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The Min clan from Yŏhŭg near Yŏju in Kyŏnggi Province gained prominence at the end of the Chosŏn Dynasty with the decline of the Andong Kim clan. Viscount Min Yŏng-hwi (1852–1935; pen name, Hajŏng) and his sons, Taesik and Kyu-sik, turned their energies mainly to finance, with interests in agriculture and industry as well. The father had been appointed to the board of the Hanil Bank in August of 1912. Within three years Min Yŏng-hwi won executive control, relinquishing the presidency to his son Tae-sik only in 1920. The family retained executive responsibilities and the major block of shares in the Hanil and its successor from 1931, the Tongil Bank. Aristocratic status and long experience of high political office served the family well in relations with the state and other Korean investors during the colonial years. Education abroad was a further advantage for the younger of the sons, Kyu-sik, a graduate of Cambridge University. Min Tae-sik's son, Pyŏng-do graduated from Keio University before returning to Korea for a career in the Bank of Chōsen and the Tongil.
A study of Min family enterprise opens up the world of banking in the turbulent years of colonial rule. One can feel the competition by looking to Min family efforts to take over the Hanil Bank, then other smaller Korean banks, and finally to sustain ownership if not control of the Hanil's successor, the Tongil Bank.
Japanese authorities gave wide publicity to the economic and social benefits of colonial rule in their Annual Report on Reforms and Progress in Chōsen. They too promoted an image of benign capitalism, but without nationalist concerns for indigenous ownership or an autonomous national economy. Yet even the Korean businessmen who might profit from such growth found themselves scrambling to survive and succeed in a closely supervised environment dominated by Japanese investment. The prominence of military leaders selected to direct the colony and the stringency of their control were evidence of the strategic importance of the Korean peninsula: a buffer against continental aggression and a base for expansion into Manchuria and China. The state never wavered in its commitment to security and control, to economic development of the peninsula as a self-sufficient colony within the empire, and later to establish Korea as a forward base for expansion into the Japanese-controlled territory of Manchukuo. The government-general kept a tight rein on an often hostile Korean populace fiercely proud of their own cultural traditions and long accustomed to domestic self-rule as an independent nation within the Chinese orbit. They denied Koreans political participation while encouraging a closely supervised role in the economy.
The colonial state has been aptly characterized as growth-oriented and interventionist in economic affairs, promoting the peninsula as a base for mineral, agricultural, and eventually manufactured exports.
Pak Hŭng-sik pleaded ignorance when accused of cooperation with the Japanese colonial rulers: “I was a businessman unversed in politics.” Unversed perhaps in nationalist politics, Pak was certainly adept in persuading the government of his credibility and hardly shy about his contribution to the growth of commerce on the peninsula. The Min brothers, Kim Yŏn-su, and Pak proved themselves masters at the practical business ideology necessary to gain government support and a share in the domestic marketplace. They faced a challenge in the colony not only of nationalist identity under alien rule, but also of capitalist enterprise in a feudal society. Byron Marshall wrote of “business ideologies” as “ideas expressed by or on behalf of the business class with the manifest intent of creating attitudes favorable to private capitalism.” Cogent ideologies are necessary to support largescale ventures, particularly in the early stages of capitalist development. Local capitalists could find no moral justification for the pursuit of private profit in their own Korean Confucian tradition. The absence of earlier ideologies complicated immediate tasks such as persuading landowners of transfer capital from agriculture to commercial and industrial investments. Add to this the fact that ideologies carried the further burden of somehow legitimating indigenous enterprise under the political rule and economic domination of Japan, and you can sense the complexity of their task.
The considerable increase in educational attainment of Chinese women from virtual complete illiteracy 50 years ago to current levels can be traced systematically for the first time on the basis of the 1982 census of China and a large sample survey of the same year. Until very recently we had known only the broad outlines of this major social transformation. Although even the newly available data are imperfect, their significance is illustrated by their strong and consistent association with such vital facts of life as the age at which women marry and the number of children they bear. Educational levels can be shown to have varied with degree of urbanization and rural development from the earliest days of the People's Republic.
Major regions of China have distinctive educational histories. In all regions examined here, however, the course of educational change was affected to a greater or lesser degree by such major historical events as the great famine, the Cultural Revolution and the post-Mao reforms. It is now possible to measure with some precision the influence of these events on educational progress. This paper utilizes census and survey data to describe change in female education nationally and for four major regional populations from 1952 to 1982. Because it is plausible that the educational trends and differentials are related to other aspects of Chinese social, political and economic history, they are presented here in some detail.
Our findings can be summarized as follows:
1. The rise of female education occurred mainly in two periods the 1950s to 1958, and the late 1960s to mid 1970s.
Recent studies of China's economic system have focused, unsurprisingly, upon the nature and progress of the reforms. As a byproduct of these studies, however, many Chinese writers seem to have settled upon a common characterization of the pre-reform system. One writer summarizes key elements of this characterization as follows
Thirty-seven years have passed since the Korean War ended in July 1953. The Korean War, which was one of the most dramatic events of the cold war, resulted not only in huge casualties on the two sides, but also in a deep wound in Sino–American relations which took more than two decades to heal. Vast amounts of research have been done on the war, but one important aspect–the motivation behind the decision of the People's Republic of China to enter the war – remains mysteriously masked, or at least unconvincingly explained.
Why did Beijing involve itself in a military conflict with the United States, the world's most powerful country, at a time when the newly established regime needed to be consolidated? What were the factors that led the Chinese to decide that they had to enter the war on behalf of North Korea? It has been generally accepted in the west that the Chinese were motivated by a combination of Chinese xenophobic attitudes, security concerns, expansionist tendencies and the communist ideology. To what extent is this perspective historically correct? What is the Chinese perspective on this issue?
The purpose of this article is to try to explain from a Chinese perspective the motivation of China's leaders in making such a momentous decision, as revealed by Chinese sources recently released in China.
Historical Roots
China's decision to intervene in the Korean War on behalf of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) had its historical roots. It was the natural result of gradually developed animosity between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and what it regarded as the foreign imperialist powers, especially the United States, and of the fear of a threat from the latter.