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This chapter addresses the role that ‘consensus’ played in the development of the European Convention on Human Rights in the period up to the late 1990s. Its main focus is upon the case law; however, a running theme will also be how consensus played a broader role, in terms of there being a political will, or consensus, amongst the Convention States – those upon whose consent the progress of the Convention rested – to see the Convention develop. That political consensus was arguably grounded upon a shared vision and commitment of the States toward the idea of the European human rights supervision project. This ‘political consensus’ was in itself a vital ingredient for the success of the Convention system, projecting it forward.
One contested practice of the European Court of Human Rights is the role of an ‘emerging European consensus’, concerning alleged common ground among the States. The Court sometimes defends its ‘dynamic interpretation’ of the European Convention on Human Rights by such a consensus. A consensus may lead the Court to restrict the margin of discretion it accords a respondent State, or subject it to stricter scrutiny. The chapter assesses this consensus practice. A much-needed specification of the practice should draw on a normative account of why and where the Court should draw on a consensus, if at all. Section 1 sketches the consensus practice, Section 2 identifies several vague aspects. Section 3 considers critically several arguments offered in its favour. The practice does not render the interpretation more democratic.; and consensus toward one particular legislative solution is inappropriate. Consensus may however help discover hitherto unnoticed discrimination against groups.
This short introductory chapter to Part I analyses the new approaches to European consensus offered in the chapters of this Part of the book. It tries to systematise the key questions raised in the chapters and it critically considers the foundations of these approaches. In this summary, how the authors of the chapters define consensus is examined, what value they see in this method of interpretation, how it interferes with other tools of interpretation of the Convention and ultimately how consensus impacts the legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights.
This chapter examines the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ practice with respect to consensus interpretation. Contrasted with the well-settled practice of the European Court of Human Rights, one can see that the Inter-American Court’s practice seems to rely on consensus when it supports a progressive, teleological interpretation of human rights, rather than being primarily a legitimacy-building device. The chapter argues that the Inter-American Court’s selective engagement eliminates the latter possibilities of the consensus method of interpretation. Instead, the Court’s seeking legitimacy not from State parties, but other stakeholders, does not seem particularly concerned with legitimacy costs (even if it probably should).
Some concluding reflections on the various chapters in the book and some suggested pathways, inspired by these contributions, as to the right and best way to think about consensus in the context of the European Court of Human Rights.
This introductory chapter sets the scene for the book, explaining its tripartite structure and identifying the key questions addressed. The chapter offers a brief overview of European consensus as an interpretative technique, discusses the inherent limitations in the attempts to conceptualise it and normatively evaluate it, and provides some insights into the direction of travel that further study of European consensus may take.
This contribution has two interrelated aims. First, it seeks to contribute to the discussion about the conceptualisation of European consensus in the broad sense of the term, touching on questions about the what (does European consensus refer to?), where (does it feature?), how (is it used by the Court?), and why (is it used in this way?). Second, it invites critical reflections on the legitimacy quest of international courts, as informed by the balance of powers between a supranational court and the contracting States, and on how this impacts on the courts’ mandate. Special regard is due to the European Court of Human Rights’ interpretation techniques and its margin of appreciation doctrine. Having regard to a range of prominent judgments, the argument is made that the Court – in the absence of an explicit theory on the meaning and measurement of European consensus – shapes the strength of European consensus so as to shape the width of the margin of appreciation, following the Court’s perception of what States will accept. Ultimately, this contribution ponders what can be considered an acceptable role for European consensus in human rights review, balancing the Court’s mandate and its legitimacy concerns.
The use of European consensus to interpret the European Convention on Human Rights has generated criticism for, inter alia, being a tool that may disadvantage applicants belonging to minorities – a concern that is particularly relevant in Article 14 cases. The chapter argues that the weight the Court places on European consensus in such discrimination cases has been inconsistent. While in some cases the Court takes full advantage of the flexibility of the consensus tool to reinforce the minority status of the applicants and to narrow the margin of appreciation, in others, the existence or lack of consensus is seemingly the sole determining factor to the outcome of the application. The chapter employs the case law on discrimination against Roma as an example of the former approach, and same-sex marriage cases as evidence of the latter. After comparing these two approaches and identifying the inconsistencies in the application of consensus, the paper argues that the relationship between consensus and the minority status of the applicant must be better defined and more consistently applied across judgments that relate to minorities.
This contribution looks at the use of the ‘consensus’ argument in 140 amicus curiae briefs submitted by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights. The analysis reveals that a ‘consensus’ argument is often wielded with creativity in their submissions, both regarding the types of consensus and the sources on which they are based. NGOs’ briefs, therefore, contribute to a further expansion of different types of consensus manifestations. Considering the multiple criticisms levelled at the consensus argument, this contribution also observes that NGOs’ briefs sometimes lack methodological rigour and rarely provide for a justification as to the relevance of the consensus argument. This might come as a surprise, coming from actors generally thought as putting forward a universalist understanding of human rights, and this chapter proposes a few hypotheses by way of explanation.
European consensus is increasingly used by the European Court of Human Rights in its judgments concerning the United Kingdom. It is assumed that this method of decision-making increases the legitimacy of the Court’s judgments and assists with implementation at the national level. In this chapter this assumption is subjected to close examination and it is revealed that consensus-based reasoning has little impact on legitimacy or acceptance where the issue is highly politicised. There is also the danger that overuse of consensus-based reasoning by the Court may alienate traditional supporters of the Court and lead some to question its legitimacy and continuing usefulness.
Should prisoners have voting rights? Should terminally ill patients have a right to assisted suicide? Should same-sex couples have a right to marry and adopt? The book examines how such questions can be resolved within the framework of the European Convention of Human Rights. 'European consensus' is a tool of interpretation used by the European Court of Human Rights as a means to identify evolution in the laws and practices of national legal systems when addressing morally sensitive or politically controversial human rights questions. If European consensus exists, the Court can establish new human rights standards that will be binding across European states. The chapters of the book are structured around three themes: a) conceptualisation of European consensus, its modus operandi and its effects; b) critical evaluation of its legitimacy and of its outputs; c) comparison with similar methods of judicial interpretation in other legal systems.