Clearly the PRC would be – and was – against any significant moves by the UK in the meantime. Unlike the usual colonial template for the emergence of independent entities, whereby self–government was introduced on the way to formal independence, Hong Kong was no Malaya or Nigeria. By the terms of the Declaration itself, even from the UK’s perspective, what was involved was the ‘restoration’ to China of Hong Kong, which now was to be accompanied by nothing far short of a calculated provocation. The Joint Declaration had not provided, or promised, democratic reform. It was to be promised subsequently in China’s Basic Law for post–handover Hong Kong. Equally the Joint Declaration did not prevent explicitly the UK from commencing democratic reforms once Hong Kong was lost to it. That was the door wherein Britain went.

Building on the discussion of the Belt and Road Initiative, the chapter offers a comprehensive inquiry into China’s economic statecraft. It first argues that the analogy often drawn between the BRI and the Marshall Plan misconstrues contemporary China’s economic statecraft. It then examines how the interest communities and partnership diplomacy serve as mechanisms for China’s economic influence. The next section considers how, with Chinese economic ascendancy in Asia, a semblance of Chinese centrality in Asia is emerging. The following section looks at China’s global influence effect in terms of the international discourse on its great-power standing as well as its drive for technical standard-setting in key industries. Lastly, the chapter discusses the built-in limits of the BRI and broad limitations of the Chinese economic statecraft in the twenty-first century.

This chapter shows how the paternalist policy style impacts social policy implementation at the provincial level and below. The top-down approach in paternalist provinces produces relatively standardized social policy but reduces opportunities for officials to innovate and tailor policies to local conditions. Fiscal transfers from the center often foster corruption and dependency in these provinces. Thus, many paternalist provinces have experienced rising inequality despite targeted policies and transfers. While focusing on health policy in paternalist provinces, this chapter also discusses the impact of paternalism on education, poverty alleviation, and housing.

Mixed provinces exhibit elements of pragmatism in addition to elements of paternalism. They tend to be more politically open than paternalist provinces but more restrictive than their pragmatist counterparts. This combination produces a policy style in which provincial leaders take a top-down approach to policymaking and standardize new policies across the province yet tend to be relatively frugal in their social policy allocations both in relative and per capita spending. In some cases, mixed provinces are caught in the middle: they do not generate as much revenue as coastal provinces, but they are not poor enough to be eligible for certain fiscal transfers from the central government. As a result, the budget for social policy in these provinces is often among the smallest in the country. This chapter focuses on health policy in mixed provinces, while also discussing the impact of a mixed policy style on education, poverty alleviation, and housing.