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China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisted*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Hao Yufan  and
Zhai Zhihai
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Extract

Thirty-seven years have passed since the Korean War ended in July 1953. The Korean War, which was one of the most dramatic events of the cold war, resulted not only in huge casualties on the two sides, but also in a deep wound in Sino–American relations which took more than two decades to heal. Vast amounts of research have been done on the war, but one important aspect–the motivation behind the decision of the People's Republic of China to enter the war – remains mysteriously masked, or at least unconvincingly explained.

Why did Beijing involve itself in a military conflict with the United States, the world's most powerful country, at a time when the newly established regime needed to be consolidated? What were the factors that led the Chinese to decide that they had to enter the war on behalf of North Korea? It has been generally accepted in the west that the Chinese were motivated by a combination of Chinese xenophobic attitudes, security concerns, expansionist tendencies and the communist ideology. To what extent is this perspective historically correct? What is the Chinese perspective on this issue?

The purpose of this article is to try to explain from a Chinese perspective the motivation of China's leaders in making such a momentous decision, as revealed by Chinese sources recently released in China.

Historical Roots

China's decision to intervene in the Korean War on behalf of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) had its historical roots. It was the natural result of gradually developed animosity between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and what it regarded as the foreign imperialist powers, especially the United States, and of the fear of a threat from the latter.

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 121 , March 1990 , pp. 94 - 115
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1990

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References

1 See Whiting, Allen, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision To Enter the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 2–13.Google Scholar Whiting comprehensively explored the question and reached many conclusions which are still widely accepted in the west.

2 Cohen, Warren I., “The United States and China since 1945,” in Cohen, Warren I. (ed.), New Frontiers in American East Asian Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. 130–46.Google Scholar

3 For the background to American policy towards China 1945–49, see Tsou, Tang, America's Failure in China, 1941–1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963)Google Scholar; Cohen, Warren I., America's Response to China: An Interpretive History of Sino-American Relations (New York: Wiley, 1971)Google Scholar; Dulles, Foster Rhea, American Foreign Policy Toward the Communist China (New York: Thomas Crowell, Co, 1972)Google Scholar; Blum, Robert M., Drawing the Line, The Origins of the American Containment Policy in East Asia (New York: Norton, 1982)Google Scholar; Stueck, William U., The Road to Confrontation, American Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947–1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981).Google Scholar

4 Tang Tsou, America's Failure, pp. 443–95.

5 The US$54 million was extended from the unexpended fund of the China Aid Act of 1948. It was adopted by Congress as an amendment to the European recovery bill allocating to the “non-Communist area of China.” See Dulles, American Foreign Policy, p. 36.

6 Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Mao-Zedong) (Beijing: People's Press, 1968), Vol. 4, p. 301.

7 Ibid. p. 5.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid. p. 426.

10 From interviews. In conducting this research, the authors have had several important interviews with relevant people who, because of personal sensitivity, refused to be identified. Since their sources, insisted on anonymity, the authors can only attribute their sources as “from interview.”

11 See Mao's, Chairman address on 11 April 1957, cited in Study of Party History Materials (Beijing: 1982)Google Scholar, Vol. 22, No. 13.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid. p. 14.

14 See “On the people's democratic dictatorship: Soviet Union our best teacher ”(Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1958); or Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. IV (Beijing: Foreign Language Press 1961), pp. 413–15 and 417.

15 See the China White Paper, issued by the United States Department of State in August 1949 under the title United States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944–1949 (Department of State Publication 3573, Far Eastern Series 30).

16 The CCP's soldiers and cadres invaded the American Embassy in Nanjing, molested consular officials in Shanghai and Mukden (Shenyang), seized the American consul's property in Beijing and jailed Consul-general Angus Ward in Mukden.

17 See Zongyun, Zi, Origin and Development of American China Policy (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1987), pp. 255–58.Google Scholar

18 The PLA's three strategic offensive campaigns occurred in Liaoshen, Pingjin and Huaihai in late 1948 and early 1949. In them almost two million of the KMT forces were annihilated; see Major Events of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (Beijing: Military Academy, 1985), p. 213.

19 See Selected Works of Chairman Mao on Military Affairs (internally circulated), p. 328.

20 Xiaolu, Chen, “China's policy towards the United States, 1949–1955,” a paper presented at the Conference on Sino-American Relations, 1945–55, Beijing, 19–25Google ScholarOctober 1986, pp. 3–5.

21 Xu, Yao, From Yalu River to Panmunjon (Beijing: People's Press, 1985), p. 2.Google Scholar

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23 Yun, Chen, Selected Works of Chen Yun (Beijing: People's Press, 1982), pp. 307–10.Google Scholar

24 Ibid. p. 310.

25 Chen Xiaolu, “China's policy,” p. 6.

26 See Rongzhen, Nie, Nie Rongzhen's Memoir (Beijing: Jiefangyjun chubanshe, 1984), Vol. 3, pp. 721–22.Google Scholar

27 Ibid. p. 722.

28 From interview.

29 Yao Xu, From Yalu, pp. 6–14.

30 From interviews.

31 From interviews.

32 Kim Il-Sung made this request to Beijing in January 1950; see Nie Rongzhen, Memoir, p. 744.

33 Ibid. p. 744.

34 Yao Xu, From Yalu, p. 22.

35 Department of State Bulletin Vol. 22, No. 574 (3 July 1950), p. 5.

36 Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs (ed.), Oppose U.S. Occupation of Taiwan and “Two Chinas” Plot (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1958), p. 3.

37 Ibid. pp. 5–6.

38 Ibid.

39 Major Events, p. 315.

40 Xinhua Monthly, May 1951, p. 12.

41 See Nie Rongzhen, Memoir, p. 734.

42 Yao Xu, From Yalu, p. 15.

43 Ibid. p. 22.

44 Ibid. p. 17.

45 As early as July 1950, United States officials began talking about crossing the 38th parallel; by the end of September, there was consensus about it. See Foot, Rosemary, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950–53 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985).Google Scholar

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47 Yao Xu,From Yalu, pp. 17–18.

48 Ridgway, Matthew Bunker, The Korean War (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967).Google Scholar

49 Acheson's response was that “Chou [Zhou]'s words were a warning, not to be disregarded, but, on the other hand, not an authoritative statement of policy.” See Whiting,China Crosses the Yalu, pp. 96 and 110.

50 Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, p. 51.

51 Ibid. p. 52. This assertion is supported by documents in the Foreign Relations of the United States; see telegram from the American ambassador to India, Henderson, 27 September 1950.

52 Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, Vol. 2, p. 52.

53 Ibid.

54 Mao on Military Affairs, p. 213.

55 Chiang Kai-shek announced on 1 August 1950 that the talk between him and MacArthur had laid the foundation for “Sino-American co-operation” and ”final victory” against the CCP. Then, on 26 August, MacArthur publicly urged that Taiwan be turned into a United States defence stronghold. See Congressional Quarterly Inc., China: U.S. Policy Since 1945 (Washington: 1980), p. 91.

56 From interviews.

57 From interviews.

58 Chen Xiaolu, “China's policy,” pp. 12–13.

59 Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, Vol. 2, p. 51.

60 Yao Xu, From Yalu, p. 22.

61 Kim Il-Sung also sent a telegram to Stalin on the same day (from interviews).

62 From interviews.

63 Yao Xu, From Yalu, p. 20.

64 See “Study on enemy on Korean battlefield,” compiled by the CPV's War Experience Study Committee (internally circulated).

65 Yao Xu, From Yalu, p. 20.

66 See General Peng Dehuai's Memoirs (Beijing: 1981), p. 326.

67 See Mao Zedong on Military Affairs, p. 351.

68 Zhou Enlai's speech to CPV Conference. Cited by Yao Xu, From Yalu. p. 22 fn. 1.

69 China Crosses the Yalu, pp. 151–58.

70 Yao Xu, From Yalu, pp. 23–25.

71 CCP Central Committee, “Instruction on current issue propaganda,” 26 October 1950.

72 Ibid.

73 Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu.

74 CCP Central Committee, “Instruction.”

75 Selected Works of Chen Yun, 1949–1966 (Beijing: People's Press, 1982), p. 112.

76 Peng Dehuai, Memoirs, pp. 257–58.

77 Chen Xiaolu, “China's policy,” p. 15.

78 Mao Zedong on Military Affairs, p. 345.

79 From interviews.

80 From interviews.

81 Yao Xu, From Yalu, p. 25.

82 Yao Xu, “Peng Dehui's contribution in commanding the CPV in the Korean War,” Research Materials for Party History (Dangshi yanjiu ziliao), Issue 1, 1982.

83 From interviews.

84 From interviews.

85 From interviews.

86 From interviews; this was also released from “Conversation of Chen Yi on April 16, 1964,” cited in Yao Xu, From Yalu, p. 22, fn. 4.

87 From interviews.

88 From interviews.

89 From interviews. This was also indicated in Nie Rongzhen,Memoir, p. 737: ”October 13, Comrade Mao Zedong and the CCP Central Committeereaffirmed the necessity of sending troops to Korea.”

90 See Nie Rongzhen,Memoir, p. 737.

91 From interviews.

92 Selected Works of Chen Yun, p. 99.

94 Yao Xu, From Yalu, pp. 25 and 30.

95 See Guangzheng, Hu, “Wise decision and great achievement: on decision to enter the Korean War,” Research on Party History (Dangshiyanjiu), Issue 1, 1983.Google Scholar

96 See Peng Dehuai, Memoirs, p. 324.

97 Ibid. p. 30.

98 Ibid.

99 Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 5, pp. 649–52.

100 Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, p. 130.

101 Yao Xu, From Yalu, p. 31.

102 Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, pp. 130 and 132.

103 Yao Xu, From Yalu, pp. 39–40.

104 From interviews.

105 From interviews.