision-making system of the EU. To signal responsiveness, governments either use their formal and informal bargaining leverage or they seek reciprocal agreements with their EU counterparts.