1 Chiu, Hungdah, Survey of Recent Developments in China (Mainland and Taiwan, 1985–1986) (Baltimore: University Of Maryland, 1987), p. 1.Google Scholar The Mainland and Taiwan use different romanization systems for Chinese names and terms. In this article, we use the pinyin system for names and terms within Mainland China. For people and organizations from Taiwan, or whose publications are from Taiwan, we use the Wade–Giles system accepted there.

2 See North, Robert and Pool, Ithiel, Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952)Google Scholar; Simon, Denis Fred, “Chinese-style S & T modernization: a comparison of PRC and Taiwan approaches,” Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Summer 1984), pp. 87–109CrossRefGoogle Scholar; White, Lynn, “The political effects of resource allocations in Taiwan and Mainland China,” The Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. 15 (October 1980), pp. 43–66.Google Scholar

3 Putnam, Robert, “Elite transformation in advanced industrial societies,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3 (October 1977), pp. 383–412.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 This discussion is based on Lee's, Fred Chwan Hong disseration, The Recruitment of Elites in the Republic of China: A Case Study in the Social Utility of Education (The University of Oregon, 1983), p. 2.Google Scholar

5 Min, Nan, “Pouxi Taiwan de shehui bianqian” (“An analysis of societal transition in Taiwan”), Guang jiavjing (Wide Angle) (Hong Kong), No. 172 (January 1987), p. 96.Google Scholar

6 In 1984 electronic products made up the largest proportion of Taiwan's exports. For further discussion of this subject, see Chu-Yuan, Teng, “T'ai-wan ching-chi ch'eng-chang te jui-kurdquo; (“A review of economic development in Taiwan”), in Ch'ai, Sung-lin and Hsieh, Chin-Ho (eds.), Ts'ai-chin feng-yün (Changes in Finance) (Taipei, 1986), p. 7.Google Scholar

7 This discussion draws heavily on Fan-Sho, Nan,Chung-kuo tsu-yu chu-yi de ts’uihou pao-lei (The Last Fortress of the Chinese Liberalism) (Taipei: Four Seasons Press. 1979)Google Scholar; and Huang, Mab, Intellectuals Ferment for Political Reforms in Taiwan, 1971–1973 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1976).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 This discussion is based on Chang Chün-hung, Wo de shen-szu yu fen-tou (My Recollection and Struggle) (Taipei); and also on Nan Fang-sho The Last Fortress, and Mab Huang, Intellectuals Ferment.

9 Mab Huang, Intellectuals Ferment, p. 23.

10 Ta-hsueh tsa-chih, Vol. 6, No. 36, p. 14; and Vol. 8, No. 48, p. 37.

11 Ibid. Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 2–4.

12 See Hsia chao (Summer Tide) (Taipei), Vol. 1. No. 8, p. 24; Ta-hsueh tsa-chih, Vol. 1, No. 5, pp. 10–13; Vol. 5, No. 5, pp. 3–4; and Vol. 8, No. 48. p. 37.

13 Ta-hsueh tsa-chih, Vol. 8, No. 48, p. 37.

14 Mab Huang, Intellectuals Ferment, p. 21.

15 See Siming, Ai, “Chung-hua min-guo te ch’uan-li ho-hsing” (“The power core of the Republic of China”), in Tou-shih ch'uan-li ho-hsin (An Analysis of the Power Core) (Taipei: Fengyun Press, 1985), pp. 35, 45–53.Google Scholar

16 For discussion of the role of Li Huan, see Ken, Lu, “Lun Li Huan,” Ch';üan-min (The People), No. 21, 25 August 1987, pp. 16–18.Google Scholar

17 The term “technocracy” was translated as the “dictatorship of engineers” in Chinese before the 1980s. See Yiwei, Jiang, “Jishu yu zhengzhi” (“Technology and politics”), Xuexi (Study), No. 16 (1957), p. 12.Google Scholar Denis Fred Simon has argued that the Cultural Revolution was launched due to Mao's concern with the increasing technocratic tendency. See Simon, Denis Fred, “China's S & T intellectuals in the postMao Era,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies (Summer 1980), p. 62.Google Scholar

18 According to the PRC's 1982 census, only 4% of members of the CCP attained higher educational degrees. Most (52.3%) had received only primary school education or were illiterate.

19 Xiaoping's, Deng speech is in Hongqi (Red Flag), No. 4 (1978), pp. 9–18.Google Scholar

20 Quoted from Tsou, Tang, “Back from the brink of revolutionary-‘feudal’ totalitarianism,” in Victor, Nee and David, Mozingo (eds.), State and Society in Contemporary China (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 67.Google Scholar

21 Ribao, Renmin (People's Daily), (4 November 1986), p. 1.Google Scholar

22 Wang Zhaoguo is now governor of Fujian province and Ding Guangen is an alternate member of the Politburo.

23 Quoted from Wang, Ting, “An analysis of the PRCs future elite: the third echelon,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies (Summer 1985), p. 22.Google ScholarHu's, words are originally in Renmin ribao (People's Daily), 19 August 1982.Google Scholar

24 Hu's, speech is in Hongqi (Red Flag), No. 6 (1983), pp. 7–12.Google Scholar

25 Hongweibing ziliao (Red Guard Publications) (Washington, D.C.: Center for Chinese Research Materials, Association of Research Library), Vol. 6 (1975), p. 1681.

26 For Fang Lizhi's technocratic view, see Daobao, Shijie Jingji (The World Economic Herald), 24 November 1986, p. 3Google Scholar and Lizhi, Fang, Women zhengzai xielishi (We are Writing History) (Taipei: Commonwealth Publishing Co., Ltd, 1987).Google Scholar

27 For detailed study of the diversification of the Mainland intellectuals in the postMao era, see White, Lynn With Cheng, Li, “Do open doors open minds? Reform and intellectuals” (presented in the 17th Sino-American Conference on Mainland China (Taipei: 5–11 June 1988)Google Scholar or the revised edition with the title “Diversification among Chinese intellectuals” (a collection of the conference papers is forthcoming from the Westview Press).

28 ribao, Renmin (People's Daily) (overseas edition), 11 October 1987, p. 1Google Scholar and 29 June 1986, p. 1.

29 From 1949 to 1985, 65% of all PRC university graduates concentrated in engineering (37%), medicine (13%), agronomy (8%) or other natural sciences (8%). Calculated from raw data in Social Statistics Office, State Statistical Bureau, (Zhongguo shehui tongji ziliao, 1987) (Chinese Social Statistics, 1987) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chuban she, 1987), pp. 134–35.

30 Ibid. p. 125. Another 18% had been to junior middle schools. Fully 24% of the 1982 population over the age of 12 was deemed illiterate or semi-illiterate.

31 For a detailed discussion of the origin and the evolution of the the theory of technocracy, see Akin, William E., Technocracy and the American Dream (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977)Google Scholar; and Cheng, Li and White, Lynn, “The thirteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: from mobilisers to managers,” Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 4 (April 1988), pp. 371–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

32 Quoted from Putnam, Robert, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1976), p. 57Google Scholar; see also McDougall, W., “Technocracy and statecraft in the space age-toward the history of a saltation,” American Historical Review, No. 4 (1982), p. 1023.Google Scholar

33 Quoted from Lee, Recruitment of Elites, pp. 1–2.

34 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, “America in the technetronic age,” Atlantic Community Quarterly (Summer 1968), p. 175.Google Scholar

35 For a further discussion of social mobility in traditional China, see Ping-Ti, Ho, The Ladder of Success in Imperial China: Aspects of Social Mobility, 1368–1911 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 92–93.Google Scholar

36 See Yanan, Wang, Zhongguo guanliao zhengzhi yanjiu (A Study of Chinese Bureaucratic Politics) (Shanghai: Time and Culture Press, 1948)Google Scholar; Ping-Ti, Ho, The Ladder of Success; Fei Xiaotong (Fei Hsiao-tung), China's Gentry (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953)Google Scholar; Chung-Li, Chang, The Chinese Gentry: Studies on their Role in Nineteenth Century Chinese Society (Seattle: University Of Washington Press, 1955)Google Scholar; Gucheng, Zhou, Zhongguo shehui zhi jiegou (The Structure of Chinese Society) (Shanghai: New Life Press, 1935)Google Scholar; Marsh, Robert, The Mandarins: The Circulation of Elites in China, 1600–1900 (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1961)Google Scholar; Ching-Chien, Chang, Chung-kuo wen-kuan chih-tu shih (The History of Chinese Civil Service System) (Taipei: Chinese Culture Press, 1955)Google Scholar; and Tung-Tsu, Chu, Local Government in China under the Ch'ing (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962).Google Scholar

37 Ho Ping-ti, The Ladder of Success, p. 256.

38 North and Pool, Kuomintang, p. 324.

39 Fei Xiaotong, China's Gentry, pp. 67–68.

40 Ho Ping-ti, The Ladder of Success, p. 259.

41 Wen-Hui, Tsai, Patterns of Political Elite Mobility in Modern China, 1912–1949, PhD dissertation (University of California, Berkeley), p. 71.Google Scholar

42 The distinction between the first part (1912–28) and the second part (1929–49) of the period was a transition from the domination mainly by military elites to the domination by both military elites and party officials. In a recently published article, Hu Ch'iu-yuan described this transition as from the military rule to the party rule. See Ch’iu-Yüan, Hu, “Wo-kuo min-chu yun-tung tso-che chih yaun-ying yu chu-ch'en chih tao” (“The causes of the failure of the Chinese democracy movement and the road of success”), Chung-hua tsa-chih (China Magazine), No. 270 (January 1986), p. 12.Google Scholar

43 For the most detailed study of this subject, see North and Pool, Kuomintang.

44 See Scalapino, Robert, “Introduction,” in Robert, Scalapino (ed.), Elites in the People's Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972)Google Scholar; and also Ying-Mao, Kau, “Patterns of recruitment and mobility of urban cadres,” in Lewis, John W. (ed.), The City in Communist China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), pp. 97–121.Google Scholar

45 Quoted from Tang Tsou, “Back From the brink,” p. 62.

46 Price, Don K., The Scientific Estate (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 19.Google Scholar

47 See Chün-Yü, Tu, “Sun Yun-suan chueh-ch’i di cheng-chih yi-yi” (“The political implications of the rise of Sun Yun-suan”), T’ou-she chieh-pan tung-hsiang (An Analysis of the Power Succession) (Taipei), p. 116.Google Scholar

48 Some scholars have argued that technocrats existed and played an important role as early as in the 1950s in both the Mainland and Taiwan. For this observation on the Mainland, see Halpern, Nina Phyllis, Economic Specialists and the Making of Chinese Economic Policy, 1955–1983 (PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, 1985)Google Scholar; and, on Taiwan, see Ai Siming, “The power core,” p. 36. But during that time, the number of specialists in power was very small for both places. In the Mainland, these specialists tended to be restricted to scientific service bureaus such as the State Statistical Bureau. But specialists today occupy leadership positions that cover almost all sectors. Furthermore, they apparently did not, then, have a clear sense of their identity as technocrats.

49 For further discussion of Max Weber's argument, see Talcott, Parsons (ed.), Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964)Google Scholar; and the critical review by Joel Aberbach, D., Putnam, Robert and Rockman, Bert A., Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).Google Scholar

50 Alberbach et al., Bureaucrats and Politicians, p. 3.

51 Parsons, , Max, Weber Ch. iii; and Kau, Ying-Mao, “The urban bureaucratic elite in Communist China: a case study of Wuhan, 1949–65,” in Barnett, A. Doak (ed.), Chinese Communist Politics in Action (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969).Google Scholar

52 Bell, Daniel, The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 348.Google Scholar

53 For further discussion of this viewpoint, see Haas, Ernst B., Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 11.Google Scholar

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55 See Morgenthau, Hans, Scientific Man Versus Power Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 168.Google Scholar

56 Quoted from Gilpin, Robert, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

57 See Bachman, David, “Differing visions of China's post-Mao economy,” Asian Survey, Vol. 26 No. 3 (March 1986), p. 316.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

58 For further discussion of this argument, see Suleiman, Ezra, “The myth of technical expertise: selection, organization, and leadership,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 10, No. 1 (October 1977), pp. 137–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

59 See Milne, R. S., “Technocrats and politics in ASEAN countries,” Pacific Affairs (autumn 1982), p. 409.Google Scholar

60 Putnam, “Elite transformation,” p. 404.

61 For a detailed study of this subject, see Holheinz, Roy and Calder, Kent, The Eastasia Edge (New York: Basic Books, 1982), p. 57Google Scholar; and also Hahn, Bae-ho and Kim, Kyutaik, “Korean political leaders (1952–1962): their social origins and skills,” Asian Survey (July 1963), pp. 312–13.Google Scholar

62 See Burham, James, The Managerial Revolution (New York: John Day, 1941), p. 171Google Scholar; Djilas, Milovan, The New Class:An Analysis of the Communist System (New York: Prederick A. Praeger Inc., 1957)Google Scholar, and also Djilas, Milovan, The Unperfect Society: Beyond the New Class (London: Unwin Books, 1969), p. 19.Google Scholar

63 Bell, Daniel, “The end of ideology revisited,” Government and Opposition, Pt I, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 1988)Google Scholar and Pt II, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 131–50 and 321–31).

64 The classic on the use of ideology is Mannheim, Karl, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1936).Google Scholar

65 For a detailed discussion of conflicting views on this subject, see Bianco, Lucien, Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915–1949 (Stanford: Stanford University, 1971)Google Scholar, including its bibliography that cites the contribution of Chalmers A. Johnson.

66 For detailed discussion of the subject, see Hsiung, James Chieh, Ideology and Practice: The Evolution of Chinese Communism (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1970), pp. 110–25Google Scholar; and Solomon, Richard H., “From commitment to cant,” in Chalmers, Johnson (ed.), Ideology and Politics in Contemporary China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1973), pp. 47–77.Google Scholar

67 For the debate on Marxism and humantarianism, see Zehou, Li, “Makeshizhuyi de chulu” (“The outlet for Marxism”), Mingbao yuekan (Mingbao Monthly) (Hong Kong), No. 262 (October 1987), pp. 13–16.Google Scholar

68 Ibid. p. 13.

69 This discussion is based on Holbrooke, Richard, “East Asia: the next challenge,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 4 (Spring 1986), p. 734CrossRefGoogle Scholar: and also Bell, “Ideology revisited,” p. 327.

70 See Scalapino, Robert, “An overview of developments in the Pacific-Asian region” (paper for the second Conference of the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley and the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, Berkeley, 15–18 September 1986), p. 13.Google Scholar

71 See Lee, Kuo-Hsiung, “Taiwan experience: an analysis on socio-political factors,” Proceedings of the Eighth Asian-Pacific Cultural Scholars' Convention, Taipei, 21–27 July 1986, pp. 195–201.Google Scholar

72 In his study of Taiwan's 1985 election, John Copper notes candidates could do everything with the exception of advocating communism and the independence of Taiwan. See Copper, John, “Taiwan's 1985 election,” Asian Affairs (Spring 1986), p. 33.Google Scholar In fact, very few people in Taiwan, including thetang-wai leaders, as Lucian Pye notes, favour communism. See Pye, , “Taiwan's development and its implications for Beijing and Washington,” Asian Survey, Vol. 26, No. 6 (June 1986), p. 621.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

73 See Putnam, Robert, “Studying elite political culture: the case of ‘ideology,’” The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXV, No. 3 (1971), pp. 654–78Google Scholar; Meyer, Alfred G., “Theories of convergence,” in Chambers, Johnson (ed.), Change in Communist Systems (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 313–41Google Scholar; and Selinger, Martin, Ideology and Politics (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1976), p. 55.Google Scholar

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77 In his study of politics in Taiwan, Lucian Pye notes that the KMT leaders continue to seek the moral justification of having an ideology, because they are not comfortable dealing directly with power unless it is cloaked in a moralistic philosophy. See Pye, “Taiwan's development,” p. 621.

78 For the technocratic orientation in international affairs, see Xuesen, Qian, “Scientific-social revolution and reform,” Beijing Review, No. 11 (16 March 1987), pp. 14–17Google Scholar and No. 12 (23 March 1987), pp. 21–23; and also Shaozhi, Su, “Developing Marxism under contemporary conditions,” in Su, Shaozhiet al. (eds.), Marxism in China (Nottingham: Russell Press Ltd, 1983), pp. 13–52.Google Scholar

79 Hsu Hsin-liang once said that most talented people in modern society received advanced training, and almost all came from certain elite universities – in the United States, Harvard, Yale and Princeton; in Britain, Oxford and Cambridge; and in Japan, Tokyo University. He then concluded that if political recruitment could be institutionalized on a merit basis, there would be less trouble for Taiwan's political development. See Hsin-Liang, Hsu, Tang-jen pu-lang (Let's Do It) (Taipei: Long Bridge Press, 1977), pp. 114–15.Google Scholar

80 See Chou, Yangsun and Nathan, Andrew, “Democratizing transition in Taiwan,” Asian Survey, Vol. 27, No. 3 (March 1987), pp. 277–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

81 For detailed study of this subject, see Harding, Harry, China's Second Revolution: Reform after Mao (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 99–100.Google Scholar

82 For further discussion on the ownership reform, see Ren-Wei, Zhao, “On the current economic structural reform in China,” paper presented at the conference on Chinese Economic Relations, University of California, Berkeley, 23–30 August 1988.Google Scholar

83 See Goldman, Marshall and Goldman, Merle, “Soviet and Chinese economic reform,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 3 (1987–1988), p. 569.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

84 Harding, Harry, “Marx, Mao and market,” The New Republic, 7 October 1985, p. 36.Google Scholar

85 For detailed studies of this subject, see Chalmers Johnson, “Political institutions and economic performance: the government-business relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan,” and Chen, Edward K. Y., “The newly industrializing countries in Asia: growth experience and prospects,” both in Robert, Scalapinoet al. (eds.), Asian Economic Development (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1985), pp. 63–89Google Scholarand pp. 131–56.

86 Huai-En, P'eng, Chung-hua min-kuo cheng-chih t'i-hsi de fen-hsi (An Analysis of the Political System of the Republic of China) (Taipei: Times Press, 1985), p. 59.Google Scholar

87 Galbraith, John Kenneth, The New Industrial State (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969)Google Scholar, quoted from Stabile, Donald, Prophets of Order (Boston: South End Press, 1984), p. 235.Google Scholar

88 See Ho, Samuel P. S., “Economics, economic bureaucracy, and Taiwan's economic development,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Summer 1987), pp. 226–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar and also P'eng Hyai-en, Analysis of Political System, p. 161.

89 This discussion is based on Chang, Shuhua, Communications and China's National Integration, Occasional Papers Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies (School of Law, University of Maryland), No. 5 (1986), p. 124.Google Scholar

90 Daniel Bell has the same argument, see Bell “The end of ideology revisited,” p. 76.

91 See Brzezinski, Zbigniew and Huntington, Samuel, Political Power: US/USSR (New York: The Viking Press, 1963), p. 429Google Scholar; and also Doyle, Michael W., “Liberalism and world politics,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar, which nonetheless suggests that modern liberal countries have not gone to war against each other.

92 For a further discussion of this topic, see Jialin, Zhang, “Economic cooperation between the two sides of the Straits in the context of Taiwan's economic dependence on the United States,” paper presented at the conference on Chinese Economic Relations, University of California, Berkeley, 23–30 August 1988.Google Scholar

93 See Renmin ribao (People's Daily) (overseas edition), 7 September 1988, p. 1.