The China ruled over by General Secretary of the CCP Xi Jinping since 2012 has come a long way from the divisions and weakness of the early 20th century. It is now recognized by all as an up-and-coming superpower capable of rivalling the US and putting its mark on international order. It seems eager to do so, especially in Asia, its immediate surrounding which it often calls its ‘periphery’ (zhoubian). In this chapter and the two following ones, we will examine how the traditional ideal of hierarchical order outlined earlier in this book, in the transformed shape it took during China’s encounter with the modern society of nation states, continues to impact the country’s foreign policy in Asia to this day. We will focus mainly on the contemporary period dominated by the figure of Xi Jinping, but will also trace back some of the features of China’s vision for order today to their origins in earlier periods of the history of the People’s Republic, namely the Maoist period (1949–1978) and the 30 years following the beginning of reform and opening under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping (1979–2008).

There is close to a consensus among analysts on this threefold division of the history of the PRC. This is certainly how Xi Jinping himself wishes to portray his country’s trajectory. He presents himself as the most transformative Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping at least, and promotes his own ‘thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era’ (xin shidai Zhongguo tese shihui zhuyi sixiang) accompanied by a new ‘principal contradiction’ to succeed that of the reform era, in conformity with the CCP’s Marxist ideological framework. Considering the CCP’s determination to shape the narrative of China’s ‘road to rejuvenation’ under its leadership, the official line advanced by the General Secretary and his team carries significant weight.

Many outside observers have in fact adopted similar demarcation lines between the era dominated by Mao Zedong, that launched by Deng Xiaoping and the current one (for example, Amako, 2014; Economy, 2018; Minzner, 2018).

To demonstrate how China’s imperial past still shapes its foreign policy today requires first determining precisely which ideas and practices have carried over and in what form. The previous chapter explored how the aspiration to establish a hierarchical world order coursed through the foundational texts of Chinese political philosophy – and outlined the analytical framework for the rest of this book in the process. This chapter and the next examine how their ideas translated into practice and in what shape they were inherited by Chinese statesmen of the modern era. Here, we conduct a broad overview of Chinese statecraft over the course of the long imperial era, aiming to highlight what elements of the ideal of hierarchical order shone through most frequently and consistently in the imperial court’s dealings with the outside world.

We will emphasize three points in particular. First, Chinese statesmen remained steadfastly attached to the idea that maintaining an all-encompassing hierarchy centred on the Son of Heaven was the only path to order and that his superior moral qualities justified his exalted position. They did not falter even when faced with situations where the empire’s ability to assert its superiority was either in doubt or simply non existent, and where the emperor strayed very far from Confucian virtues. In such cases, they employed various rhetorical techniques to reconcile reality with their ideal of hierarchical order. Second, the role of ritual in maintaining this order went much beyond the reception of tribute and the granting of imperial titles to forge suzerain– vassal relations with other polities, although these were indeed the most common and favoured ritual institutions. A large part of this chapter will be dedicated to an analysis of the broader universe of Chinese techniques of ‘rule through ritual’ (lizhi), and to their purpose and function. Third, it was well understood throughout the imperial era that the power to ‘rectify names’, to awe through military might, and to offer economic benefits to those who followed ritual rules were essential tools for obtaining compliance with the Chinese vision of hierarchical order.

This chapter demonstrates the interplay between domestic and international ideas about birth control and abortion in Republican China (1912–1949). Eugenic discourses linking individual health to national strength and modernity gained currency in the early 1920s. Margaret Sanger’s visit to China in 1922 further fueled elite preoccupation with using contraception to improve the “quality” of the population, while reformers called for an end to social ills, such as abortion, child abandonment, and infanticide. Mirroring the blending of Chinese and foreign eugenic thought, the medical language used to describe birth control merged a primarily traditional Chinese medical discourse with Western and Japanese scientific terminology. Despite their prominence in intellectual circles, many of the high-level arguments for and against birth control had little direct impact on everyday reproductive practices.

Like their predecessors, Communist officials initially placed strict restrictions on birth control and abortion, encouraging high fertility rates. Focusing on the early years of the People’s Republic from 1949 until the Great Leap Forward, this chapter shows that even in this constrained environment, literature on sex and birth control continued to be published, promoting disparate narratives on sexuality and fostering diverse local contraceptive practices. The need to more fully mobilize women’s labor led to a gradual loosening of birth control limitations. Yet, the availability of information about sex, as well as access to birth control, abortions, and sterilizations, differed dramatically according to location, class, and education level.

This chapter clarifies why blunt force regulation is so distinctive. It begins by outlining two underlying logics regulatory enforcement, namely, “rules-based” regulation (which prioritizes effectiveness) and “risk-based” regulation (which prioritizes efficiency). Drawing on case details, it then illustrates how blunt force regulation fits into neither category, offering neither efficient nor effective regulation in the long-term. Instead, it represents an unusual combination of indiscriminate enforcement (which devalues compliances) and arbitrary but inflexible enforcement (which increases regulatory distrust and business uncertainty). This raises the question: Why blunt force regulation?

During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) and the Sent-Down Youth Movement (1968–1980), the latter bringing millions of urban youth to the countryside, the city and the countryside converged in unprecedented ways. Focusing on the period from 1966 until the establishment of the One Child Policy in 1979, this chapter uses rare court records, medical guides, and memoirs to analyze the evolving tensions among national directives, local policy implementation, and grassroots sexual realities. Although the deployment of minimally trained “barefoot doctors” helped integrate state-led family planning into the rural healthcare system, local authorities used the court system to arbitrarily police abortions. By creating unprecedented opportunities for sex among unmarried youth with limited access to prophylactics, the state paved the way for the contemporary reliance on abortion as a primary tool for family planning.

This chapter argues that the Chinese leadership is trying to transition out of blunt force regulation by increasing investments in 1) conventional regulatory institutions, which offer more efficient, sustainable pollution control, and 2) bottom-up enforcement, where citizens are used as “fire alarms” to strengthen the threat of conventional enforcement institutions.Using a case study of antipollution protests in a wealthy Chinese city – a case that, at the outset, appeared likely to succeed at improving government enforcement – this chapter examines how the state’s ambivalence to civil society activism closes off channels for effective bottom-up enforcement. Further interview evidence reveals that as an authoritarian state, Chinese officials fear the accountability mechanisms (such as a free press, independent judiciary, and community activism) that make bottom-up enforcement so effective in other countries. These limitations have pushed the leadership to repeatedly return to blunt force solutions, suggesting that it is not just a transition phase.

This chapter probes the short- and long-term costs of blunt force regulation. Case studies and local news reports show that workers do protest, businesses do resist, and local bureaucrats do publicly criticize the short-term nature of blunt force solutions. How does the state guard against the political risks of blunt force regulation? Using two cities as case studies – one wealthy and developed, and the other poor and industrial – this chapter shows how the state concentrates the costs of blunt force pollution reduction on the groups that are the least able to push back. It targets smaller, private firms or industries that rely on temporary, transient labor. These strategies are effective at preventing unrest, but exacerbate inefficiencies in the economy and may complicate efforts to reduce pollution in the future.