We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected]
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This chapter explores the ideas and political movements of the CYP in warlord China through three sections. The first section characterizes the CYP’s ideology by its cultural conservatism, political intellectualism, and integral nationalism based on a combination of transformed federalism and corporatism specific to the Chinese sociopolitical context, particularly through the ideological debates of the CYP founders with Communists between 1924 and 1927. The second section delves into the CYP’s mass political movements of different types. Finally, as a precondition for the CYP’s rapid development in north China and Manchuria, the third section explores how the CYP created friendly political environments by collaborating with leading regional warlords in different periods.
This chapter examines the CYP’s local construction in Sichuan between 1926 and 1937. Through its organization of the students and teachers in educational circles, its work with local gentry through the case of the Relief Committee (Anfu weiyuanui), and its quest for the support of local warlords, this chapter highlights the CYP’s successful local operations in Sichuan in this period. By so doing, this chapter helps readers understand the regional variations of China’s state construction during the Republican era.
The CYP founders were at one time inclined to the anarchist social revolution, widely debated during the May Fourth era in the late 1910s. Contrary to the Communist members in the Young China Association, however, they turned to national socialism in the wake of the May Fourth.This chapter traces the early journeys of Zeng Qi and Li Huang from Sichuan, Chen Qitian and Yu Jiaju from Hubei, and Zuo Shunsheng from Hunan as May Fourth youths, and highlights on what ideological grounds they reached out again to Zhang Taiyan and Liang Qichao for spiritual guidance in the early 1920s. In opposition to current historiography, this chapter does not discuss the May Fourth as a significant rupture, but rather takes it as bridge to the rise of the Chinese radical right, establishing a nationalist “Confucian China” out of the civilizational “Confucian China.”
The Anti-Extradition Bill protests in 2019 culminated in an unprecedented level of violence that departed from the established peaceful social struggles in Hong Kong. This paper examines the evolution of protest repertoires by analysing the interactions between protesters and state actors on a local and global scale. A dataset is presented to show the type, frequency and distribution of tactics. This paper reveals that structural and cultural changes as well as activists’ cognitive, affective and relational transformations at the micro- and meso-levels were pertinent to tactical radicalization. Cognitively, militant tactics were pragmatic responses to state-sponsored violence and police violence. They were also the affective outcomes of grief and anger. These processes were intertwined with the relational dynamics that advocated horizontal mobilization and that shaped, and were shaped by, the political-economic interactions between China and the West. The result was an extensive use of violent tactics alongside innovations in non-violent tactics.
Changes to the legal profession in the post-Mao years led to significant changes regarding courts and judicial autonomy that have been deeply intertwined with the stratification of living standards, dramatic growth of the Chinese legal profession, and emergence of significant income differentials for lawyers across urban localities, especially after 1992. This details these dynamics, which are consistent with this book’s ecological explanation of court reform, which posits that the structure and process of socio-legal forms have an interactive relationship; I also provide evidence in the second part of this chapter suggesting that these dynamics in the social forms of law influence the substance of law, for example, the decisions of court leaders in urban China to increase transparency of their courts and enhance the statutory basis of their judicial decisions. These developments also indicate expansions in judges’ overall decisional autonomy, as discussed in Chapter 1.
The strategic judicial responses to the Case Quality Assessment System (CQAS), detailed in the previous chapter, provide necessary context for understanding how the stratification of local markets for legal services in urban China can affect court reform and the decisional autonomy of judges. Variation in the development of the legal profession in different urban localities is the focus of this chapter, which also traces the major spatial and temporal shifts that have influenced lawyers’ career choices, and in turn, judicial designs in urban China. A spatially informed explanation of socio-legal processes and their structural effects begins with the higher salaries, standards, and status available to lawyers in “high-end” local legal service markets; the temporal analysis concentrates on how these dynamics were made possible by national recommitments to liberalizing reforms in the late twentieth century and then accelerated in the early twenty-first century.
Despite the consolidation of Communist power and the encouragement of President Xi Jinping’s cult of personality, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has also surprisingly moved to expand judicial autonomy during Xi’s term in office. This chapter discusses that the years leading up to sweeping reforms to enhance the autonomy of China’s judges, local promotion systems for mid-ranking judges in some case study localities featured enhanced transparency, competition, and the routinization of judicial promotion procedures that departed from previous systems of direct nomination and appointment by local Party leaders. Based on nearly two years of in-country fieldwork, I present the broad contours that the expansion of the legal profession pressured judicial leadership to enact these and similar changes, a theory and approach that both challenges and contributes to the extant literature on comparative court politics and Chinese judicial politics.
This chapter provides a comprehensive account of the main argument of the book and its supporting evidence and limitations, describes developments in China’s judicial politics since 2016, and then discusses implications of this book for future research in the field. Framed in the context of nationwide reforms to enhance judicial autonomy between 2014 and 2016, which I find were motivated by a constellation of similar local concerns including judicial “brain drain,” rapid increases in the cost of living in urban China, and the major transformations of the legal profession particularly prevalent in high-end localities elucidated throughout this book.
At the outset of the post-Mao reform era in 1978, there was little semblance of an organized legal profession in China – certainly not in a formal sense. The globally unprecedented growth of the legal profession in the subsequent decades, however, led to significant changes in China’s courts and its broader legal system, and this chapter begins telling the story of how these changes occurred. What began as a state-led efforts to construct a professional class of lawyers largely began in the early 1980s transformed into a privatized expansion effort closely related to inbound foreign investment into China. In the early twenty-first century, the growth of the legal profession pressuring courts to recalibrate various institutional practices related to judicial autonomy, particularly in urban areas, in order to stem the attrition of judges leaving courts for law firm employment opportunities.