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This paper explores the genesis and growth of the current Chinese wireless network infrastructures by pulling together the historical threads of two telecommunications infrastructures: first, the development of the first-tier inter-provincial optical backbone, the “Eight Vertical and Eight Horizontal Fibre-optic Grid,” in the late 1980s and 1990s; and second, the deployment of two broadband-access cellular networks, the third-generation (3G) cellular networks in 2008 and the fourth-generation (4G) networks from 2013 to now, which constitute the wireless network's edges. I insert the development of Chinese wireless networks since the 1980s into the interconnected global technological environment, contextualizing the infrastructure deployment in the history of Sino-American technological cooperation and competition, traversing the final decade of the Cold War era (the 1980s), the dual global expansion of economic neoliberalism and informational technology since the 1990s and the crisis of global capitalism since 2008. This historical inquiry reconciles two historical (meta-)narratives that are not always compatible with each other – the Chinese narratives grounded on the overarching concept of Chinese post-socialism, and the narratives in Western discourses that often evoke Cold War/post-Cold War dialectics. This paper examines the global distribution of wireless network infrastructures on the basis of commercialization, technology transfers and trades of techno-commodities across borders, challenging the reduced depiction of the Chinese wireless network as an extension, or an exception, to the West-centred techno-capitalist system.
This research report measures changes in China's public diplomacy after a May 2021 collective study session of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo. The session examined the country's global communications strategy and fuelled speculation about what might change in China's external communications, particularly with regard to its “wolf warrior” diplomats. Combining hand-coding and quantitative text analysis, we develop and validate a measure of “wolf warrior diplomacy” rhetoric and apply it to over 200,000 tweets from nearly 200 institutional, media and diplomatic Twitter accounts. Using a difference-in-difference research design, we evaluate if the session led to a noticeable change in the tweets of diplomats based in OECD countries. After the announcement, PRC diplomats in the OECD moderated their tweets in comparison to non-OECD diplomats, but we do not detect a major re-orientation of PRC communication strategies. These findings have relevance for scholars of Chinese foreign policy, nationalism and public diplomacy.
Drawing on more than a decade of fieldwork, The Logic of Governance in China develops a unified theoretical framework to explain how China's centralized political system maintains governance and how this process produces recognizable policy cycles that are obstacles to bureaucratic rationalization, professionalism, and rule of law. The book is unique for the overarching framework it develops; one that sheds light on the interconnectedness among apparently disparate phenomena such as the mobilizational state, bureaucratic muddling through, collusive behaviors, variable coupling between policymaking and implementation, inverted soft budget constraints, and collective action based on unorganized interests. An exemplary combination of theory-motivated fieldwork and empirically-informed theory development, this book offers an in-depth analysis of the institutions and mechanisms in the governance of China.
Chapter 5 offers the first systemic examination of the strategic considerations that underpin an emerging trend that has not yet gained enough attention in either academic or policy circles – the growing role of counterterrorism in China’s foreign policy. China needs to enhance its force’s counterterrorism capabilities, protect the growing number of Chinese nationals and assets abroad, and build an image as a responsible international stakeholder. However, these goals conflict with China’s desire to minimize grievances arising from its economic activities, which could lead to the country becoming a target for international terrorist groups. Empirical analyses of original data on the counterterrorism joint military exercises held by China and foreign forces indicate that China is highly cautious and selective when it comes to these exercises. Military counterterrorism cooperation tends to closely follow Chinese economic investments.
Chapter 4 documents and analyzes China’s domestic policies aimed at countering Uyghur violence. We discuss the broad securitization of Xinjiang, including budgets and the forces involved. Drawing on the best available data on Uyghur-related political violence and China’s public security expenditure in Xinjiang, we present the first rigorous assessment of the feedback loop of violence and repression in Xinjiang. We demonstrate that government repression is not systematically followed by increased Uyghur violence and that increased security expenditures are excessive and inefficient, especially in the long run. This chapter also traces the recent strategic shift in China’s policies from postattack securitization toward actively and forcibly promoting ethnic mingling and “de-extremification.” While this policy reorientation has been attributed to Beijing’s intolerance of instability, our analysis shows that it is a result of a more complex set of competing priorities within the Chinese government.
Chapter 1 sets the stage for our study, introducing both the political violence and repression endemic to Xinjiang. We provide a brief account of the recent history of Xinjiang and the Uyghurs to contextualize the current situation before introducing the book’s motivations, arguments, and structure.
Chapter 6 concludes the book with a discussion of the future of Xinjiang as well as the implications for both China and US foreign policy. Given the ongoing US presence in Afghanistan, the complexities of US relations with Pakistan, and the increasing presence of Chinese nationals around the globe, it is easy to imagine how a seemingly manageable precipitating event could lead to outsized effects.
Chapter 2 provides an in-depth examination of the political violence occurring within and emanating from Xinjiang. We introduce the most comprehensive data on terrorism in China assembled to date, which we draw upon to argue that the nature of terrorism and counterterrorism in China has evolved in three fundamental ways. First, the nature of this violence has evolved over time from overt armed rebellions and riots to covert attacks. Second, the movement has shifted from separatism to a hybrid of ethnonationalism and jihadism. Third, the official response has partially transitioned from framing terrorism as a domestic issue cloaked by sovereignty to an issue of foreign affairs with increasing prominence in China’s diplomacy and military policy. This chapter also introduces the militant organizations that have been active in the conflict, details trends in violence, and assesses linkages between militants in Xinjiang and competent jihadist organizations active in Central Asia.