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This paper examines China's water governmentality in advancing the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC). It attends to how discourses, used as a political instrument, are framed, justified and contested in the reshaping of international hydrosocial territories. China's official and popular discourses present the LMC as promoting multilateral politics, economic benefits and social integration, while they obscure polarizing politics, external interventions and regional conflicts. Using strategies of positive publicity first, top-down communication and mutual empathy creation, these discourses aim to deflect attention away from controversies and geopolitics in the region to construct governable hydrosocial territories. However, in a transnational context where the Chinese state cannot unilaterally control geographical imaginaries, alternative discourses depict China as a “hydro-hegemon” that poses threats to downstream countries. The discursive dichotomy reflects multiple ontologies of water and power struggles in international river governance, bringing regional stability and sustainable development into question.
The chapter focuses on how the European Union (EU) and European powers have struggled to navigate between transatlantic alliance and growing Eurasian connectivity, which is energized recently by China’s rise. When first proposed by the EU in 2016, “strategic autonomy” was about the European search for independent capacity to militarily balance against the Russian power. When applied to Asia, the concept is mainly about Europe’s choice in a region, which is fast becoming the center of the global political economy but is increasingly dominated by US-China competition. With the EU labeling China “a systemic rival,” the multipolarization behind European strategic autonomy has hardly unfolded as envisioned by Beijing. The chapter first examines Europe’s limited presence in Asian security and addresses the unfulfilled transatlantic potential under the US rebalance towards Asia during the Obama administration. Next it analyzes the European search for strategic autonomy amid the emerging great-power competition in the Indo-Pacific. Finally it examines the geoeconomics associated with the Belt and Road Initiative and Europe’s broad relationship with China.
The chapter looks at China’s approach to regional and global institutions. It starts with a quick review of Asian regionalism first led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Japan, focusing on how Asian regionalism facilitated China’s socialization in the 1980s–1990s. The chapter then explores China’s multipronged strategy in dealing with its evolving institutional environment. First, China has pursued a latent regionalism, which is centered on East Asia, relies on the BRI, and takes advantage of ASEAN-led mechanisms to mitigate geopolitical trends harmful to its interests. Second, China has undertaken limited institutional innovation, opting instead to promote its targeted reformist agenda towards the Bretton Woods economic order. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the only institution China created and has led, demonstrates its preference of reform over innovation concerning the global economic order. Finally, to project influence, China has relied on its leadership positions in regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the United Nations system, including the World Health Organization. Taken together, China’s institutional tactics show that instead of offering an alternative Chinese order, China has been mainly interested in reshaping the institutional settings of its international environment.