Beginning in 2014 there was a series of controversies before violent protests erupted in connection with the Hong Kong Government’s 2019 Extradition Bill, which in turn led to the National Security Law of 2020. Often discrete events do not suggest a larger catastrophe until it is too late. The controversy over the State Council’s 2014 white paper, even the ‘Occupy’ Protests of that year, the strange ‘missing booksellers’ controversy in late 2015 and the 2017 West Kowloon Terminus issue each did not in themselves suggest the sweeping legislative changes that would take place by 2020.

The negotiations following Margaret Thatcher’s visit had commenced on 12 July in the former Austro–Hungarian Legation Building in Beijing. As we saw, Cradock may have taken the view that China's leaders were incorrigible, ineducable, and blinkered by dogma and nationalistic pride, but to the Chinese side, Britain’s negotiators demonstrated a ‘colonialist and imperialist attitude’, one which was ‘outmoded, lacking in reality and would get nowhere’. Mid–way through the formal negotiations in July and August of 1983, between the second round in late July and the third round in early August, the Chinese delegation was to present publicly its position on the indivisibility of sovereignty and administration, i.e. that there is no resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong if Britain were to continue to administer it. China also unveiled the 12 principles (or ‘Twelve Point Plan’) for Hong Kong.

The Hong Kong S.A.R. enjoys delegated treaty powers and relations and has in this sense ‘its own’ treaty regime; it retains on top of that certain colonial treaty features which were present before the handover, such as the continued application of the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or ‘ICCPR’ notwithstanding that the PRC is not party to the ICCPR; finally, certain PRC treaties nonetheless apply to Hong Kong while Hong Kong is at the same time exempt or excluded from other PRC treaties. That at least was what the PRC and the UK agreed. Insofar as the application of PRC multilateral treaties to Hong Kong is concerned, these have been notified to third countries through a letter by the PRC to the United Nations Secretary–General as treaty depository.

Clearly the PRC would be – and was – against any significant moves by the UK in the meantime. Unlike the usual colonial template for the emergence of independent entities, whereby self–government was introduced on the way to formal independence, Hong Kong was no Malaya or Nigeria. By the terms of the Declaration itself, even from the UK’s perspective, what was involved was the ‘restoration’ to China of Hong Kong, which now was to be accompanied by nothing far short of a calculated provocation. The Joint Declaration had not provided, or promised, democratic reform. It was to be promised subsequently in China’s Basic Law for post–handover Hong Kong. Equally the Joint Declaration did not prevent explicitly the UK from commencing democratic reforms once Hong Kong was lost to it. That was the door wherein Britain went.

Building on the discussion of the Belt and Road Initiative, the chapter offers a comprehensive inquiry into China’s economic statecraft. It first argues that the analogy often drawn between the BRI and the Marshall Plan misconstrues contemporary China’s economic statecraft. It then examines how the interest communities and partnership diplomacy serve as mechanisms for China’s economic influence. The next section considers how, with Chinese economic ascendancy in Asia, a semblance of Chinese centrality in Asia is emerging. The following section looks at China’s global influence effect in terms of the international discourse on its great-power standing as well as its drive for technical standard-setting in key industries. Lastly, the chapter discusses the built-in limits of the BRI and broad limitations of the Chinese economic statecraft in the twenty-first century.

This chapter shows how the paternalist policy style impacts social policy implementation at the provincial level and below. The top-down approach in paternalist provinces produces relatively standardized social policy but reduces opportunities for officials to innovate and tailor policies to local conditions. Fiscal transfers from the center often foster corruption and dependency in these provinces. Thus, many paternalist provinces have experienced rising inequality despite targeted policies and transfers. While focusing on health policy in paternalist provinces, this chapter also discusses the impact of paternalism on education, poverty alleviation, and housing.