For anyone who studies modern Chinese political thought, the revival of interest in federalism is one of the most striking features of the current scene. It has been particularly visible abroad in the wake of the Tiananmen massacre, and its most conspicuous spokesman has been the former director of the Institute of Political Science of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Yan Jiaqi. In remarks delivered to the First Congress of Chinese Students and Scholars in the United States, held in Chicago in July 1989, Yan proposed a Chinese “federation” (lianbang guojia) having a democratic system as the best hope both for reforming China's internal politics and ultimately for resolving the problems of Hong Hong, Taiwan and Tibet. He made similar remarks in other speeches in America and at the founding meeting of the Federation for Chinese Democracy, of which he was elected president, held in Paris in September 1989. Some other mainland Chinese intellectuals, among them Ge Yang, former editor-in-chief of Xin guancha, have supported such views, as have members of the China Spring movement. A recent official denunciation of such views is testimony to their growing influence.

These are surprising developments. Federalist programmes for China have long been seen as little more than relics of an era which ended in the 1920s. As the Cihai entry for liansheng zizhi (one of the phrases for the idea in Chinese) puts it, while certain warlord politicians of the 1920s believed that federalism was the appropriate political system for China, “after the Guangdong revolutionary government launched the Northern Expedition in 1926, no one advocated federalism again.”

Four decades have passed since the 1949 Communist Revolution divided China into two political entities. These culturally similar polities adopted different ownership systems and divergent development strategies in their early decades, but they have witnessed nearly identical elite transformations and convergent social transitions in recent years.

At their recent respective 13th party congresses, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) both promoted a great number of new leaders who can be identified as “technocrats” to top Party positions. In the Mainland, this new group of leaders has only recently come to power, while in Taiwan it emerged at the beginning of the 1970s and has continuously increased in number since then. This is a new generation of leadership, whose socialization, educational background, political experience and value orientation differ significantly from those of the old elite.

Parallel to this leadership transformation, a profound social transition has also occurred in both Mainland China and Taiwan. The Chinese people in both places have made great economic achievements and have moved rapidly from isolationism towards mercantilism. This is particularly obvious in Taiwan, but it can be seen to a lesser degree in the Mainland. Less noted, but equally significant, has been the change in their political systems. In Mainland China, although the June Fourth Incident (1989) has impeded the momentum of political reform, the relationship between state and society has been significantly altered. It seems that political reform, which includes institutionalization, decentralization and liberalization, will continue its zigzag but progressive journey.